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1Introduction: Critical Ruptures
Martin Holbraad, Bruce Kapferer and Julia F. Sauma
The unsettling effects of rupture, understood as a radical and often force-
ful form of discontinuity, are central to current perceptions of a world 
in turmoil. How far might a sense of rupture – of a world that is serially 
breaking with itself – be an occasion to transform conceptions of social 
and political transformation? And how might the ruptures and fissures 
that lie at the heart of such experiences of turmoil instigate a break in the 
way we think about them? This volume casts a sharp focus on rupture 
as the active ingredient in some of the most defining experiences of our 
time, including the rise of populist politics, the corollary impulse towards 
protest and even revolutionary change, as well as moves towards violence 
and terror, and the responses that these moves elicit. The volume’s cen-
tral contention is that a concern with different experiences of rupture lies 
at the heart of these diverse phenomena. Gaining a handle on the ways 
the world around us is changing, therefore, demands paying attention to 
how burgeoning forms of rupture, some of them familiar (e.g. populism, 
protest, revolution), others apparently new (e.g. global/virtual specta-
cles of terror, natural disasters, responses to environmental catastrophe) 
are constituted, experienced, and even desired for their own sake.
One of this volume’s prime concerns is therefore to expose what, 
after Spinoza, we call the ‘dual aspect’ of rupture: while rupture oper-
ates as an inherently negative moment – a critical cut or ‘switch-point’ 
(Weber 1930)1 that instigates a significant break with existing con-
ditions – by the same token it can act as a positive or dynamic impulse 
towards escape, redirection, reconstitution and sometimes renewal. 
In our conceptualization, then, ruptures are moments at which value 
emerges through a break with something. Focusing on the co-implication 
of emergence and negation in times of rupture, we suggest, allows us to 
break away from conventional functionalist orientations (e.g. that link 
continuity with change) or those of a dialectical or transformational kind 
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that beg questions as to the values of what is to come. It also allows us to 
steer in a new direction analyses that tend to view change as a piecemeal 
affair undergirded by continuities of structure and process (e.g. Sahlins 
1985; Latour 1999), as well as a more recent inclination to celebrate dis-
continuity as the moment in which the new might emerge (e.g. Badiou 
2003; Robbins 2004, 2007, 2010; cf. Humphrey 2008).
By thematizing rupture as a radical, sometimes violent and even 
brutal form of discontinuity, the volume lends a harder edge to contem-
porary discourses, both in social theory and public debate and policy, 
couched in terms of novelty, collaborative creativity and emergence. At 
the same time, sharpening the analytical focus onto questions of rupture 
serves to counter the politically freighted tendency to view contemporary 
upheavals through the prism of ‘crisis’ (see also Roitman 2013). Taking 
a longer view, the volume’s emphasis on the dual aspect of rupture res-
onates with Victor Turner’s focal concern with the mutual relationship 
between disruption and reconstitution in the phenomena he treated as 
‘liminal’ (Turner 1969; 1975) – a notion that continues to hold a spell 
over generations of anthropologists, albeit sometimes as something of a 
conceptual catch-all. Furthermore, attention to the mutual constitution 
of discontinuity and renewal in specific ethnographic settings allows us 
to offer alternatives to the revival of Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of ‘cre-
ative destruction’ (1994) in sometimes wide-eyed contemporary debates 
about ‘disruptive innovation’ (e.g. Christensen et al. 2015). Indeed, our 
orientation towards the concept of rupture implies no judgement as to its 
value, suggesting neither a pessimistic nor an optimistic assessment of 
its impact. How ruptures are evaluated by the people caught up in them, 
and how these evaluations emerge and interact with one another, are for 
us open ethnographic questions.
In the rest of this introduction we make two moves towards sub-
stantiating the volume’s perspective on rupture as a concept and concern 
peculiarly attuned – indeed pressing and necessary – for the contempo-
rary juncture. First, we place the idea of rupture in the intellectual land-
scape not only of the development of anthropology – the discipline from 
which the chapters of this volume speak – but also of broader social and 
political theoretical trends in recent decades. Most crucially, we address 
the apparent aversion towards the negative moment of rupture in a lot 
of the writing that has been associated with the late twentieth-century 
shift away from the certainties of ‘modernity’. Following on from that, 
our second move will be to explore how an anthropological multiplica-
tion and reformulation of rupture as a variable object of ethnographic 
inquiry could serve to rescue the harder edge of rupture that, we feel, is 
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so needed to make sense of the tumultuous transformations of the con-
temporary world. Is it possible to take seriously the criticisms that have 
been made of standard ‘modern’ conceptions of rupture – for example, 
its association with the violence of revolutionary politics, or the closure 
of dialectical progressions – without losing the analytical power of the 
very concept of rupture? To make an argument that such a move is not 
only possible but necessary, we draw substantially on the chapters in this 
volume, which, taken together, demonstrate the critical power of rupture 
as a concept of and for our times.
Old and new ruptures
Anthropology itself, as a discipline, saw its beginnings in a moment of 
profound rupture, making some of its greatest contributions by witness-
ing and recording the violent emergence and global expansion of Euro-
pean and North American power. Shifts in anthropological focus and 
thought throughout the discipline’s development have been no less con-
ditioned in the rupture of what some might describe as the decline of 
the West. While anthropology is in many ways the discipline of rupturing 
moments, however, its traditional point of departure has been normative 
in orientation, examining societies as more or less completed systems, 
often presented as closed, self-reproducing orders. The forces of rupture 
connected to Western expansion were therefore viewed as principally 
disruptive and destructive of a static unchanging traditional order that 
was brought in from out of the cold, as it were.
Attempts were made by some to make change more central to 
anthropological analysis, and Gluckman (e.g. 1955; 1963) and the 
Manchester School were arguably at the forefront of this reorientation 
(Evens and Handelman 2006; Meinert and Kapferer 2015). For them 
change was the condition of existence, normative consistency was the 
exception. Gluckman and his colleagues therefore made process the cen-
tre of their methodological innovations, developing around the concept 
of situational analysis, which concentrated on events or moments of 
rupture, disruption and disturbance in the ongoing activities of every-
day and not so everyday life. Events in this approach exhibited what 
Gluckman and his colleagues discussed to be the logics of practice rela-
tive to the situations in which they were provoked. They were windows 
on the continually emerging structures of existence that were highly 
variant – dependent on the problem at hand – in their situated prac-
tice, rather than being consistent or normative in the ideal typical sense 
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apparent in many ethnographies to this day. Anthropological description 
as abstracted empiricism (Mills 2000) was what characterized the bulk 
of ethnography at the time: the event not as a dynamic or process of the 
continual construction and reconstruction of value – in which the diverse 
and differentiating potential of value in practice was revealed – but as an 
illustration of overarching value of a normative sort. In this perspective, 
events were generally treated as moments of conflict, and breaks and dis-
ruptions in the ongoing flow of life – ruptures, in effect – were integral to 
the continuity of existence.
The Manchester group conceived of rupturing moments as integral 
to what had been conceived as stasis, as well as to transformations in the 
orders of sociocultural existence. The dichotomy between the modern 
and the traditional – an ideologically legitimating move for Western dom-
inance, consequent of the irruption of its emergence to power, and these 
days much thrown into question – was problematized. Furthermore, the 
tendency at that time for anthropologists to regard the societies they 
studied as closed systems was criticized as a limited analytical strategy. 
Rupturing events were reconceived as born of the structural contradic-
tions in idea, structure and practice, as always in some way or another 
produced by their entanglement with historical forces in larger global 
realities.
However, in more recent decades it feels as if the concept of rupture 
has somehow fallen by the wayside for some, outmoded by a putative 
shift from the age of extremes of the twentieth century to a twenty-first 
century of multitudes and assemblies, to take Hobsbawm’s (1995) and 
Hardt and Negri’s (2004) books’ titles as somehow representative. 
Rupture, to be sure, connotes radical change, and the desire for sundry 
forms of transformation, including truly radical ones, has hardly gone 
away. Yet rupture also connotes negativity – breaking away from things 
as well as changing them, tearing things apart as well as encouraging 
them to flourish in new directions, brutally razing things to the ground 
as well as sowing the seeds for their emergent flourishing. If the hegem-
ony of what, for the purposes of this broad exposition, we will be tag-
ging as a contemporary ethos of the ‘life-affirmative’ is anything to go by, 
however, it would seem that these kinds of investments in the moment 
of the negative have been out for a good while in social theory at large. 
Process is preferable to essence (Braidotti 2006; Stengers 2014); rela-
tions go before entities (Barad 2007; Latour 2005); assemblages obviate 
social groups (DeLanda 2006); difference trumps identity (cf. Laruelle 
2010); exceptions rule over rules (Agamben 2005); the multiple trumps 
the negative (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).
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Particularly towards the end of the twentieth century, when these 
choices were most hotly debated, the shift from the negativity of rupture 
to the affirmation of life was glossed as a transition from modernity to 
postmodernity. It is significant for our purposes here to note how close to 
the surface of those debates the concept of rupture lay. For example, one 
of the concerns that rode on these critiques of modernity was the appar-
ent demise of ‘grand narratives’ (Lyotard 1984). Certainly, the very idea 
of rupture seems ‘grand’ in just that sense. Imagined as momentous, one-
off events that change the course of history, ruptures are, as Reinhardt 
Koselleck (2005) wrote in relation to the modern concept of revolution 
in particular, ‘metahistorical’: they provide the definitive temporal struc-
ture of the open, forward-moving thrust of chronological time that the 
grand narratives of modernity take as their premise. Indeed, if ruptures 
also connote a moment of temporal evacuation – the void that the hiatus 
of their break opens up – they rehearse also the definitive ontological 
structure of what is perhaps the grandest narrative of all, namely the 
Judaeo-Christian conception of creation ex nihilo (Rubenstein 2012).
Plenty of anthropologists have taken these critiques of the grand 
narratives of modernity to heart, contributing substantially to them or, 
often, adopting them as a diffuse theoretical aesthetic. The logical prior-
ity of relations over entities, for example, has been developed systemat-
ically out of first structuralist principles into a powerful post-structural 
analytical paradigm for both feminist (Strathern 1988; 1995) and post-
colonial purposes (Viveiros de Castro 2003; 2013), giving rise to what 
today is discussed in the discipline as a ‘relational’ approach (Holbraad 
and Pedersen 2017). Similarly, the conceptual ammunition provided 
by the emphasis in social theory on the contingency and porousness of 
all identities, giving logical priority to becoming over being (e.g. Ingold 
2011), has for some time now been deployed by anthropologists against 
the threat of essentialism, which, it is felt, dogged earlier generations’ 
accounts of social and cultural diversity (e.g. Herzfeld 1997). Still, partly 
owing to the analytical traction of these approaches, no doubt, and partly 
owing to the general philosophical atmosphere connoted by the prefix 
‘post-’, which still holds so much sway, an aversion to entities, essences, 
fixity, permanence and any hard and fast way of distinguishing one thing 
from another seems to have become normative in anthropology today. 
The logic of both/and, to put it figuratively, is now simply better than that 
of either/or.
Critical assessments of the effects these developments in contempo-
rary anthropology (and social theory more broadly) have been growing 
in recent years, exploring ways in which this life-affirmative theoretical 
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aesthetic stands in the way of getting an analytical handle on such phe-
nomena as individual subjectivity (e.g. Humphrey 2008; Laidlaw et al. 
2018), forms of ‘detachment’ (Candea et al. 2015) and other phenom-
ena that in one way or another could be described as ‘non-relational’ (cf. 
Venkatesan et al. 2012). At the same time, the ‘endurance’ (Stoler 2016) 
and therefore relational dimensions of the negative – structures of racial 
exclusion and ‘zones of non-being’ (Fanon 2007) established through 
violent and undesired instances of rupture, such as the transatlantic 
slave trade (Sojoyner 2017; Alves 2018) and the European colonization 
of Native American lands (Simpson 2014) – have been brought to the 
fore of anthropological thinking. Powerfully describing how the ideals 
that emerged from modern instances of ‘rupture’ – such as freedom, the 
individual and democracy – are entwined with the violent breaches cre-
ated and maintained by an ongoing, fundamentally racist Euro-American 
colonial project, these texts push us to consider how the practices of 
refusal and escape that emerge as a result of such breaches can reorient 
anthropology’s analysis of structures of power, of strategies of resistance 
and instances of radical autonomy. Crucially, it is from their dual capac-
ity to both theoretically unmask ‘the field of racial annihilation we call 
civil society’ (Alves 2018, 13) and consider forms of black and indigenous 
agency that often appear as contradictory – such as black youths’ involve-
ment with crime in Brazil or Native American claims to ‘nested sover-
eignty’ (Simpson 2014) – that these authors take the impetus to question 
the unexamined, often heroically charged deployment of the concept of 
resistance, and invite further ethnographic research.
Building on this work, in relation to the conceptualization of rup-
ture in particular, we make two critical comments about the broader 
implications of the hegemony of the life-affirmative – one political, the 
other theoretical. On the politics, it is important to note that the nor-
mative rise of life-affirmation in anthropology and elsewhere has been 
something of a double-edged sword. On one side, it has been fuelled by a 
desire to break down the certainties upon which structures of power and 
domination are built. If colonialism, nationalism or the patriarchy, say, 
are social constructs, then resisting them must involve deconstructing 
their claims to essences that hold sway over time, critically exposing their 
fluidity and contingency, rendering them more fragile and reversible in 
the process. In such a context, any insistence on essence or attempt to fix 
an identity smacks of violence – a power-move to be resisted (even when 
that power-move is itself framed as a form of resistance to the life-affirm-
ing hegemony of what the populist far-Right in the USA, for example, 
deride as ‘the liberal establishment’).
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The other side of the sword, however, cuts in the opposite direction. 
If all that is solid melts into air in this particular way (Berman 1988), 
then experiences of exclusion and alternative political projects or propos-
als are also subject to de-essentializing deconstruction. Indeed, one way 
to think of the passage from an age of extremes to one of multitudes and 
assemblies is as a transition from a politics of clashing proposals for the 
good life (e.g. free market versus state socialism) to a politics of differ-
ence, in which keeping the horizon for such proposals open becomes the 
prime political objective (e.g. Holbraad et al. 2014). While potentially 
welcome, positive assertions in favour of an alternative political order 
must be themselves founded on essentializing assumptions that close 
down the scope for multiplying diversities. Affirming just that scope, 
then, by turning the process of an open politics into a political project 
in its own right, is the point at which otherwise contrasting hues of lib-
eralism, libertarianism and Left radicalism meet in the cause of auton-
omy, freedom, diversity, inclusion, creativity and so on. What is lost in 
this (or overcome, depending on the view one takes) is what David Scott 
(2004, 96) calls the ‘heroic figuration’ of a politics centred on overthrow-
ing one political order in favour of another. Such a view of politics, Scott 
suggests, following Hannah Arendt (1965) as well as Koselleck (2005), is 
distinctly modern, and bound up with a post-Enlightenment conception 
of revolution in particular, seen as ‘a form of change that looks forward 
into an unknown and novel future’ (Scott 2004, 89). What is lost or over-
come, in other words, is a politics of opposition, antagonism, clash and 
mutual exclusion, including the mutual negation of opposites – a politics 
of either/or, of down with this and up with that; in short, a politics of 
rupture.
In fact, ongoing Left-radical debates regarding the relevance – 
indeed the possibility – of revolutionary action (as distinct, say, from 
political activism) are telling of the apparent demise of rupture as a 
political option. Invested in violence and heroic class struggle, revolu-
tion is now often seen as a cipher of failure, the failure of modernity’s 
failure as it were; an outmoded aspiration wedded to outmoded grand 
narratives about wholesale social and historical transformation. As in 
the much-cited adage, pronounced with mournful irony by Marxist 
critics of postmodern images of life-affirmative emancipation, in the 
post-Fordist, post-Soviet era it is easier to imagine the end of the world 
than the end of capitalism (Jameson 2003). Indeed, while icons of the 
contemporary Left such as Slavoj Žižek and Alain Badiou may proclaim 
the virtues of a revolutionary action that ‘“resignif[ies]” terror, the 
ruthless exercise of power, the spirit of sacrifice’ (Žižek 2000, 326), the 
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deliberately rearguard character of such provocations (invoking Lenin, 
Stalin and Mao over and again) bears out the notion that debates about 
emancipatory politics on the Left have left grandstanding rhetoric of 
‘historical rupture’ behind. As the German environmental protesters 
discussed in Stine Krøijer’s chapter (this volume) also testify, Left-
radical calls to emancipation in the era of multitudes (as opposed to the 
era, say, of class struggle) are much more likely to take the form of pre-
figuring assemblies (Juris 2008), temporary autonomous zones (Bey 
1991), deterritorialized nomads and migrants (Hardt and Negri 2000), 
and other such forms of decentred insurrection performed contingently 
and on a local scale (see also Graeber 2018). Revolutions, on this kind 
of view, are to be celebrated not as violent overthrows of existing orders 
of power, but rather as festivals of carnivalesque expressions of desire. 
Gilles Deleuze’s link between his philosophy of difference and affirma-
tion with the repudiation of the politics of revolutionary rupture in the 
final pages of Difference and Repetition delivers the point pithily:
History progresses not by negation and the negation of negation, 
but by deciding problems and affirming differences. It is no less 
bloody and cruel as a result. Only the shadows of history live by 
negation: the good enter into it with all the power of a posited dif-
ferential or a difference affirmed … That is why real revolutions 
have the atmosphere of fêtes. (1994, 268)
This leads us to our second point, which concerns the deeper philosophical 
roots of the bracketing of rupture in favour of life-affirming processes of dif-
ferentiation and creativity. At issue here is the philosophical fate of negation 
in particular, understood as a constitutive feature of the either/or logic that 
seems to have fallen out of philosophical favour, being seen now as a cipher 
of a peculiarly modern tendency to treat change as a matter of dialectics. 
Marxist social theorists John Holloway, Fernando Matamoros and Sergio 
Tischle (2009) see this as a general characteristic of post-structuralist philos-
ophy in the wake of the experience of state socialist ‘dialectical materialism’ 
in the USSR and elsewhere, which they see as rooted in Hegel’s ‘apologetic’ 
dialectics (as opposed to Theodore Adorno’s ‘critical’ negative dialectics – 
Bonnet 2009: 42; cf. Adorno 1990). To state the charge they cite Michael 
Hardt and Colectivo Situaciones (in a somewhat rough translation):
The dialectical operation consists of putting an end to that which 
has none, giving a defined orientation to that which has no final-
ity, taking (overcoming) the previous moments by rescuing what is 
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useful (preserving) in the service of a new affirmation, prohibiting 
every consciousness of an irreducible diversity, of an excess that is 
not retaken. (2007, cited in Holloway et al. 2009, 4)
The problem with dialectics, then, is that it impoverishes difference, 
turning it into contradiction, replacing the openness of affirmation with 
the closure of negation. On such a view, Holloway et al. suggest:
Life becomes a positive concept rather than the struggle against 
the negation of life. There is in general a positivization of thought. 
Struggles are seen as struggles for, rather than being principally 
struggles against. The centrality of crisis (a negative concept) is lost 
and replaced by an emphasis on restructuring (a positive concept) 
... This has not only theoretical but also political consequences: it 
can lead to a blurring of the distinction between negation and syn-
thesis, between refusal and reconciliation, between an uprising and 
the reconciling government that follows the uprising. (2009, 6)
From their trenchantly critical theoretical perspective, Holloway et al. 
lament the loss of critical potential that negation affords. They write:
What we need is not to reject dialectics as such, but only the syn-
thetic understanding of it: to insist, in other words, on a negative 
dialectics, a restless movement of negation that does not lead nec-
essarily to a happy ending. History is seen not as a series of stages, 
but as the movement of endless revolt. (2009, 7)
It is not our intention here to take sides on these controversies – neither 
the political question of whether revolution is still possible or desirable, 
nor the related philosophical question of whether negation and the dia-
lectical view of history that it supports ought to be rescued or abandoned. 
Instead, distinctively anthropological, our purpose is to unhook the con-
cept of rupture from these debates by multiplying it in line with the vari-
ety of contingent ethnographic situations in which, as the chapters of the 
book show, rupture features as a matter of concern.
To be sure, this is in part the standard anthropological response to 
any normative controversy: take a concept that in a given debate features 
as normative premise, stand back from it critically and then multiply it 
ethnographically to show that other ways of conceiving it and experi-
encing it are possible – anthropology as the vantage of the ‘otherwise’ 
(Povinelli 2012). Indeed, our interest in making such a move on rupture 
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is expressed in the plural of our title: ruptures. In this connection, a book 
in political philosophy by literary and cultural theorists Paul Eisenstein 
and Todd McGowan (2012), titled Rupture in the singular, serves as use-
ful foil by the contrast it presents. Having defined rupture as ‘the occur-
rence of the impossible, when the very ground under our feet shifts in 
order to transform the point from which we see’ (2012, 4), the authors 
go on to scope the remit of a new political philosophy that, rather than 
concerning itself with the ‘distribution of power’ (2012, 3), takes rupture 
as its starting point:
The fundamental question of politics is in not how to assume or 
contest power but how one relates to rupture ... Within the logic 
of rupture, all subjects are irreducibly singular and free. The rup-
ture frees individuals from the despotic rule or nature or tradition, 
and it constitutes them as singular subjects. But it also introduces a 
principle of equality that binds subjects to one another in an expe-
rience of human solidarity. Belief, universality, solidarity, equality, 
freedom, singularity, and humanity are neither natural values nor 
the achievements of culture. They are the product of the rupture 
that causes culture to arise out of nature or the rupture that causes 
a new social order to emerge from an older one. Rupture marks the 
creation of value out of nothing, and the paradigm for this creation 
is the emergence of signification itself. (2012, 11)
From our anthropological point of view, the problem with this way of 
approaching rupture is not just how it enshrines within it so many of the 
cardinal principles of an emblematically modern conception – culture 
rising out of nature, freedom from the despotism of tradition, and the 
emergence of new social orders as a matter of breaking with old ones. 
The issue is rather how the concept of rupture here is pressed to the ser-
vice of a normatively conceived political programme, based now not just 
on cardinal principles but also on cardinal virtues, expressing an image of 
the good life consisting of solidarity, equality, freedom and so forth. Our 
anthropological tack here, by contrast, is to place such normative points 
of departure between brackets in order to explore how far conceptions 
and experiences of rupture can be multiplied ethnographically, rendered 
contingent in a way that might display alternative sets of possibilities for 
thinking, including for thinking politically.
Still, our desire for ethnographic multiplication also has a more 
pointed critical purpose, namely that of disentangling the concept of 
rupture from its putative modernity, to render it capacious enough to 
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address the contemporary circumstance of turmoil. As we have seen, 
one reason why the notion of rupture is sidelined in much contemporary 
social and political writing is that it is seen as bound up with both politi-
cal and philosophical projects that now seem outmoded – revolution and 
dialectics being prime examples of projects that, with the advent of the 
‘post’ era of the late twentieth century seemed exactly the kinds of things 
one ought to be ‘post’ about. Regardless of whether it is fair, the idea that 
rupture is somehow stuck in the twentieth century raises the question 
of whether it could yet be unstuck from it, for use in the twenty-first. 
Can the baby of rupture (if such it is) be rescued from the bathwater of 
modernity (ditto)? Can one maintain one’s interest in rupture as a consti-
tutive element of social reality – indeed a potent political force – without 
thereby also committing to the baggage of the grand narratives it has so 
typically carried in the past? Can one think rupture without the heroic 
politics or revolution, the closed telos of self-transcending dialectics, the 
monotheistic mould of ex nihilo creation, and all the Sturm und Drang of 
the forward thrust of history?
To bring rupture back into the fray in this way, we suggest, is nec-
essary when confronted with a world experienced as turmoil. We may 
remain agnostic as to whether something called modernity has indeed 
been surpassed. What seems patently obvious to us, however, is that any 
notion that negativity, contradiction, fissure and violence have somehow 
been on the wane, and that the world around us is now better understood 
in terms of the affirmation of life in and as difference, is just wrong. If 
there is something in the common sense, not only of commentators but 
also of ordinary people as well as protagonists across the globe, that new 
forms of terror, authoritarianism and populism, not to mention rising 
inequality and pending environmental catastrophe, are all encroaching, 
then a place for rupture must be found in our thinking about these cir-
cumstances. We can indeed sidestep the grand narratives that earlier ver-
sions of rupture-thinking supported, and open ourselves up to the shifts 
in attention that writings thinking after (if not post) modernity have pro-
duced – new ‘arts of noticing’, as Anna Tsing calls them (2015). Yet in 
doing so we need to retain the capacity for thinking with a harder edge – 
forms of understanding and analysis that can countenance the brutality 
of what is going on, and the perhaps irreducible conflicts and fissures 
that seem to be erupting in so many registers of life today.
The point, we should be clear, is not to use the concept of rupture 
as a lever for erecting new grand narratives of history, politics or human 
life in the round. Nor is our aim to use rupture in order to articulate a 
new political theory, fit for our times, as Slavoj Žižek (e.g. 2010) and 
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Alain Badiou (2007) have sought to do in recent years – indeed, the trac-
tion their attempts to do so have gained in broader debates is itself tell-
ing of the renewed relevance of rupture in the contemporary setting. In 
fact, even philosophical projects that deploy notions of radical rupture to 
undo attempts to found politics on prior principles (God, Nature, Reason, 
Justice or indeed Conflict), tend to capitulate to the basic expectation 
that a political philosophy, as such, must provide some kind of normative 
criterion about what counts as ‘political’ in the first place (e.g. Marchart 
2007). As anthropologists, we are more interested in political cosmolo-
gies of rupture than we are in its political philosophy – if by ‘cosmologies’ 
we designate the long-standing anthropological concern with charting 
the entities and relations that compose people’s conception of the worlds 
they inhabit (Kapferer 2010; Abramson and Holbraad 2014; Sauma 
2016). Ethnographic scrutiny of how ruptures of different kinds and in 
different senses are constituted and lived in varying social (as well as 
political) settings, we suggest, may provide the resources for exploring 
what alternatives to modern conceptions of rupture might look like. With 
reference to the chapters that follow, in the next section we set out some 
programmatic thoughts on how this might be done.
On ethnographic ruptures
Given the dangers involved in reintroducing the negative into anthro-
pological analysis, and the significant shifts in attention brought with 
postmodernist vitalism, how can we proceed? Our answer is to treat rup-
tures as a way of doing and describing, rather than as an explanatory 
lens, as offering a method of cutting through rather than resisting grand 
narratives, since resistance itself can so easily become yet another ‘grand’ 
axiom. This shift can be delineated by looking at the effects that think-
ing with rupture can have on the very different materials presented by 
the contributors to this volume, effects that we would distinguish into a 
series of possible forms of interference in the production of grand nar-
ratives. The first of these effects reveals the multiple dynamics that lie 
underneath the surface gloss of heroic, emblematic events or contexts 
of rupture: the ethnographies and/or anthropological analyses con-
tained here therefore pluralize singular moments of rupture, looking to 
the breaks within them. By describing what is produced at the moment 
of revolution, of populist electoral upheaval, of spiritual awakening as 
rupture rather than transformation, the authors can therefore point to 
the unexpected consequences of these significant moments for those 
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who bear witness to them. Through this multiplying dynamic we there-
fore find heroism’s more qualitative foundations: the radical uncertainty 
upon which its varying, impressive structures are built.
There are probably no grander instances of this than the great rev-
olutions that open our volume, in Caroline Humphrey’s analysis of the 
different scales of the rupture caused by the Terror during the French 
Revolution, and in Michael Rowlands, Stephan Feuchtwang and Lisheng 
Zhang’s description of the cyclical relation between radical rupture and 
necessary repair in relation to the Chinese Communist Revolution and 
New Era. In the first of these meditations on the underside of heroic 
transformation, Humphrey’s significant distinction between revolution 
and rupture is guided by the guillotine itself, and the temporal cut that it 
makes in our capacity to look at the French Revolution as a linear process. 
This emblematic killing machine produces something very different, not 
the replacement of one political whole with another – monarchy with 
republic – but the dismemberment of something previously considered 
whole, the body politic: a cut that contains not just a before and after 
but also the singular moment in which it happens. Witnesses to Louis 
XVI’s decapitation and the ensuing period of the Terror are therefore 
seen to carry within them not only revolutionary fervour and national 
vitalism but ‘new sensations, excitements, fears and strangely productive 
pathologies’ (Humphrey, this volume) caused by the physical cut and 
gush of blood produced by the guillotine. Blood that repulses and royal 
blood that is collected and kept as keepsake, undoing the revolutionary 
neutralization of the royal body, producing numerous breaks within the 
revolutionary self, the revolution itself and the retelling of it: ruptures 
between those who were present and became energized by blood, and 
those who fell apart in witnessing the decapitations; between those who 
defended and those who criticized the violence. The ‘we’ of the Terror 
contains a rupture that is ‘a shifting, temporary and multiple entity’, that 
places the radical nature of the revolution in question by ‘that spectral 
“thing” which had been cut off’ (Humphrey, this volume) and in doing so 
also produces a break in the heroic ‘we’ of the most primordial of Euro-
American revolutions.
While in the French case rupture and revolution are made distinct by 
the guillotine, in the Chinese case Rowlands, Feuchtwang and Zhang point 
in this volume to how revolutionary objects can also enact rupture – a break 
with the humiliation and repression of the past – not as a cleavage, not as 
a cut, but as a repair of the human: the re-establishment of some form of 
continuity with the potential of the people, something that is both new and 
ancient. Rupture, in this case, is not multiple but cyclical, not spectral but 
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practised. The private museum collection analysed by the authors conveys 
this ethnographic instance of rupture, with its artful simultaneous claim to 
both a commitment to historical restoration and to support Xin Jinping’s 
New Era. Adeptly negotiating potential accusations of ‘historical nihilism’ 
and therefore censorship – aimed at those who would deny the Party’s rev-
olutionary accomplishments, ‘the historical inevitability of China’s socialist 
path’, through claims to historical objectivity – Fan Jianchuan’s controver-
sial and celebrated private collection of everyday objects, the waste of the 
Cultural Revolution, conjures the correct balance between facticity, pat-
riotism and personal remembrance of revolutionary suffering. In doing 
so, these discarded, broken objects ensure that an obsolete past – and the 
people of that past – are given new life within Xi Jinping’s drive to project a 
new global China. Rupture as repair can be seen as the non-narrative expo-
sition of a revolutionary past – and loss – in a fast-paced, consumer-driven 
present that breaks with it: rupture as cyclical – it has happened before 
and will happen again but not in the same way – rather than as linear or 
singular, conjures an ambivalent history ‘more fractured and open [to the] 
coincidence of norms and histories ... in which realities can be questioned 
and alternative futures can be seen enacted and propagated’ (Rowlands, 
Feuchtwang and Zhang, this volume).
In both of these reflections about the multiple ruptures that lie 
beneath the veneer of singular revolutionary moments, we find the 
motile play between the different spatio-temporal scales of the events 
witnessed, experienced, portrayed and enacted, the play between rup-
ture as past, present and future, as personal, national and universal 
phenomenon. This conforms to the suggestion made by Daniel Knight 
and Charles Stewart in a comparative study of recent experiences of ‘eco-
nomic crisis’ in Southern Europe, that ‘in moments of extreme crisis, time 
becomes elastic’, and ‘crises turn ordinary daily routine inside out and 
expose the seams of temporality to view’ (2016, 3). Drawing on works 
in the philosophy and anthropology of time (e.g. Deleuze 1991; Serres 
and Latour 1995; Hirsch and Stewart 2005; Hodges 2010), Knight and 
Stewart explore how moments of crisis put the very notions of time and 
history in crisis. Familiar distinctions between past, present and future 
are compressed, collapsed or suspended in different ways, and people’s 
historicity – their ‘sense of the historical continuity grounding the pres-
ent’ (Knight and Stewart 2016) – becomes connected with scales of expe-
rience that may in ordinary times feel removed. Such temporal torsions, 
along with spatial and scalar ones with which they are often related, are 
certainly characteristic of the situations of rupture we examine in this 
book. Treating rupture as an object of ethnographic inquiry therefore 
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implies also treating the constitution of time and history in each case as 
an ethnographic variable, much as Knight and Stewart do in their study 
of crisis.
To the extent that the concept of crisis is itself constitutive to the 
‘grand narrative’ of modern historical reckoning, however, and has 
become a prominent ingredient of ideological formations of contempo-
rary global capitalism (Roitman 2013; Masco 2017), we prefer to parse 
these temporal dimensions in terms of the concept of rupture, which 
carries less of this political and economic baggage. As an analytical con-
cept, we suggest, crisis connotes the very grand narratives it diagnoses 
as unstable, while rupture has the potential to cut through them. Our 
emphasis on the cut here also allows us to relate to important bodies 
of work on memory, in anthropology and beyond that pre-date current 
emphases on crises and that have long reflected on the ways in which 
experiences of traumatic collective loss or breach (whether historical 
or not) inform everyday practice. Through numerous descriptions of 
the ways in which collective memory is maintained by repetition – that 
which allows regeneration and also ‘continually “cuts” back to the start’ 
(Snead, cited in Hartman 1997) – and takes place even when there is an 
‘inability to occupy an imagined prior condition or to bridge the divide 
of the split subject’ (Hartman 1997, 75), such works push us to consider 
the different ways in which the temporal ‘elasticity’ of rupture is related 
to specific experiences of reconstitution, of re-encountering something 
previously known, and perhaps purposefully forgotten or taken away.
Nowhere is this more anthropologically and politically poignant in 
this volume, perhaps, than in Carol Greenhouse’s description and analysis 
of Donald Trump’s electoral victory in 2016 and its immediate aftermath: 
the way in which it ‘unsettles habits of time, place, scale and standpoint’. 
Using the metaphor of temporal heat to characterize the sudden reali-
zations and encounters, the sparks that occur at the moment of political 
rupture and of its unforeseeable consequences – such as the realization 
of having knowledge that one was not aware of before – Greenhouse 
challenges us to acknowledge the untenable continuity of relativism’s 
‘cool indifference’. The destabilization of the political field and of anthro-
pology’s social distance is thus conjoined. In the gaps produced by this 
fissure, the author reveals the production of a different temporality and 
relativity, one more suited to the heat of this moment, so that ‘ethno-
graphic knowledge is inseparable from self-knowledge, knowledge of 
others in the world, others in oneself’ (Greenhouse, this volume). In this 
context, Greenhouse experiments with other ways of knowing power, 
with identifying political agency through the signs constituted by people’s 
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experience of power and of powerlessness, with the personal, subjective 
dimensions of political rupture. In doing so hers is a call for anthropology 
to understand ‘the diversity of people’s practical experience of democracy 
(or lack of it) in their own lives’ (Greenhouse, this volume). This is a call 
for full ethnographic relativity – a commitment to the multiple directions 
that rupture takes – widening a parallel space and time for the anthropol-
ogist’s personal convictions as a visible source of insight.
The subjective or personal scale of political agency in the face of 
rupture is also a concern for Morten Pedersen’s interlocutors in his 
chapter on the significant political influence of the Danish Protestant 
movement, but in a directly opposing way – usefully highlighting the 
multiplying effects of rupture at an ethnographic and analytical level. 
Pedersen’s ethnography of a Lutheran movement in Denmark, in con-
junction with his analysis of the ideas of key figures within it – such as 
the Danish philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard – reflects 
specifically on the significance of the experience of subjective rupture. 
However, in this case it is not political but existential rupture that is at 
stake: ‘leaps’ that arise from ‘genuine faith’ and, significantly, oppose all 
forms of political and societal upheaval. This is subjective rupture not 
as a future and outward-oriented break with the past, but as the inward 
re-entrance into the kingdom of God. As it is individualized, rupture is a 
conscious or indeed desired change, a transformation premised in every-
day actions that, taken together, intone one’s leap of faith, one’s relation 
to God and therefore one’s freedom. Rupture as leap, rupture as action 
rather than as historical event, transforms this notion spatio-temporally: 
rupture not in hindsight or as future promise, but as a constant present, 
as the condition of humans as detached or fallen parts of the kingdom of 
God. In this view, the attempt to ‘change or improve this primordial fall or 
rupture in the form of progressive reforms, let alone political revolutions, 
are … evil and ungodly’, for ‘[s]ince God is not of this world, you are in 
this world not supposed to relate to society and politics in a god-like and 
absolute way’ (Krarup, 1987). In the Lutheran movement in Tidehverv, 
as described by Pedersen, we therefore find an explicit preoccupation 
with the different scales of rupture, with its multiplying capacity and 
as such a concern with how to keep it within a ‘radically introspective’ 
individual: apprehensions that have had a direct impact on the modern 
Danish nation state.
The individual, internalized rupture that defines the Danish 
Lutheran movement is probably something that the priest in Tobia 
Farnetti’s chapter in this volume on conversion in Japanese Catholicism 
would repudiate to a certain degree; the life of his church is after all in 
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its community activities. However, it is also the case that his flock, in con-
verting to Catholicism, must struggle with rupture on a daily basis; as a 
result of internal and external impositions – from the priest himself and 
from Japanese society – they are being made to break with previous cul-
tural forms and therefore with previous relations, past and present. In 
response to this demand for rupture, which also figures so prominently in 
anthropology’s treatment of Christian conversion (Robbins 2004; 2007), 
Farnetti’s interlocutors practise the blurring of the clear distinctions set 
from within and without, between previous and current lives. In personal 
histories Christian conversion figures as ‘a flavour or an afterthought’, as 
a gradual process lacking any sense of crisis and calling. In their appar-
ently transgressive weekly drinking sessions particularly, there is no 
sense in which they are flouting Christian values, but instead seem to 
mark, as Farnetti notes, ‘a particular affective way of engaging rupture’ 
(Farnetti, this volume), by blurring the distinct lines that it draws. The 
result is that for a few fleeting hours, during evenings of drinking that are 
in a continuum with church life – since drunken conversations are dom-
inated by church activities and people – the clear distinction between 
Christian and Japanese life, drawn by priest and by society, is collapsed, 
so that it seems that each encompasses the other simultaneously, without 
‘a definite direction or outcome’ aside from establishing the indispensa-
bility between the two. Rupture in this sense can not only be multiple, but 
is also temporarily erasable; it can somehow also be refused.
If the erasability of rupture is particularly vivid in Farnetti’s ethnog-
raphy, it would be incorrect to say that this is the first time we encounter 
it in this volume, or indeed the last. From the very first two chapters we 
see, in relation to the French Revolution and to cyclical socialist rein-
ventions in China, how the invention of powerful collective narratives is 
premised on the erasure of rupture, the erasure of terror and suffering. 
It also emerges, in a very different way, in Ramon Sarró’s contribution 
to this volume, with the double rupture required for prophetic inven-
tion in West and Central Africa. If, in the Japanese case described by 
Farnetti, rupture is deliberately blurred, here putative ruptures are cre-
ated through careful works of erasure. What emerges is an ‘as if’ rupture, 
which is very important for the inventor’s claim to be an instrument of 
God, a prophet, but which is actually founded on a much more piece-
meal and combinative basis, which needs to be ‘erased’ for invention to 
be recognized as such. So in Sarró’s description of the creation of the 
language and ‘graphemes’ of Mandombe by Wabeladio Payi we encoun-
ter with tremendous precision the double aspect of rupture: destruction 
as tantamount to creation. In the case described by the author, double 
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rupture occurs through the decontextualization of geometric elements 
from their tangible foundations, and then the disconnection of the final 
product from traditional influences – such as the inventor’s conversa-
tions with Kinshasa artists, mathematicians, linguists and theologians. 
Invention is therefore the pragmatic use and breaking with material and 
immaterial origins, which must be erased or forgotten to denote original-
ity: a process of synthesis, the capacity to ‘connect the seemingly uncon-
nectable’, which allows Wabeladio to ‘simultaneously introduce the new 
and revalue the old’ (Sarró, this volume).
The interference involved in this creative process, and the effect 
that it can have on dominant narratives, leads us to focus on another 
way in which rupture emerges as an effective ethnographic device: not 
only does it render emblematic, unifying events multiple or invisible, by 
shifting the spatio-temporal coordinates and scales at stake, it can also 
create fissures in the concepts commonly used to oppose Euro-American 
grand narratives. We are thinking here specifically of notions such as 
resistance, which as other authors have noted (for example, Abu-Lhugod 
1990; Kapferer and Taylor 2012; Mitchell 1990; Ortner 1995; Mbembe 
2001) has the potential to be a stultifying grand narrative of subaltern/
minority political agency. Rupture, we believe, can act instead to reveal 
instances in which interference in dominant narratives is more strategic 
than resistance. In this way, the concept of rupture indicates the voids 
or gaps produced by acts that we might superficially identify as those of 
resistance, and the unexpected strategies of interference that fill those 
gaps. In thinking about her own work in this way, one of the volume’s 
editors, Julia Sauma, suggests that perhaps the most powerful interfer-
ence for us (the editors) to think with here comes not from prominent 
political events or religious practice but from apparently more periph-
eral examples: from what is generally considered to be the collateral 
damage of contemporary capitalist societies, as yet to be resolved by lib-
eral practices of ‘social justice’. Looking to her previous work with street 
children in Brazilian metropolises, for example, she argues that it is such 
non-axiomatic contexts that the plentiful gaps produced by thinking 
with ruptures are most explicit.
Sauma notes that there is a reflex reach for the apparently 
 self-evident idea of socio-economic failure and the need for protective 
liberal framings when anthropologists are faced with such contexts. 
Childhood can do this to us. It is a powerful construct, sedimented in 
our minds and actions by law and everyday collective practice. So what 
does the ethnographer do when street children themselves persistently 
break with and escape from the notion that childhood is a spatially and 
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temporally delimited, and therefore subordinate, condition – that the 
best place for children is under an adult gaze, and that childhood will 
inevitably end? The enduring return of children to violent streets even 
when other options are made available, and their practised escape from 
the end of childhood – such as by dissimulating their ages or forgetting 
birthdays (Sauma 2007) – are powerful examples of how rupture can be 
persistently enacted: as recurrent escape from and interference in dom-
inant anti-Black contemporary ideals in Brazil, such as the virtues of 
security, labour and individual responsibility. Among the street children 
that she worked with for almost a decade, this interference took the form 
of performative play, through which they oscillated constantly between 
the position of dangerous criminal, lost child and responsible workers, 
to name a few. The interfering rupture that they sought, and that they 
sought to fill with questions, was thus not with the notion that being 
a street child was a dangerous condition – none of them could doubt 
that – but that being an adult and participating in an adult world was a 
solution: that that world, a world in which their blackness is persistently 
used as a marker for limiting presents and futures and yet is ideologically 
denied, was necessarily as coherent, as non-violent as the adults around 
them tried to make out.
Interference in the coherence of dominant anti-black narratives and 
ideals does not push against them with an opposing force, as the notion of 
revolutionary resistance suggests, but rather cuts through them, refusing 
their logic, their mode of operation, and this can occur in many different 
ways – as a growing body of literature on indigenous and Black political 
and cultural expression can attest (e.g. Alves 2018; Hartman 1997, 2007; 
Moten 2008; Simpson 2014; Sojoyner 2017; Sauma, in preparation). In 
the case of the street children, rupture with the adult world opens up a 
prohibited space in that world – the street – from where they can identify, 
observe, experience and manipulate the oscillation that occurs alongside 
coherence in a ‘normal’ anti-Black world.
In a similar way, the environmental activists described by Stine 
Krøijer in her contribution to this volume seek to create internal breaks 
within a totalizing capitalist system by enacting a slowing down of life 
and a reconnection with the non-human, a building of alternative struc-
tures and practices in the very centre of that system: the ‘carbon bombs’, 
the mines, the often unseen and brutally extractive spaces that support 
capitalist speed and growth. This anti-heroic form of activism, as Krøijer 
notes, has grown as a response to the perceived failure of approaches 
historically favoured by the radical Left: the inability of effecting change 
through protest. In place of the ‘spectacular confrontations and clashes 
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with the police and the heroic narratives about it’ (Krøijer, this volume), 
the activists with whom she works see the need to change strategies, 
to produce a rupture with capitalist structure of domination by doing 
exactly that which capitalism (and revolution) will not do: by slowing 
down, by sneaking, dwelling in trees and becoming animal. By doing so 
her interlocutors seek to create a radical break within capitalism, a rup-
ture within the rupture of resistance. This form of rupture is premised 
on the idea that mundane acts can scale up, potentially creating ‘large-
scale or delayed systemic effects’, reminding us of the potential heat of 
the moment raised by Carol Greenhouse in her contribution (Krøijer, this 
volume). The subjective scale of this form of political agency also brings 
with it uncertainties about what lies ahead, about the ability to endure in 
this form of rupture, in the internal gaps that this type of activism creates 
within the system that it is attempting to implode. Once again, we see 
how thinking with rupture changes the scale and spatio-temporal dimen-
sions of political agency, shifting the focus of activism from grand scale, 
macho and aggressive political events premised on unwavering certainty 
to the construction of ‘new more-than-human political subjectivities’ that 
abandon male and human vanguardism, enabling avoidance and hesita-
tion rather than resistance, and in doing so awakening ‘the brutal realiza-
tion that something must change’ (Krøijer, this volume).
This form of rupture, one in which parallel spatio-temporal coor-
dinates are revealed, can also be identified in Anja Kublitz’s description, 
in this volume, of what happens in the process of becoming a Danish 
jihadist. In this case, however, it is not oscillation but underlying divine 
harmony that becomes apparent to the young men who answer the call 
to fight against a fractured, violent existence of recurrent rupture. Her 
description therefore shows how the montage of jihadi anasheed (mili-
tant Islamist hymns) YouTube videos that her interlocutors watch, which 
pointedly display the repetitive nature of Muslim suffering and inspire 
them to travel to Syria, appears to open a portal to them: access to an 
underlying world of harmony that they can tap into in their daily lives, 
through which they might be able to transform a history of suffering on 
repeat, and at the same time experience what their parents and grand-
parents might have felt once before. This portal is built on the powerful 
affects produced by the recursive ruptures that are ‘always new again’, 
of the everyday lives of peoples profoundly marked by changes such as 
forced migration and racial discrimination: broken continuities that ‘make 
[the past] reappear, reflecting and intensifying the present’ (Kublitz, this 
volume). In this way, Kublitz argues against a traditional Christian view 
of rupture as a singular break in a linear continuity, to  show how the 
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radical transformative events upon which rupture is based can take var-
ious forms and, in the case of her interlocutors, as ‘intersecting rhythms’ 
between past, present and future: ‘as a continuous repetition of extraor-
dinary transformative events’ (Kublitz, this volume). These rhythms are 
powerful in that they are able not to resist but cut through an ‘existing 
spatio-temporal colonial order’, offering a glimpse to an underlying world 
of harmony ‘perfectly made’ and ready to be joined, ready to be enacted 
in the everyday.
The gaps produced by such actions require new descriptive forms, 
that is clear: if not resistance, for example, then what might be our means 
to describe the instances of turning away from, breaking with, refusing 
that we are raising here. As we have seen, the spatio-temporal coordinates 
and scales evoked to describe these very different moments of rupture 
are motile, but rupture also has an effect on the metaphors that we might 
use to describe these instances of interference, multiplication and/or cut-
ting through. The contributors to this volume provide us with a range of 
new images with which to consider rupture, and this is part of the ethno-
graphic premise of our proposal. We therefore have rupture as the gush 
of blood, the need for repair, the heat of the moment, leaping, blurring, 
sneaking and rhythm. In relation to the most cataclysmic events described 
in this volume, in Edward Simpson and Michele Serafini’s analysis of the 
aftermaths of earthquakes in India and Nepal, rupture is therefore used 
by the authors to identify the different levels – the physical and emotional, 
familial and material, political and religious – of the shock caused by these 
disasters, and how they establish the condition for new possibilities. The 
breaking apart of land might appear as one of the most powerful images 
that we can conjure, but in its stead it is rupture that the authors use to 
identify the different levels – the physical and emotional, familial and 
material, political and religious – of the shock caused by these disasters, 
and how they establish the condition for new possibilities.
Significantly it is the aftermath of rupture that concerns the authors, 
who can therefore directly answer any doubts that we might have over the 
unforeseeable consequences of the cataclysmic events described by some 
of our other contributors: that in the long term rupture not only leads to 
new forms of cooperation but also to conflict and to the restoration of 
older patterns; destruction does not wipe the slate clean. In describing 
moments in which there is a ‘general sense ... that history had imploded 
into a rumbling moment and meaning had collapsed’ (Simpson and 
Serafini, this volume), it is therefore notable that the authors describe 
how – much as in the aftermath of ritual liminal moments of communitas 
(Turner 1969) – in the aftermath of earthquakes relations are renewed 
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between people and the state, leading to a renegotiation of these rela-
tions, to the appearance of new vocabularies and solutions. However, it 
is also interesting to note how the tools for this renegotiation do not just 
emerge from the places and peoples at stake, but the way disaster marks 
the influx of intervention of various kinds, the bureaucratic, financial, 
infrastructural and divine, which are sought out to impose some form of 
control over what these chaotic moments are able to produce.
Fissures and openings
Taken alongside the preceding chapters, then, Simpson and Serafini bear 
out our emphasis throughout this volume on conceptualizing rupture as 
a creative/destructive dynamic, which operates in many ways as what is 
currently being discussed as a ‘singularity’ (see Stengers 2000). Seen in 
the light of the chapters of this volume, rupture can be understood as a 
moment of differentiating and generating intensity, creatively emergent 
from the destructive force either of a natural sort (earthquakes, floods, 
volcanic eruptions) or of human manufacture, though always specifically 
as a dynamic of sociocultural formation. If destruction is a vital dimen-
sion of rupture, such destruction has immanent within it a creative and 
regenerative potential that is never the reproduction of the same but 
always of difference. As Deleuze might have said (1994), it is a dynamic 
energy of repetition or the continuity of the existential terms of human 
life – always a sociocultural phenomenon – through creative regenerative 
(re)construction. It is in rupturing moments and in the reverberations of 
rupturing effect (their aftershocks as it were) in which the social and cul-
tural nature of human being as constant unfolding potential is revealed, 
in multilinear and multidirectional ways. In a sense, the nature of human 
being can never be known in any causally originating sense – a particular 
essentialism in anthropology that has largely been discarded – but only 
through the way in which human beings create the terms (or objectifica-
tions) of their existence and action (Kapferer 2014).
Such an emphasis on the capacity of rupture to reformulate the 
coordinates of people’s existence raises the broader methodological 
question of how such a forcefully regenerative potential can be described 
without fear of reducing it to the very terms with which it seeks by its 
nature to break, this being a feature that our conception of rupture as a 
singularity shares with Alain Badiou’s conception of the ‘event’ (2007). 
Indeed, the question of how anthropological language is affected by the 
kinds of ruptures we present in this volume is central to our proposition. 
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The ruptures presented here do not only point to previously unseen fis-
sures in the emblematic images of rupture we inherit from the grand 
narratives of modernity, interfering with and cutting into the putative 
heroism of rupture as grand Event (a heroism that Badiou’s theorization, 
incidentally, ratifies entirely – see also Humphrey 2008; Laidlaw et al. 
2018 – and from which we seek to find ethnographically driven routes of 
escape in the present volume). The chapters also explore new descriptive 
forms that can get to grips with the kinds of situations ruptures engender, 
and the forms of life they format, doing justice to the character of rupture 
as at once destructive and generative – its dual aspect, as we call it, which 
makes it irreducible to standard social scientific dilemmas between, for 
example, continuity and change.
The question we are left with, then, is whether, as anthropologists 
working in the current historical juncture, we are ready to break with 
the legitimating controls of the discipline, which demand that we always 
end our analyses with the aplomb of certainty as the signature of analyt-
ical success – of our job well done. Perhaps a test of this lies in how we 
might conclude this brief introduction to the chapters that follow. Our 
sense is that breaking with the academic compulsion toward producing 
grand narratives must involve breaking also with the linearity of such 
arguments and forms of thinking. This feels particularly important at this 
present moment of turmoil and rupture – one that, as so many of the 
chapters show explicitly, defies any sense of linearity (e.g. Humphrey, 
Greenhouse, Sarró) or indeed clarity and consistency of scale (e.g. 
Krøjer; Kublitz; Simpson and Serafini). Such a focus, we suggest, nec-
essarily stands against any ultimate kind of unifying narrative about the 
forcefulness of rupture. Instead, what we have here are also a series of 
attempts to trace in the narrative form of ethnographic engagement how 
what we have to say about rupture can break with itself at every turn, 
demonstrating its violently incisive power in its very action.
Note
1. Max Weber was consciously using a railway metaphor to indicate a radical change of direction. 
Weber was interested in those moments in history that were new directions and ultimately irre-
ducible to the past with which they are continuous. Thus, he was interested in what are referred 
to as axial moments, for example the advent of Christianity and of Islam that have related but 
different and major implications for history. It is noteworthy that Weber used a railway met-
aphor, appropriate to the technological era of modernity with which his sociology was large-
ly concerned, and which focused on the redirections and turning points in the heterogeneous 
‘tracks’ along which history unfolds.
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The Guillotine: Reflections on Violent 
Revolutionary Rupture
Caroline Humphrey
Introduction
The guillotine is routinely associated with the French Revolution, but I 
shall suggest that one value of thinking about the killing machine itself is 
that it forces us to realize that ‘rupture’ is not the same as ‘revolution’ and 
requires its own analysis. Crucially, the two have a different relation to 
time, or more exactly they have different ‘time-forms’. While most revo-
lutions begin, or their actors imagine they begin, with rupture, this is but 
the initiatory moment in their onward process of transforming politics 
and society (Holbraad 2018). Along the way they face opposition, con-
fusion and internal divisions, and the need to work out on the go what 
the new arrangements are to be. Hence revolutions occur in stages, a 
sequence of bursts and retreats, and it is often difficult to tell when they 
begin and when they end (Herrmann 2011). Rupture, as I use the word, 
has a different shape: by definition it is a splitting apart of something 
that was previously joined or a whole, and it is conceived as a singular 
moment. It will be argued here that a moment of political rupture has to 
be bidirectional, in that actors inhabiting that point in time have to face 
the past as well as the future. In other words, rupture is a radical cut that 
is at the same time a ‘break from’ and a ‘break towards’. There is nothing 
simple about this idea. Since the event of rupture includes not only the 
time of the severance itself but also the visions by which both the before 
and the after are imagined, it contains a notional internal trifurcation. 
There is a further complexity, namely that it is only amid political strife 
and with imaginative strain that something vividly present now can be 
turned into a thing of the past, while elaborate efforts are simultaneously 
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made to call into being the things of the future. The split is in practice 
convoluted, since each of the elements as they are understood on the 
spot affects the character of the others. This chapter will suggest that the 
trifurcation and convolution of rupture are evident not only in political 
events but also appears in the subjectivities of the actors in diverse ways. 
The guillotining of Louis XVI in January 1793 is a moment of rupture that 
exemplifies these points.
Studies of French politics at that time suggest that the past as 
then conceived was coloured as tyranny precisely by the ways in which 
it contravened the virtues of the new society being initiated. The glow-
ing ‘future coming into being’ was relational too – it was bringing into 
existence institutions that glimmered not only with a forward but also 
with a vengeful backward-looking light. The time now starting was still 
coloured to a great extent negatively, by the dark features of the betray-
als, insults and injustices that must immediately be punished. Yet at the 
same time, this future also shone with the pure light from a deeper past, 
since the break was conceived by many revolutionary leaders as a return 
to once existing ‘natural rights’ – the rights to life, liberty and property 
that Rousseau had claimed natural to humanity before it was deformed 
by the evolution of society. This was a world view (though not the only 
one) through which the existential break at the juncture of these com-
plicated and mutually influenced pasts and futures – the execution of 
the king – was conceived to be fertile. Starkly, the killing cut itself was 
politically ‘life-giving’: the display of the king’s severed head was fol-
lowed by silence, then the cries ‘Long live the Republic! Long live the 
nation!’ Robespierre had expressed the thought when he declared: ‘It is 
with regret I pronounce this fatal truth: Louis must die so that the nation 
may live’ (Robespierre 1958, 130). As this chapter will show, however, 
this idea of ‘national life’ was far from the only way in which execution 
by guillotine was imagined by the population to produce vitality. Indeed, 
over a wider compass of time, it was prolific with new sensations, excite-
ments, fears and strangely productive pathologies.
There is a question that should be addressed first: can the guillo-
tining of the king be said to be the rupture of the French Revolution? 
Historians, the populace and the state have named other revolutionary 
events as the moment of rupture. In particular, 14 July 1789, the date 
of the storming of the Bastille prison, was a day that became The Day. 
It came to signify the founding moment of the Revolution and therefore 
a historical rupture. Already a grand public festival on its first anniver-
sary, in 1794 it became the Fête de l’Etre Suprême at which Robespierre 
declaimed: ‘Nature, how sublime, how delightful thy power! How the 
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tyrants must turn pale at the thought of this Festival’ – though Christopher 
Prendergast commenting on this declaration remarks that the tyrants 
‘were more likely to turn pale at the thought of the guillotine, which for 
the duration of the festival has been discreetly moved from view to – of all 
places – the site of the now demolished Bastille’ (Prendergast 2008, 17).
It was 14 July that was taken up by the French state as the cardinal 
national holiday, a point I will return to later, but meanwhile it should 
be noted that several other events have been claimed by historians as 
just as significant, even more truly ruptural in a political sense. For as 
it was happening the attack on the Bastille was not conceived as a pro-
ject of ending monarchy (it was mainly a rush to acquire arms from the 
prison’s store for self-protection against royal troops). The achievements 
claimed for it – the capitulation of the king, its designation as an act of 
the people’s sovereign will that would transform the political system, the 
invention of a new concept of revolution – were all conferred on the event 
after it had happened (Sewell 1996); whereas the meeting of the Estates 
General in May 1789, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen 
in August that year, the reinvention of dates itself and declaration of a 
new calendar in November 1793, the official end of the monarchy on 21 
September 1793, and the founding of the Republic on the 22nd, were all 
regime changers in themselves. I can see no problem with acknowledg-
ing that a revolution might contain within itself several crucial breaks 
that might metaphorically be called ruptures. But the beheading of the 
king in January 1793, and more broadly the Terror, the period between 
September 1793 and July 1794 when thousands were guillotined, was 
rupture in the most direct sense. It was understood to be a rending apart 
in itself, as it happened and not by virtue of some subsequent designa-
tion. It combined – uneasily – the three elements of how ‘rupture’ can be 
thought: the biological-material, the ideational-symbolic and the politi-
cal. Further, as a devastating experience for participants and onlookers, it 
had an unexpected psychic afterlife, a bizarre and diverse existence in sub-
sequent decades that has something important to say about the ongoing 
social implications of violence.
Matters at stake
It is very difficult to discuss the Terror as a point of rupture without a brief 
preliminary survey of the turbulent intellectual debates about what the 
Terror was as a political event. The beheading of the king curdled radi-
cally opposed political philosophies and thus it represented, and still to 
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some extent represents, rifts in social and moral judgement. I provide a 
short outline – indeed outrageously brief in view of the mass of writing on 
this subject – in order to acquaint readers with what at least some of the 
stakes are. Even for contemporaries in the eighteenth century, the guil-
lotine stood for several sharply conflicting positions. For radical Repub-
licans, it was the just and efficient instrument that demonstrated égalité 
and the will of the people (kings and workmen, they all die in exactly 
the same way); indeed, the clean cut of the guillotine was regarded as 
humanitarian, in comparison to earlier frantic mob carnage. For con-
servatives, the guillotine represented the barbaric bloody violence that 
destroyed the ‘natural bonds’ of society and religion; while for moderate 
Republicans it stood for an impending tyranny that threatened progres-
sive ideals of democracy and liberty.
Later interpretations that influenced the way the Revolution is 
understood today have been set out by one of the most renowned his-
torians of the Revolution, Francois Furet. As he explains (1998), most 
nineteenth-century historians were champions of the Revolution and 
adhered to Rousseau’s theory of the general will; that is, the idea that 
politics is largely about the process of discovering the will of the nation. 
This later solidified into a Marxist orthodoxy according to which the 
Revolution was not just a battle to overcome evil (absolute monarchy) 
and replace it with good (republican democracy), but was also a deeper 
transformation through class conflict, in which feudalism gave way to 
capitalism. After the overthrow of the monarchy, the conflict shifted to 
pit the capitalist bourgeoisie against the urban political movement led 
by the sans-culottes with their vision of a truly social revolution. With 
this overall positive view historians could nevertheless understand the 
Terror in different ways. The Revolution was divided into phases. For 
loyalists of the Revolution, the Terror had to be separated off as a tempo-
rary aberration in the general trajectory. It was the consequence of ‘the 
intentional villainy of historical actors’, or alternatively it was elevated 
to the cosmological-theological, being understood as the outcome of the 
design of Providence (Furet 1998, 55). For some writers, far from being 
consubstantial with the Revolution, the Terror manifested, on the con-
trary, ‘the emergence of its antithesis, its anti-principle, the resurrection 
of the [despotic] Ancien Régime and the corruption of the new by the 
old’ (1998, 56).
Radical Jacobin republicans, on the other hand, did not reject the 
Terror. They explained it as necessary, since the revolutionaries faced 
both internal and external enemies. In their view, according to Furet, 
the Terror was nevertheless separable from the Revolution, being not 
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intrinsic but merely one of its risks, and if the killing phase was par-
ticularly ‘heroic’ this was because it achieved victory, not because of the 
means it used to do so. Furet himself attacked the ‘Marxist catechism’ of 
the class struggle reading, and returned to political theory and intellectu-
al-cultural history; he refused to separate the Terror from the Revolution, 
seeing it as the logical result of the reconceptualization of politics, which 
was now based on popular sovereignty. The Terror was the Revolution’s 
culmination, quite plainly an abuse of power, achieved through dema-
goguery in the name of the people.
The American historian Arno Mayer (2001) has developed Furet’s 
argument to discuss terror comparatively in the French and Russian rev-
olutions. He argues, in summary, that there is no true revolution with-
out violence and terror; that terror takes several forms, both ‘wild’ and 
‘would-be legitimate’; that its initiation stems from the radical breakdown 
of political authority; that terror is driven by a dialectical interaction 
between revolution and counter-revolution; and that a key element in 
this interaction is religious confrontation (in the case of France between 
secular millenarianism and the fanaticism of folk Catholicism). However, 
Mayer, unlike Furet, downplays the importance of revolutionary ideology. 
He argues that terror directly emerges out of the revolutionary process 
itself, from the confrontation with the real threat of counter-revolution.1 
This conclusion is supported by Timothy Tackett (2001, 570–2), who 
emphasizes more than Mayer the stimulant of fear among the revolution-
aries and the emergence among them of an obsession with conspiracy 
and hidden counterplots. This is splendidly illustrated by a revolution-
ary poster in which the aristocracy is depicted as a Janus-like figure: a 
demonic, knife-wielding priest and a simpering lady are bound together by 
a serpent, while a cloven hoof and a claw appear from under their gowns. 
The legend reads: ‘The aristocracy unmasked. Beware of its caresses, its 
thousand arms are ready to strike you’ (Tackett 2000, 690).
Most germane to this chapter, however, is the work of Sophie 
Wahnich (2003; 2009; 2012), a writer of the Left who nevertheless 
eschews a directly Marxist account. She argues that the Terror can 
only be understood, and its political import comprehended, by think-
ing about the emotions that compelled it and which it generated. For 
her, the Terror was not a rational recourse of government, the only way 
to maintain order (i.e. through imposing fear) when all civic institu-
tions had been overturned, as the revolutionary Saint-Just had argued 
(Sonenscher 2008, 404). Rather, it came about as an emotional reac-
tion to insult, the aristocracy’s refusal to accord sovereign right to the 
new Republic, surging first as frenzied vengeance for the assassination 
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of the revolutionary hero Marat in July 1793. This vengeance was not 
that of an individual psychological kind, nor the expression of primi-
tive animal instinct, nor was it a displacement of religious ideas into 
politics; rather this vengeance was a foundational violence, one that 
gave a new possibility for bringing men together, and it is best under-
stood in the light of the dismantling and remaking of social relations, 
and of sacrificial ritual and sacred violence (Wahnich 2003, 21–2). 
Other writers, such as William Sewell in his magisterial study of the 
Bastille, reserve the notion of foundational violence for the glorious 
14 July (Sewell 1996, 859); but Wahnich refuses to dissociate 1789 
from 1793, and thus in effect she defends the Terror, characterizing 
it as a response to the counter-revolutionaries’ threat to terrorize the 
people. This idea of relational responses is why she advances the idea 
of an economy of emotions – in which initiatory actions were imagined 
as ‘paybacks’ in return for the anger of an enemy. What is important, 
she writes, is to understand which political sacra were the foundation 
of the circulation of emotions that led to the Terror (2003, 24–6). They 
were justice, honour and the masses’ identity as ‘the people’ and as the 
victors. Thus, the Terror in Wahnich’s account appears as a form of 
constitutive justice corresponding to a new social configuration, that 
of the sovereign people (2003, 43–4).
Wahnich’s works contain important discussions of how her inter-
pretation relates to the argument that the Terror was the precedent for 
twentieth-century totalitarianism, to Agamben’s theory of Homo sacer 
and the sovereign exception, and above all to contemporary terrorism 
(Wahnich 2009). But for now I will leave these questions aside in order 
to focus on the anthropology and ethnography of the Terror as rupture.
Anthropologizing a historical event
Given these conflicting understandings of what the Terror and the Rev-
olution were (ontologically), it seems to me that anthropologists could 
best approach them as ‘matters of concern’ (Latour 2004). Latour advo-
cated against deconstructing swirling debate, facts, opinions and emo-
tion to get at the truth. Rather he was aiming at a new realism concerned 
with ‘things’, in which ‘a thing is in one sense an object out there and, in 
another sense, an issue very much in there’, in a gathering of participants 
(2004, 233, emphasis in original). ‘The critic is not the one who lifts the 
rugs from under the feet of the naïve believers, but the one who offers 
participants arenas in which to gather’ (Tafarella 2012).
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In our case, the contents of any ‘arena’ offered by anthropologists 
will be filled in – short of becoming a historian oneself – by the materi-
als supplied by social historians, with their accumulation of painstaking 
research on places, dates, persons and eyewitness accounts. Some of their 
work also raises what we can readily see as anthropological issues – that 
is, interpretations, using concepts developed by the authors that would 
be alien to eighteenth-century participants but make sense in terms of 
the intellectual history of their discipline. An example is Lynn Hunt’s 
Freudian influenced argument (2013) that the French Revolution was 
imagined through a new conceptualization of patriarchy and the famil-
ial order. And as Thomassen points out (2012), there are many classical 
theories developed in anthropology that could be turned to analysing 
revolution, such as Van Gennep on ritual, Simmel on crowd behaviour, 
Turner on liminality and Bateson on schismogenesis. However poten-
tially productive these ideas might be, I do not propose to return to them 
in this chapter, which is concerned specifically with rupture. Instead I 
turn to the newer anthropology focused on the event, ontology and expe-
rience, hoping in this way to offer an ‘arena’ for gathering that is indeed 
composed as far as possible of contemporary participants, rather than 
retrospective analysts. Such anthropology, I am convinced, is needed to 
deal with the singular physical and conceptual moment of rupture that 
the guillotine brings so vividly before us.
Admittedly, the guillotine is a grim object around which to enable a 
gathering. But it is a brilliantly ‘contrary’ kind of case if we are thinking 
about the co-presence of the physical and conceptual that I am arguing 
for; the point may appear glib, or even obvious, but it is worth pointing 
out that arguing for it goes against the grain – runs contrary to countless 
descriptions, narratives and rhetorical statements from the time of the 
Terror that separated body from mind. For the cut effected by the guillo-
tine was not the splitting of an object into two similar parts, like slicing an 
apple in half. It was the separation of a person’s head, with all of its conno-
tations of mind and personality, from their body, with its implied merely 
physical nature. The decapitation of Louis XVI was a particular point of 
concentration that brought into focus and then threw up and multiplied 
many antimonies: on top of mind and body there tottered an edifice of 
sacred king versus mere man, monarchy versus republic, tyranny versus 
freedom, abstract reason versus history and indeed life versus death. 
‘Rupture’ is a capacious idea that can accommodate the splitting that took 
place on so many ‘levels’, or rather within so many kinds of discourse. Yet 
it is a properly anthropological task to query this capaciousness, to inquire 
about the grounds for the proliferation of conceptual bifurcations, and 
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in particular to investigate the idea that politically conceived oppositions 
might be placed in relational tension by physical/mental combinations 
thrown up in the actual experience of beheading. Actually, if we consider 
the philosophy, political and social history, psychology and psychoanaly-
sis, art history and indeed subsequent revolutionary activist theory that 
has been devoted to the French Revolution, I do not think that anthropol-
ogy can provide anything more than a partial view of the event of rupture. 
Still, it is worth trying to think about what that might be.
The historical ‘we’ of the Terror
That being said, I hope readers will forgive me for preparing the ground 
by starting with Hegel and Kant. Although of different generations, they 
were contemporaries of the Terror and both had interesting things to 
say about the Revolution that can orient an anthropological view of rup-
ture, in particular if the aim is not just to write another anthropologically 
inflected social history but also to ‘gather in’ the philosophical rumina-
tions that gave meaning to such a brutal happening. Hegel in The Philos-
ophy of Spirit is concerned to understand how a finite event, the French 
Revolution, could take on a universal, transcendental character (‘spirit’), 
such that it could be conceived as having in some sense happened to us 
all. His critique of the Terror was that in their efforts to institute a new 
conception of human freedom – absolute ahistorical human freedom – the 
Republicans were forced to turn on themselves and to destroy the very 
institutions of freedom they had created. As David Ciavatta argues, this 
meant that for Hegel the Revolution was a failed attempt to efface its own 
character as a historical event, its actual contingency and spatio-temporal 
contingency. As the voice of timeless reason, the Revolution was inher-
ently incapable of owning up to its own historicity (Ciavatta 2014, 579).2 
This argument is crucial for Hegel because it reveals the impossibility of a 
rationality that is wholly detached from history. The event of the Terror, 
by which the Revolution annihilated itself, thus becomes for Hegel a deci-
sive revelation of the historical nature of reason itself. The Terror cannot 
be understood as the vehicle of a rationality that exists independently or 
prior to these events, but must be understood as having its own thought 
process that gives efficacy and compelling authority to a rationality that 
could not exist at any other moment (Ciavatta 2014, 580).
Kant, older by a generation, makes a not dissimilar argument, 
though in a completely different way. In his work on enlightenment and 
revolution, as described by Foucault, Kant’s question is: what is this ‘now’, 
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which we all inhabit and which defines the moment in which I am writ-
ing? What is there in this present that can have contemporary meaning 
for philosophical reflection? Kant’s response is that this meaningful ele-
ment manifests itself in the bearer of a process of thought, someone who 
forms part of this same process, figuring in it. To be a philosopher is not a 
question of adherence to an ideology, nor belonging to the human com-
munity in general, but of membership in a particular ‘we’, corresponding 
to a cultural ensemble characteristic of his own contemporaneity. The 
French Revolution, like the Enlightenment, was an event in the history 
of thought that created such a ‘we’. It does not consist of its successes or 
failures, its overturning of institutions or its crimes. Rather, its meaning 
lies in its operation as a spectacle and in its re-memorable, demonstra-
tive and diagnostic character as an event. In effect, the bearers of this 
meaning are all the people who may not have taken part in it but allow 
themselves to be swept away by it. According to Kant such approbation 
emerges from a moral disposition of humanity: to provide a government 
for itself that seems good to itself, virtuous and renouncing external war. 
This is why the Revolution, which reveals this thought, can never be for-
gotten, even if the actual result was to slump back into something like the 
old rut (Foucault 1986, 92–4).
Hegel and Kant both suggest, at least to my mind, that under-
standing the Terror requires placing the philosopher in the middle of it, 
as a necessarily historical actor experiencing its particular reasoning 
and enthusiasm. So what could this have meant in an event as ghastly 
as rupture effected specifically by the use of the guillotine? Perhaps 
the best way to think about this is to consider the similarities and dif-
ferences between the so-called ‘September massacres’ of 1792 and the 
Terror proper initiated by the guillotining of the king in January 1793. In 
September crowds had attacked virtually the entire prison population of 
Paris, in the fear that the inmates would break out and join the enemies 
then invading France. The subsequent decision to employ the guillotine 
by the revolutionary regime, in public and surrounded by thousands of 
soldiers, was rationalized as the terrible but orderly justice of the state. 
The contrast between the two episodes of violence can be seen in the kill-
ing of the Princess de Lamballe, whose ghastly end also has some inter-
esting things to say to us.3
On 3 September 1792, the princess was extracted from prison, and 
‘gasping for breath, held at arm’s length, almost unconscious’ she was 
led before a hurriedly improvised Tribune of the People.4 She was sen-
tenced to death, to be ‘sent away’ (élargie) in the euphemistic language 
of the Tribune. Two men carried her into the street; she was struck with 
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sabres on her head and neck, stabbed in the eye. She tried to fall down 
to die, but the crowd forced her onto her feet. A certain Charlat knocked 
her senseless with a log, and then the crowd attacked her body until it 
was a shapeless, bloody, unrecognizable thing. A butcher’s boy named 
Grison cut off her head. A procession then set off dragging the macabre 
trophies, pulling a rope attached to the princess’s feet. It visited her fam-
ily’s Paris residence, then the place of imprisonment of the royal family. 
The head, people said, was brought to make a bow to Marie-Antoinette, 
before parading both head and body in the streets of Paris. In the words 
of an observer:
We heard tumultuous and prolonged shouts: they were here! Two 
individuals dragged a naked body by its legs, headless, its back on 
the ground and its abdomen laid open to the chest. The cortege 
halts. On a shaky platform, the corpse is ceremoniously spread 
out, and the limbs arranged with a kind of art, and, above all, a 
sang froid, which leaves a vast field to the meditations of the wise. 
To my right, at the end of a lance, was a head that often brushed 
against my face because of the movements the bearer made when 
he gesticulated. To my left, another one, more horrible, held in one 
hand the intestines of the victim against his chest, and in the other 
a large knife. Behind them, a large collier hung from a lance, above 
my forehead, a scrap of camisole soaked with blood and mire. (De 
Baecque 2003, 62)5
The crowd demanded the presence of the royal family at the win-
dow to witness the body and hear the shouts demanding the head of 
Marie-Antoinette; the corpse was then taken to be presented to the 
Duc d’Orléans, the princess’s brother-in-law, amid constant tumult, 
oaths and roars of triumph. The crowd disposed of the body at a con-
struction site near Chatelet, where it was left naked all night, and next 
day taken to be buried at the Foundlings’ Cemetery.
What is common to the execution of the king and that of Lamballe 
is that the dismembered physical parts were not ignored as embodiments 
of the rejected past, but instead became a matter of extraordinary atten-
tion. The revolutionary future and the abhorred past were both kept in 
full view. In fact, it is not just that the ‘revealed, paraded, exhibited, tor-
tured body is like the support of the judiciary procedure … that must 
become readable for everyone’ (Foucault 1977, 47–8), the corpse also 
became an object of hatred and wild phantasmagoric visions released 
during or immediately after the killing.
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The death of the princess, like that of the king, can be seen as a 
‘thing’ in the Latourian sense, in which participants gather to maintain its 
existence by their conflicting accounts (Latour 2004, 246). De Baecque 
underlines the probable embroidery of the popular narratives, pointing 
out that official reports did not support the eyewitness accounts cited 
above: the body was left clothed; trinkets in the pockets were preserved; 
the corpse was probably carried in a wagon, not dragged through the 
streets at the end of a rope; decapitation did occur, but the head was 
not damaged. No mention was made in these sober reports of mutila-
tion or the sexual outrages that appeared almost obsessively in outraged 
Royalist narratives, such as cutting off the genitals or plucking the pubic 
hair to be worn by a soldier as a mocking moustache. It is clear, however, 
that the public needed to project backwards some kind of imagined past. 
It had been animated by rumours about the despicable and depraved life 
the princess had led: she was a courtesan, rumoured to be an intriguer at 
court; and through her the crowd took aim not only at a friend of hated 
Marie-Antoinette but also at her as a woman and her alleged homosexu-
ality (De Baecque 2003, 71).
Whatever the truth of the treatment of this particular body, it 
is evident that the corpse, representing all that was rejected by the 
Revolution, was at the very least an equal in the imagination of the 
crowd to the vision of a socially just future. In this respect, the same 
was true of the guillotining of the king, as I shall show. Yet the crucial 
difference is that there was no contemporary ‘we’ of the September 
massacres. In the following months, citizens advised one another to 
‘cover with a veil’ this terrible event (Tackett 2015, 217). No public 
body took responsibility for those killings, unlike in the case of the 
king, when the Convention, which argued for days, took several 
close-run votes to arrive at the sentence for the monarch. The deci-
sion that prevailed emerged through reasoned arguments: the king 
had committed treason by earlier attempting to flee France, and his 
inviolability accorded by the Constitution of 1791 was subordinate 
to the principle of equality embodied in the revolutionary Rights of 
Man and the Citizen. Almost all social groups followed the debates 
in the Convention closely. The participants themselves took collective 
responsibility for the decision to kill the king, and even an anxious 
member had no doubt that the story of the execution ‘would rever-
berate to the far corners of the earth and through the end of time’ 
(Tackett 2015, 239–42). Thus, unlike the case of the princess, the exe-
cution of the king became a political-social rupture as I have defined 
it; that is, as a conscious making of a momentous historical break.
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The decision was based not only on new political principles but also 
on its own distinctive idea of virtue. It was in its light that members of 
the Assembly solemnly voted to execute Louis XVI and later to enable the 
Terror. Virtue was now defined, especially by Robespierre, as unshakea-
ble and selfless devotion to the public good. Furthermore, ‘being virtuous’ 
had to be demonstrated by action, for fear of accusations of hypocrisy 
(Linton 2013). Thus, it had become ‘necessary to be inhuman’, to wound 
sensibility by offering violence to the body of the enemy, ‘a violence that 
was infinite, exceptional and legitimate, since it was offered through the 
sentiment of doing good’ (Wahnich 2003, 20).6
The fertile blood of rupture
The ‘we’ of the execution of the king was, however, a shifting, tempo-
rary and multiple entity, as I attempt to describe in the following sec-
tions. The shape of a political rupture that takes place in history can 
be notionally divided into a before, now and an after. Yet in this case, 
the trifurcation is more like a constantly moving immaterial coupling 
that has a recursive form, in that the attempt to make a radical rift is 
constantly placed under question by the unpredicted reattachment to 
the present of that spectral ‘thing’ which had been cut off – yet this is 
a rejoining that is given a new, productive meaning by the actors as it 
happens. Revolutionary rupture in such a ‘social form’ may be mobile in 
the sense that it becomes a new part of a culture (Robbins, this volume) 
to which people can have recourse, and may re-enact in different places 
and periods. But I would like to differentiate the ‘re-memorative’ rev-
olutionary fervour extolled by Kant, which reappeared for example in 
the Paris Commune of 1870 and the Russian Revolution in 1917 (adum-
brated also by Rowlands et al. for the Chinese case in this volume), from 
the imaginative shape surrounding a subject ‘in the middle’ of rupture, 
the subjectivity of the one who takes part if only in his or her mind. 
In the abstract, the guillotine seems to bring about a simple relation – 
that of a whole entity that becomes two separate parts. But it did more 
than that. The very instant of severance brought before a viewer’s eyes 
a third active element. Mechanically more efficient than other methods 
of execution it may have been, but beheading by the guillotine caused 
a gush of blood; this was something ambiguous and unearthly, a messy 
flow that was neither ‘the head’ nor ‘the body’ and that somehow had 
to be conceptualized with the cultural means of the time. As I shall now 
explain, the spilling of blood became an element, at once tangible and 
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symbolic, in the creation of social identities (the various ‘us’) attached 
to revolutionary events.
Let us turn to the execution of Louis XVI, or Louis Capet as he was 
then known. At this point, in January 1793, the political breaks had 
already happened: the monarchy was over and the Republic had been 
founded. So the decision to guillotine the former ruler shows that some-
thing not purely political had come to the fore: the issue of physically 
ending the threat posed by the continued life of the heir of the Bourbons. 
Blood-metaphor was the language of the day, and now real blood was 
to become its physical instantiation. As he stood on the scaffold, Louis’s 
last words were, ‘People, I die an innocent man. I pardon those who 
have decided my death. I pray God that my blood will not come down 
on France’ (Tackett 2015, 241). And during the subsequent Terror, 
Louis-Marie Prudhomme repeated like a litany, ‘They [enemies of the 
Revolution] want our blood. Well then, since it’s blood they want, let the 
blood flow’ (Tackett 2015, 278–9).
The killing of the king on 21 January 1793 was the first and most 
important act of the Terror and everyone realized its symbolic signifi-
cance. The platform of the guillotine was surrounded by around 20,000 
spectators and 80,000 armed guards. The tension in the air was extraor-
dinary, for the king was seen by all to have been the apex of an entire 
social order. Even though he had by now become Louis Capet and thus 
his body was in principle no longer held sacred, at his trial the ‘sacred 
body’ of the king was invoked, since, as de Baecque argues, the person 
of the king had to be ‘excepted’ from ordinary humanity as the body and 
soul of the monarchy, the better to turn it into a monstrosity ‘outside 
the nation’ (De Baecque 2003, 90).7 The Divine Right of the Kings of 
France had rested greatly on the rites of internment whereby the sacred 
power was transmitted to a successor-descendant (Kantorowicz 1997). 
In 1793 the elaborate rites and constantly reiterated masses, designed 
to proclaim that the kingship never dies, were abruptly cut short and the 
royal mausoleum of Saint-Denis was desecrated along with the other 
repositories of royal remains. This was the context in which Louis’s exe-
cution was designed to draw attention to a void – his blanked-out royal 
ancestry. The revolutionaries deliberately moved the platform of the 
guillotine so that it faced the empty pedestal that had earlier supported 
a statue of the previous king, Louis XV. The whole religious funerary 
hand-over scenario was now abolished by the ‘rational’ decapitation of 
the king.8 The revolutionaries insisted on the ordinariness of the body, 
on the sober demeanour of the crowd. There was to be no sacraliza-
tion of the corpse, no insult, no desecration. ‘Let them take his body 
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where they like! What does it matter to us?’ exclaimed Le Républicain 
(De Baecque 2003, 98). Révolutions de Paris wrote: ‘The head of a king, 
in falling, must not make more noise than that of any other scoundrel’ 
(2003, 99). In other words, once it had happened the execution was to 
be a non-event, a true annihilation.
But meanwhile there was the blood, and this, it seems,  turned 
people to a frenzy. Again, the official reports denied or downplayed any 
such happening. But almost immediately graphic representations of 
the Medusa-like severed head (Louis’s head held up by an anonymous 
arm, copiously dripping) appeared everywhere, prominently featuring 
blood.
De Baecque writes:
The properties of royal blood are rich, as we know, and by a very 
strange spatiotemporal phenomenon, seem to stretch out in time 
and dilate in space the Republican representation of the death of 
the king: the blood flows out from the royal corpse, spreads out, 
and Republican narratives soon begin to swell, making the ordinar-
iness and silence at first associated with the description of the exe-
cution implode. (2003, 102)
Eyewitness accounts of the execution appeared in the same month. 
The people wanted the king’s hair, others rushed to soak their hand-
kerchiefs in the blood, dip their lances and bayonets in it, taste it; 
there was crying with joy. According to Prudhomme, one man climbed 
up onto the guillotine, plunged his bare arm into Capet’s blood, filled 
his hand with it and three times showered the crowd of attendants 
who pressed up to the foot of the scaffold to receive drops on their 
foreheads (quoted in de Baecque 2003, 107). People were reported to 
have paid to get hold of traces of blood, and pieces of bloodied cloth, 
hair, and fragments of the king’s clothing were sold. The impression 
is inescapable that the blood of the king was not just plain blood; rhe-
torically impure as it might be, but had become somehow vitalizing, 
like an injection of a dangerous drug, giving a burst of energy to the 
popular spirit of the Revolution itself.9 Blood-soaked, tiny scraps of 
material had become magic charms.10 Indeed, among such a (perhaps 
formerly, but still…) Christian people as the French in the eighteenth 
century, it would not be surprising if being anointed by the king’s 
blood was experienced by many participants as a new subjectivity, 
something like a baptism – perhaps a kind of transformation of the 
self, via the overcoming of revulsion.
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The ‘we’ thus created by acquiring blood relics, or participating in 
the enthusiasm for them, was replicated in similar form a few months 
later, following the assassination of the ‘Friend of the People’, Jean-Paul 
Marat in July 1793. What is interesting about this is first that it was the 
exceptionality/sacredness of the blood that seems to have mattered 
most, rather than judgement of its character (that of a traitor king in one 
case, of a revolutionary hero in the other), and second that the liquid, 
absorbable nature of blood enabled the creation of a immediate ‘we’ of a 
socially dispersed kind. Marat’s body, already decomposing and turning 
green, was paraded through Paris, with the chest naked, exposing the 
bloody knife wound. According to eye-witness accounts, people fainted 
at the ghastly sight. Men turned away to look at the orators, but women 
gazed firmly at the bier, threw flowers on it, and in great numbers gath-
ered the blood that seemed to flow from the corpse. The body remained 
more or less entire, but the blood was disseminated – into Marat’s shirt, 
his gown, the pages of the journal he had been holding, and onto those 
who were attending him (Guilhaumou 1986, 71). This powerful blood 
took on a biologically life-giving, or hero-creating, vitality. Women were 
anointed with it to the cry, ‘Let the blood of Marat become the seed of 
intrepid republicans’. They replied, swearing to ‘people the earth with 
as many Marats as they could’ (Guilhaumou 1986, 71; Hunt 2013, 76).
However, the antinomy intrinsic to rupture, that of the discarded, 
the horrible, the impure, being re-attached as a vitalization of the future 
good life, is most starkly seen in the case of the king. In later generations, 
the ‘we’ of the Revolution found this difficult to bear. Indeed, the contra-
diction turned the king’s blood into an archetypal Latourean ‘thing’ of con-
tention. One issue was about impurity. At the time, republicans began to 
identify Louis’s earlier life with evil blood. ‘Scarcely had he emerged from 
infancy when the germ of that ferocious perversity that characterizes a 
despot was seen to develop in him. His first games were games of blood, 
and his brutality increasing with age, he took delight in satisfying it on 
all the animals that he encountered’, wrote the Comité des Secours Publics 
(De Baecque 2003, 103). In the poster, the king’s blood drips directly onto 
the caption (‘May an impure blood water our furrows’), a visual statement 
that the ‘impure blood’ is that of the king, with the understanding that it 
is impure because he was a vicious enemy. However, this caption is a line 
from the refrain of an army song, the Marseillaise, which shortly became 
the republican, and then the French national, anthem. National sentiment 
changes over time, and later on the idea of glorifying in the blood of the 
defeated enemy began to evoke alarmed responses. Could such a blood-
thirsty sentiment represent France, and anyway, was this interpretation 
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not ignorantly anachronistic? Latter-day observers pointed out that in 
eighteenth-century agrarian France the sans-culottes were of lowly, often 
peasant, origin, that the king’s blood was pure by definition, and therefore 
that it must be our blood, the honest impure blood of ordinary people, that 
would fructify the furrows. Thus, it is concluded, the caption refers sym-
bolically to our sacrifice, that of republicans proud to give their blood on 
the field of honour (Peretti 2012). Something of a sleight of hand perhaps, 
yet it is only in such ways that jarring antinomies can be circumvented 
and the ‘we’ of the Terror morphed into the glorious ‘we’ of the Revolution 
taken as a whole.
This revised interpretation of the placard reflects, of course, the 
political and moral ambivalence that simmered beneath the surface 
among many of those who had publicly acclaimed the Terror. It was only 
a year later, in July 1794, that the radical Committee of Public Safety was 
ousted in the coup of 9 Thermidor (in the new dating system), and in 
1795 Robespierre was arrested and guillotined. A poster of Robespierre’s 
cut-off head now appeared. Visually, this undoubtedly referenced the 
one of Louis XVI, but the caption was changed to reflect the new senti-
ment of revulsion: ‘“I’ve played the French and divinity … I die on the 
scaffold, [which] I have well merited.’”
People who had earlier fervently supported the guillotining of the 
king and queen as a necessary part of the Revolution, now turned against 
the Terror, many afraid for their own lives. If there can be no Revolution 
without its Thermidorian reaction, more germane to this chapter is the 
thought that rupture may contain its own inner rupture, the splitting 
apart, or transmutation, of the formerly seemingly implacable ‘we’ (or 
even ‘I’) that had formed around it. The placard has Robespierre himself 
abjuring his acts, and while this was an external imputation, it is clear 
that there were many advocates of the Terror who soon disowned it in 
person – abdicating from its ‘we’. One such was Prudhomme, who had 
first called for bloodletting but from 1794–5 devoted himself obsessively 
to collecting and disseminating the names of all the victims and then to 
publishing an ‘impartial’ multi-volume history of the faults and crimes 
committed during the Revolution (Prudhomme 1796).
The widespread recantation is a main reason why, in my view, it 
would be mistaken to approach the killing of Louis XVI, in terms of sacri-
fice. This observation does not apply to revolution as a whole. Indeed, the 
language of sacrifice was used widely, in many different circumstances, 
during the French Revolution, usually in the sense of self-denying sacri-
fice of property and even one’s own life for the sake of the patrie, using 
the idiom of virtue. Membership of the community of the faithful was to a 
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Figure 1.1 Placard of the head of Robespierre. (Bibliothèque 
nationale de France, département Estampes et photographie, RESERVE 
QB-370 (48)-FT4). 
great extent defined by evidence of this kind of sacrifice. Analytical works 
have drawn on a different notion of sacrifice – as expiatory violence, the 
revolutionary ‘transfer of the sacred’ from monarch to nation – an exam-
ple somewhat hazily drawn is Wahnich (2003) (for a thoughtful and 
extensive survey of this literature, see Zizek 2016). Nevertheless, I would 
argue that the rupture of the killing of Louis XVI was not a sacrifice in the 
classical anthropological sense (Hocart 1954; Hubert and Mauss 1964; 
Hertz 1960). As theorized by Maurice Bloch (1991), for example, the 
ritual of sacrifice is an attempt to bring about the very opposite of rup-
ture – the continuity of a transcendent social-cosmological vision. The 
executors of a killing that is sacrifice in this sense desire to sustain, by this 
means, the continuation of the immortal social and political subjecthood 
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of all those who had carried out this sacrifice in previous generations. 
This was not the case with the guillotining of Louis XVI. In that killing 
the aim was radical change, of both the object (now not a king) and the 
actor-subject (an entirely new body, the Jacobin republicans). Although 
the act could be subsumed as an episode in the overall revolutionary pro-
cess, for which the overarching idea of ‘revolutionary sacrifice’ may well 
be appropriate, I would submit that it was in itself not a sacrifice, if only 
because the executants cut themselves off from their cosmological past, 
and were riven in the way that rupture itself is riven.
This was a deeply ambivalent position and its fragility (prone to fac-
tions and disintegration) is one reason why I suggest, contra Wahnich, 
that the historical descendants in France of the ‘we’ of the guillotining of 
the king could not be the same as for the French Revolution. It would be 
interesting, though I cannot take the point further here, to compare this 
situation with the ferocious factionalism inside the Soviet Communist 
Party at the initiating of the 1930s purges, which indeed appropriated 
some of the language of the French Terror.11 But politically this was a 
different situation and a dissimilar, more long-drawn-out rupture. In the 
French case, the latter-day inheritors of the Terror were mostly the vic-
tims; far removed from the state, they appeared in strange, displaced and 
shattered forms.
The afterlife of rupture
Early in the Revolution, in 1790, the physician Philippe Pinel observed 
the ‘salutary effects of the progress of liberty’. The national mind was 
flooded with vigour ‘as though by some electric virtue, the system of 
nerves and muscles of a new life’. Earnestly committed to the Revolution, 
he gave up his Christian faith and decided to become a doctor. By 1793, 
however, the massacres appalled him, and the execution of Louis XVI 
provided the occasion for him to draw up his own judgement:
As a physician and philosopher accustomed to meditating on gov-
ernments, ancient and modern, and on human nature, I can foresee 
only anarchy, factions, and wars that will be disastrous even for the 
victors, now that I truly know [Paris] and the full value of the pyg-
mies making so much noise. (quoted in Murat 2014, 42–3)
In August 1793 Citizen Pinel was appointed to the post of physician at 
Bicêtre, a combined prison, hospital and hospice of appalling squalor 
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that housed some 4,000 people of all kinds, some 200 of them insane, 
along with vagabonds, epileptics, criminals, the senile and the venereal. 
Pinel drew up a chart of the 200 under his care, noting the large num-
ber of cases, some 33 per cent, whose mental distress was not caused by 
economic or domestic misfortune, nor by love, nor by religious fanati-
cism (his other categories), but by ‘events connected by the Revolution’ 
(2014, 49–50). For him, ‘madness’ was a ‘disease of human sensitivity, 
whose causes are to be found in the torments of life – mourning, despair, 
jealousy, desire for fame, excessive bookishness or religion’ (2014, 43). 
Pinel thus understood his patients to be in a common pool with the rest 
of humanity and to be curable. He wrote:
The idea of madness should by no means imply a total abolition of 
the mental faculties. On the contrary, the disorder usually attacks 
only one partial faculty, such as the perception of ideas or judge-
ment, reasoning, imagination, memory or psychological sensitivity. 
A madman who died this year and who thought he was Louis XVI 
was a living example of the nonconformity of ideas with the objects 
that occasioned them, since he saw all persons who entered the 
hospice as so many Pages or Guardsmen come to receive his orders. 
(quoted in Murat 2014, 44)
Pinel thought that there was a substrate of reason that the doctor should 
try to reawaken, and that this should be done first by protecting patients, 
earning their trust, and then shocking them into an unambiguous break 
with their delusions – this last to be done by a ‘formidable show of terror’.
How could Pinel, who despaired of revolutionary excesses, have 
used such an expression? As Murat observes, it was not a coincidence. 
The semantic spread of the word ‘terror’ – the arbitrariness of violence as 
a policy of necessary virtue, that is to say as ‘all at once attribute, method 
and system of government – was in fact perfectly suited to the ambiv-
alence of the birth of psychiatry, its structure and ideological options’ 
(2014, 45). The point I would like to make is that Pinel, by using both 
sympathy and terror, was entering into the mental world of the people 
affected by ‘events connected to the Revolution’.
According to Pinel’s accounts, what prisoners awaiting their execution 
by guillotine dreaded most was not death but the public dismemberment, 
the end to the integrity of the body in a gush of blood. Many people had 
this same dread even if they had not been sentenced. One was a tailor who 
had one day freely expressed his opinion about the beheading of Louis XVI, 
and thereafter lived in perpetual fear of arrest and execution. In ‘trembling 
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and dark consternation’ he lost the ability to eat and sleep, until he lost his 
mind. Sent to the Hotel-Dieu, he failed to improve from the usual treatment 
(blood-letting) and was then transferred to Bicêtre. The idea of his death 
haunted him day and night. Pinel applied his usual sympathetic treatment, 
encouraging the man to take up his usual trade of tailoring inside the asy-
lum. But after some months of improvement, the patient had a relapse. Then 
Pinel applied the terror. This consisted of a mock trial set up by the doctors, 
at which after a serious questioning of the ‘accused’, the ‘prosecutor’ in a loud 
voice, so as to make a deep impression on his imagination, pronounced the 
citizen duly examined according to law and found him to be a true patriot 
and not guilty. The stratagem worked for a while; the tailor went back to 
work, though he relapsed into depression when someone told him that the 
trial had been a jest (Murat 2014, 58–60).
If this case shows the thoughtful doctor as well as the patient tak-
ing subjective positions in relation to the threat posed by the guillotine, 
another case is more direct evidence of a subjectivity of rupture. A watch-
maker patient believed he had lost his head on the scaffold; that it had 
been thrown in the basket indiscriminately among the heads of other 
victims; that the judges, repenting their cruel sentences, ordered these 
heads to be restored to the owners and placed on their shoulders; but 
that in consequence of an unfortunate mistake the head of a different 
victim had been placed on his own shoulders. The idea of this change of 
head occupied his thoughts night and day, which caused his relatives to 
consign him to Hotel-Dieu and thence to Bicêtre. The watchmaker had an 
outrageous and jovial humour. ‘Look at these teeth’, he would cry; ‘mine 
were exceedingly handsome, but these are rotten. What a difference 
between this hair and mine before my head was changed!’ (from Pinel, 
quoted by Murat 2014, 61).
Here the political rupture is transmuted into personal mental-phys-
ical experience, but something has gone terribly wrong with the clean 
split: instead of dismembered death on one side and a completely new 
being on the other, this imaginary saw only a jumble, a mistake, a loss of 
the person’s true identity. This case is different from the public preoccu-
pation with blood discussed earlier, for that was always blood that was 
in some way symbolic, which because it represented an idea could then 
appear as an external agent with efficacious powers. Here, the watch-
maker can only have been one among countless other witnesses whose 
imagination fixed on the real bodily separation: my body, my head, and 
on the unthinkable of existence after decapitation. The rupture of the 
body politic was transmuted into the rupture of me as a whole and con-
tinuous human being, someone who now hosts ‘the wrong head’.
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Conclusion
Extracting the pivotal moment of ‘rupture’ from the revolutionary pro-
cess, as I have tried to do here, is a theoretical exercise. It has left aside 
consideration of many themes usually regarded as essential to under-
standing the French Revolution: the great changes of structures of gov-
ernment and the new language of political legitimacy (Sewell 1996), 
the strategic manoeuvring of leaders, and the occupation of the space of 
power, which Furet saw as filled up with democratic rhetoric but other 
writers such as Jean-Clément Martin and Lynn Hunt have described as 
sucking in gender, religious, social, economic and regional differences, 
allowing these strands to combine, disaggregate, and then recombine 
in explosive fashion.12 A more comprehensive understanding would 
have to incorporate the new ‘practical filiations’ to which both Martin 
and Wahnich draw attention, the new social groupings and sensibilities 
that suddenly appeared (from the aesthetic taste for ruins, the fashion 
for mesmerism, changes in familial relations, new perception of bodily 
smells, the vogue for pornography, to the appreciation of the horrific 
‘sublime’). Still, in support of advancing a skeletal picture of rupture in 
order better to delineate it, there is the key argument made by Wah-
nich, which is relevant both to the Terror and to the political violence 
of our own time. Addressing anyone who might think to draw a paral-
lel between the Terror and 9/11, she states: ‘Revolutionary violence is 
not terrorism. To make a moral equivalence between the Revolution’s 
year II and September 2001 is historical and philosophical nonsense … 
The violence exercised in September 2001 aimed neither at equality nor 
liberty.’13
The ‘we’ of the Revolution consisted of those who upheld the val-
ues of equality, liberty and justice. And perhaps the elevation of values 
declared to be universal and human has to be true of all revolutionary 
movements, in order to form the resolute ‘us’ against which the rotten 
enemy is conceived. Martin Holbraad, for example, has drawn attention 
to how people in Cuba are encouraged by official discourse to think of ‘our 
revolution’ as an ongoing project that has continued to develop since the 
event of the revolution’s ‘Triumph’ in 1959. He argues that the notion of 
‘having been formed in the revolution’ and the feeling of still in some way 
caring about it continues to be common, even normal (2018, 1–2). Castro’s 
proclamation: ‘Within the Revolution – everything; against it – nothing’, 
made revolution into a container, with the shape of a totality outside of 
which contrary forces had no right to exist. This shape was developmen-
tal, forward-looking, a totalizing current (2016, 7–8). In the case of the 
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French Revolution, the great social changes that gave evidence of the ‘love 
of humanity’ extolled by Robespierre also took years to unroll. The ration-
ale of state, as well as much retrospective historical judgement (e.g. Sewell 
1996), heaped them together as the achievements initiated by Bastille Day. 
But by this move the systematic slaughter of the guillotine was cast aside, 
without an owner. Was there then no ‘we’ of the Terror?
Arguing that there was, I have come to the conclusion that this ‘we’ 
was a subjectivity of a specific and conflicted kind – one formed by histori-
cal rupture. If we are to call any moment rupture, there has to be a bursting 
of bonds; there has to be a new sensibility, the definition of a reviled object 
from which to be separated, and the abrupt violence that actually achieves 
the split. This combination evoked the extraordinary antimonies of feeling, 
the necessary cruelty, that Robespierre called for: ‘Citizens, the last proof 
of devotion that representatives owe to the fatherland is to immolate the 
stirrings of natural sensibility in a salute to a great people and to oppressed 
humanity! … The clemency that complies with tyranny is barbaric.’14 Loyalty 
to transcendent and absolute principles meant that sympathy with the desig-
nated enemies was anathema. They were ‘beyond the law’ because they did 
not recognize the rules of the now regenerated ‘humanity’; that is, the puri-
fied people who had recuperated humanity’s original nature. Yet, after all, 
what could be more human than the blood that reddened the king’s shirt? 
Thus, as Wahnich observes with magisterial understatement, a ‘theoreti-
cal humanism’ was inextricably tied to an ‘anti-humanism of the situation’ 
whereby a human life was worthless if it was decided that it had traduced 
its ‘humanity’ as that ought to be (Wahnich 2009, 220). We see from this 
that in the highly theorized terms employed by Wahnich, the ‘we’ that took 
ownership of the Terror was one founded on an antithesis.
As I hope this chapter has shown, the shape of rupture outlined at the 
beginning – namely a tripartite splitting into two opposite-facing parts with 
an unfathomable liminal fulcrum – was reproduced subjectively among 
the people who were participants or witnesses of the guillotine in action, 
and who quite soon found it unbearable. In the end the shared intention-
ality disintegrated into diverse and eccentric forms of memory (of which 
I have been able to give only a brief impression here). The ‘revolution as a 
whole’, which secreted the Terror into a dark fold, gave rise to a far more 
robust and productive kind of ‘we’, since it could be given the appearance 
of a transition from one holistic polity to another. But the ‘rupture’ created 
and revealed internal divisions, inconstant re-attachments, and desperate 
metaphors: along with the revolutionary mothers who swore to give birth 
to ‘republican babies’ there were also the people broken by contemplation 
of the idea of killing to give (political) life.
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Notes
1. See discussion of these points in Tackett (2001, 570–2).
2. Ciavatta writes that the Republican calendar is an excellent example to show the ambivalent 
relation to history at the heart of the Revolution: (a) a radical new beginning, itself – not 
Christ’s birth – is now the foundational orienting point; and (b) we can detect in the calendar 
an attempt to efface the inescapable situatedness of its own institution, since its express goal 
was to rid itself of any trace of historical origins, for example the use of new names and a dec-
imal system as the most rational (Ciavatta 2014, 580–81).
3. In the aftermath of the storming of the Bastille, members of the Assembly made a similar con-
trast between mob violence and the ‘justified violence’ inspired by the ‘annihilation of despot-
ism and the birth of liberty’, quoted in Sewell (1996, 858).
4. The tribune ‘had been pronouncing swift, often hasty judgments, handing prisoners over to a 
few slaughterers officiating in front of the prison, in the street, surrounded by a large crowd 
with sabres, lances and bludgeons. In four days, 1,300 people were thus massacred in Paris, 
at the Abbaye, La Force, and the Conciergerie, including nonjuring priests, aristocrats and 
common prisoners’ (De Baecque 2003, 61–2).
5. The quotation is from a manuscript of 1792 first cited in Bertin (1888, 323–36).
6. It should be noted that Wahnich herself extends her support of the Terror to the September 
massacres, which she includes in the framework of constitutive vengeance, seeing them as 
a means of ‘manifesting irrevocably the identity of the sovereign people by the act of public 
justice’ (2003, 45). However, the merely tepid acceptance of that violence by the revolution-
ary leaders suggests that Wahnich’s judgement has to be seen as retrospective rather than one 
current at the time.
7. The corpses of the kings of France had always been ‘excepted’ from those of ordinary  humanity. 
Since the seventh century they had been inhumed in the royal necropolis of Saint-Denis and 
provided with effigies. From mediaeval times, they were subject to embalming and ritualized 
dismemberment: with the custom of ‘tripartition’ the entrails and heart were separated from 
the body and taken to further, strategically located sacred repositories (Migeon 2018, 48–9).
8. The Republican newspaper Journal des homes libres de tous les pays wrote: ‘Today the great 
truth that the prejudiced ones of so many centuries had stifled has been clearly shown; today 
we have been convinced that a king is nothing but a man, and that no man is above death. 
Capet is no more. People of the earth! Contemplate thrones and see that they are nothing but 
dust.’ Quoted in De Baecque (2003, 98).
9. ‘One zealot sprinkled blood on the crowd shouting, “Brothers, they tell us that the blood of 
Louis Capet will fall again on our heads; well, so be it, let it fall … Republicans, the blood of a 
king brings happiness”’ (Hunt 2013, 10).
10. To this day, certain families in France retain vessels containing scraps of material said to be 
soaked in the king’s blood (Biancamaria Fontana, personal communication).
11. In Soviet Marxist circles ‘Thermidor’ was a synonym for betrayal of the Party line from with-
in. Further divisions into ‘right’ and ‘left’ Thermidorians were used in confusing accusations 
against enemy factions in the Party (Greeman 2015, 220).
12. See discussion in Hunt (2007).
13. Quoted in Ruth Scurr’s review of Wahnich’s book In Defence of the Terror: Liberty or Death in the 
French Revolution. The Guardian, 17 August 2012.
14. Parliamentary speech 1792, quoted in Wahnich 2009, 215; my translation.
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Rupture and Repair: A Museum of the 
Red Age Confronts Historical Nihilism
Michael Rowlands, Stephan Feuchtwang and Lisheng Zhang
Introduction
It is difficult to tell the difference between rupture and repair. We shall 
present a case of rupture as repair, but we must first acknowledge how 
common such a perception of rupture as repair and repair as rupture 
must be. When it issues from a new narrative of history, every break with 
the past (as Benedict Anderson 1991 and 1999 pointed out) that is facing 
the future rather than repeating a liturgical or ideal historical foundation 
results in a project that is the formation of a new kind of state, a nation 
state. But it presents the break as a repair, which is to remove the blocks 
preventing the realization of the potential of the people, or, in China’s 
case, just as in every decolonizing moment, the removal of humiliation 
and repression of its people. It is the repair of the human, of a civilization 
that can realize what is universally human but in and from a local, terri-
torially sovereign, base. Hannah Arendt, both in The Human Condition 
(1959, chapter 6) and On Revolution (2006, 216) refers to Greek antiq-
uity for the idea of human action as engagement in politics, the capac-
ity to listen to and be changed by different others, and the contradictory 
capacity to make a secular world of humanity but not yet to have done 
so, creating a rupture with whatever knowledge and belief are present 
with a prospect of promise. This European tradition of emancipation 
was universalized as modern civilization, imposed as imperialism and in 
counterviolence used for counter-European, anti-imperialist revolutions 
of liberation. In all cases the claims to humanity and civilization became 
the universalizing modes that complement and extend nations in their 
international relations. In the case of China, emancipating its empire 
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from the English lessons (Hevia 2003) of the Euro-American imperialists 
and the Manchu emperors involved, as Wang Hui writes (2016), was a 
movement that like all other nationalisms was both historical and revo-
lutionary, a movement in which the new idea of culture bore the idea of 
humanity and of a universalizing and renewed civilization. Such emanci-
patory and universalizing assertions of civilization are a future-oriented 
temporality through which all the civilizations of the planet are turned 
into projects of repair and of rupture. Therefore there are different ver-
sions of emancipatory rupture besides that of simply achieving nation-
state sovereignty. One is liberation from colonial rule. Another is toward 
a promise of greater social justice, socialist revolution. So we come to the 
ruptures that bring that promised future into the drama of the modern 
history of China.
From such a drama of repair follow dramatic turns redefining the 
authority of state sovereignty commemorated by the year and month 
in which they began as a repair that was at the same time a rupture. In 
China these were October 1911, the new Republic of China; 4 May 1919, 
the launch of the New Culture and New Youth movement; October 1949, 
the Liberation from the Republic into the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC); and less formally the two renewals of that revolution in the Great 
Leap Forward of 1958 and the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of 
April 1966, which ended in the repair of Reform and Opening in 1978.
Emancipations are revolutionary, but they are also restorations 
of humanity. This is both a new thing and ancient, historically and bio-
logically in its ontological justifications. At the same time each revolu-
tionary restoration is a rupture that itself needs either to be restored or 
renewed or repaired, each repair maintaining itself to be a continuation 
of selected past lines of revolution and modes of revolutionary govern-
ment. We will be arguing that revolutionary ruptures are repairs and that 
they prompt repairs that are themselves further ruptures. What is rup-
tured and repaired is in all cases a people’s sovereignty and its promise. 
Personal lives are at stake but always as part of a trajectory far greater in 
scale. We will base this argument upon a case study of a state-sanctioned 
private museum and its entrepreneurial author, Fan Jianchuan, in China 
under the market reforms of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Most 
importantly these reforms include the strengthening of an historical res-
toration that is also a self-proclaimed New Era under the personal leader-
ship of Party leader Xi Jinping. Even while conducting his own historical 
claims to authority, Xi wields against other such claims the accusation of 
disloyalty and the denial of the Party’s revolutionary accomplishments, a 
denial that may be named ‘historical nihilism’.
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‘Historical nihilism’
This accusation has precedents in previous phases of the market reform 
and opening of China that ended the politics of class struggle and mass 
mobilization but sought to maintain the authority of and from Mao 
Zedong. This awkward contradiction has made it impossible in China 
officially and publicly to commemorate the suffering of the Great Leap 
Forward and the Cultural Revolution alongside the officially proclaimed 
suffering of the pre-Liberation period without risking accusations of ‘his-
torical nihilism’.
In October 2016, in an editorial published by Xinhua, China’s offi-
cial news agency, the author Guo Songmin wrote: ‘The vital part of his-
torical nihilism is to radically deny the leading role of Marxism and the 
historical inevitability of China’s socialist path, and to deny the leader-
ship of the Communist Party of China. We should be on guard for the 
influence of historical nihilism, and … declare war on it.’ The author 
defines historical nihilism as a systematic denial of the historical achieve-
ments of Mao Zedong and the CCP in the Chinese revolution, namely 
the establishment of the PRC. In party-speak, historical nihilism means 
denying the ‘inevitability’ of China’s march towards socialism (the coun-
try is currently deemed by the CCP only to be in the early stages of it). It 
is a term that came into vogue among party officials after the crushing 
of the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989. Jiang Zemin, who was then 
party chief, declared that historical nihilism was one of several ideologi-
cal vices that had ‘seriously eroded’ the party. Other, more obvious ones, 
included yearnings for freedom and democracy. By reviving Mr Jiang’s 
rhetoric on nihilism, Mr Xi Jinping (the current President) is signalling 
that the party could again face regime-threatening danger unless it tight-
ens its grip on the way history is told (The Economist 2016).
The notion that an evidential history that is objective can also con-
stitute nihilism has a Nietzschean ring to it. A moral nihilism is threat-
ened, a collapse of order being the outcome of a particular delineation 
of past events. Yet, conversely, it is an accusation that is being used to 
tell observers and residents of China to ‘forget’ unfortunate events – in 
other words those that force themselves into one’s consciousness, not-
withstanding the pressures to keep them repressed. They should not be 
remembered because they threaten the current narrative with the pos-
sibility of another one, which would replace, indeed negate, it. This is 
more than some homily about committing the past events to oblivion – 
more than ‘the need to forget to taste the full flavour of the present’ (Augé 
2004, 3). The political and ideological repression of the past is part of the 
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inevitable process of ensuring not only that what would have an alter-
native, counter-hegemonic, repressively named, counter-revolutionary 
narrative is set in the past, but also that the unfinished business of revolt 
will not constitute an ongoing suppressed ideal that is just waiting for the 
right occasion to happen again. Yet committing past events to oblivion 
is unlikely to be totally successful even when it is engineered socially by 
powerful elites.
Restoration that skirted historical nihilism
Our main focus here is on an instance of rupture and repair in which an 
alternative historical understanding of the Mao era was encouraged. 
In 2003, a private museum was created by a retired businessman, Fan 
Jianchuan, near Chengdu in Sichuan. Clearly with the support of central 
authorities in Beijing, it manages to embed factual accounts of key events 
in the Mao era within acceptable heroic and patriotic narratives. Instead 
of being condemned as nihilistic histories, the installations combine 
belief and knowledge to domesticate any potential for nihilism. Between 
the editorial on historical nihilism and the original authorization of the 
museum, complex salient issues are being worked out in contemporary 
China at different levels of politics, ideology and everyday life.
The seeking of alternative understandings referred back to the 
Socialist Education movement (1964–6) and the Cultural Revolution in 
China (1966–76), attacking the ‘four olds’ (old customs, old cultures, old 
habits, old ideas) that could only be replaced with ‘four new things’ of 
the same kind. Eventually, in 1977, these were referred to as the Four 
Modernizations, of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science 
and technology; and in their turn these were taken up and transformed 
into the introduction of markets that had Chinese socialist characteris-
tics. Political practices at one stage in this progression were delegitimized 
during the next, but always they were placed in a teleology of socialist 
progress. Relegitimizing has meant more or less the contemporary dis-
appearance of the imagery of Mao as well as, since the 1990s, vast sums 
being spent on copying, restoring and rebuilding many of the images 
destroyed in the Cultural Revolution. Contemporary attacks on histori-
cal nihilism, on the other hand, constitute attacks on the production of 
knowledge about events of the Mao era, such as on one hand positive 
reminders of the necessity for class struggle and on the other the mag-
nitude of the ‘mistake’ of causing the famine in the Great Leap Forward. 
Wang Hui’s history of China’s revolutionary twentieth century (2016) 
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comes close to the first reminder without endorsement and totally avoids 
the second. Accused of attempting to delegitimize the socialist path of 
the CCP, authors can be imprisoned, sacked from their university posts 
or silenced in other ways. The irony of such retroactive de- or relegitimi-
zation of a socialist path, is that Mao did the same for the previous era; 
that ended with mainland victory for the CCP over the Guomindang in 
the civil war. Intellectuals and authors of the Guomindang either fled to 
Taiwan, disappeared or were converted. Yet current re-legitimizing of the 
past under Xi Jinping involves new calls for the retroactive reinstalling 
of a similar Confucian morality and teaching – the spread of Confucian 
institutes and schools – as a new potentiality that is drawn from a past 
reality similar to the revised Confucianism that Chiang Kaishek made 
his own. What we find is a dialectic of knowledge and belief that entails 
 delegitimization is always founded on possibilities of retroactive relegit-
imization. The ruptures that are produced by both appear very different. 
But of course they encounter and reproduce each other. Each is at the 
same time a new rupture and a repair.
When the mainland ruptured from the ‘four olds’, in Taiwan there 
was an amplification of Chiang Kaishek’s New Life version of Confucianism, 
itself a modernizing adaption and a break from more conservative ways, 
into a cultural renaissance (wenhua fuxing). Since then the rejection in 
Taiwan of Chiang Kaishek’s military command era on the island and a cel-
ebration of new religious organizations, as well as the finding of oppor-
tunities for parties to gain votes in local festivals, has coincided with a 
mainland renewal of admiration of the General and an accompanying 
plethora of touristic and governmental cultural heritage projects.
Attacks on historical nihilisms are directed against attempts to 
objectify a different past, the revolutionary past. If the revolution has to 
be a permanent process, then past failures are both a problem and not 
so easily empirically denied. An element of belief is essential to portray 
objective accounts of past events as lacking in patriotism and fundamen-
tal misrecognition of the true potential that an appropriate history can 
provide for the realization of the future of China. New pasts have to be 
created and retained to repair previous iconoclastic rejections of a past 
through selective retrieval from what had previously been rejected, cre-
ating a certain shape that links the new present to past beliefs or past 
practices and knowledge. We can see this in images from the opening 
ceremony of the Beijing Olympics in 2008.
The first image is the percussive effect of 4,000 bronze drums of the 
Shang Early Bronze Age, followed by iconic images of the major creative 
innovations of 4,000 years of civilization. Nothing about the twentieth 
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century in China appeared in the opening ceremony. The following year, 
in Tiananmen Square in Beijing, at the 60th anniversary of the founding 
of New China in 1949, the intensity of an abstract icon shorn of any ref-
erence to particular individuals or events was marked by the fact that the 
female soldiers in the first row marching past President Hu Jintao were 
models selected for their beauty, the men were told they could not blink 
and the whole event was choreographed by the theatrical director of the 
Beijing Olympics opening ceremony.
Whilst the ‘errors’ of the Cultural Revolution (and to some extent 
earlier catastrophes such as the Great Leap Forward and the Anti-Rightist 
campaigns) have been recognized by the CCP and in turn thrust into a pre-
history, this frees the present dialectic of belief and knowledge to create 
a temporal paradox between rupture and repair. ‘Nihilistic’ remembering 
is what is left after the commitment to oblivion. Though it is positively 
dangerous to remember ‘bad pasts’, a disciplined amount of facticity is 
needed, melded with patriotic fervour, to create an acceptable normative 
understanding. The normative and the forgetting are closely imbricated 
through these movements of belief and knowledge, and internalized in 
the reproduction of a strong, populist, everyday sense of the normative.
But if this dialectic of rupture and repair was so successful, then 
why would there be the lurking subversive questioning about what actu-
ally happened? The contemporary Chinese version of post-truth is, after 
all, played out in an environment relating to the future of the CCP and 
socialism in China, which is less than secure though it is asserted as nor-
mative. Mao’s insecurity after the failures of the Great Leap Forward 
instigated his own turn to the Cultural Revolution and his call for the 
right of youth as ‘Red Guards’ to rebel.
In the Maoist era, the Anti-Rightist campaigns depicted the past 
in the present in two contradictory ways. In films, cartoons, posters and 
parades of the accused counter-revolutionaries and revisionists seeking 
to reintroduce capitalism and the past of semi-colonialism and semi-feu-
dalism, victory over them is guaranteed. But Mao had also written and 
made speeches saying that the revolution had not been secured and its 
perpetuation required constant class struggle (Meisner 2007, 161–3). 
Celebration of victory was at the same time also a condemnation of the 
threat to the revolution, which is why the enemy elements were depicted 
as monsters (guai). The old is a threatening past in the present. Rupture is 
not secure. The new moment of the Deng Xiaoping reforms is indeed the 
revision that Maoism so fervently opposed. New norms for this new pres-
ent have to be established, but without denying a selected and restricted 
continuity with what went before.
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The new norm
It may not be a surprise that since 2003, this necessity for the supplemen-
tary factive content of pasts to be kept at a safe distance should coincide 
with a massive boom in museum-building in China. In 1949 there were 
only 21 museums in China. By contrast, a survey in 2016 put the number 
at over 4,000 (State Administration of Cultural Heritage 2016). China 
is also second, after Italy, in the world ranking for the largest numbers 
of UNESCO World Heritage-nominated sites. Much of this boom in Chi-
nese heritage has taken place since 2003 as part of the latest top-down 
development plans that are aimed at transforming the social, economic 
and cultural life of the country. Within this massive appeal to restoring 
tradition – in particular intangible cultural heritage – only one museum, 
a so-called private initiative, has been allowed to develop as a museum 
of the twentieth-century history of China. Ironically there is no explo-
sion of ‘negative heritage’ in China (creation of memorials/trauma sites/
recognition of sites of injustice, etc.), unless suffering is embedded in 
acts perpetrated by foreign invasions and matched by heroic response. 
In this sense the curation of facticity in a symbolic matrix is valued as 
a widespread normative patriotic device. A museum embeds norms in 
the significance of the imagery of its displayed objects. A single museum, 
now the largest private museum in China, devoted to twentieth-century 
history was the beginning of something different.
The Jianchuan Museum Cluster
The Jianchuan Museum Cluster is the brainchild of Fan Jianchuan, a for-
mer People’s Liberation Army officer from Sichuan who turned to busi-
ness and real estate. The museum is in the famous historic small town 
(guzhen) of Anren, the home of the Land Reform hate figure of landlord 
Liu Wencai.1 It is a vast complex of more than 20 exhibition halls and 
installations devoted to China’s twentieth-century history and covers 
an area of 82 acres (33 hectares), featuring some 8 million pieces, with 
many of them classified as Class One National Treasures. The largest 
non-governmental (minjian) museum in China, it is upheld as a model 
for museum privatization in Sichuan, but it is also not infrequently crit-
icized by the central authorities for its ‘controversial’ narrative of Chi-
na’s twentieth-century history. It should be noted that all the exhibits 
and their captions are subjected to detailed scrutiny by Beijing’s or local 
officials who periodically demand the removal or revision of some of its 
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potentially unacceptable didactic messaging. For instance, the museum 
of the Red Age presents dioramas and vast quantities of everyday objects, 
from enamel washbasins, diaries (5,000 from the Cultural Revolution), 
50,000 letters, sewing machines, bicycles, matchboxes, towels and flan-
nels, mirrors, chopsticks, badges and posters, musical instruments and 
toys, shoes, satchels – all presented in cabinets and displays with cap-
tions personally written by Fan Jianchuan. Fan Jianchuan’s plans to open 
an exhibition hall on the Great Famine (1959–61) in 2010 have since 
then been repeatedly denied. In fact any further ‘objective pasts’ of the 
twentieth century by Fan Jianchuan have been refused since 2012. In the 
meantime, Fan has a Weibo profile (Weibo is a popular social media site 
in China), with 1.5 million followers, which he updates every day. His 
posts seem to suggest that everything he does is government-endorsed 
and transparent.
Here we need to note Mr Fan’s personal trajectory and his self-con-
struction as a charismatic maker of history, noting how this project 
coincides with the history-making charisma being constructed around 
President Xi Jinping. Both conduct themselves as heroes of repair. For 
Fan it is the future of the to-be-remembered past; but for Xi it is in order 
to lead China into what he has defined as a New Era of consolidated Party 
rule with Xi as its core, material prosperity and the global projection of 
Amazing China (a 2018 film) in China and throughout the world, this 
definition now being inserted into the PRC’s Constitution (Lee Myers 
2018).
Fan Jianchuan was born in 1957 to military parents. His father, 
born in Shanxi, joined the army at the age of 13 and fought in the War of 
Resistance, the War of Liberation and the Korean War, and was the only 
survivor of 13 brothers. He gave his son the name ‘Jianchuan’, meaning 
Build Sichuan, when he moved south to Sichuan in the early 1950s. He 
was condemned as a ‘capitalist roader’ (zouzhipai) during the Cultural 
Revolution and purged (Fan 2013). Jianchuan’s interest in collecting, 
as he came to realize, was motivated by a search for the truth about his 
father’s life. What had happened that meant a man who had devoted 
his life to the Party was so brutally treated? In 1979, when Jianchuan 
enrolled to study at university in Xi’an, he started to collect Cultural 
Revolution artefacts systematically, trawling through rubbish collection 
depots for badges, sheets, ration tickets, mirrors and much more.
Such personal motivation to collect and display the past is not 
unusual, and there are certainly hundreds of private museums in 
China devoted to local history, memorials and ancestral halls. In 
many cases they respond to the expectations of party officials and 
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others for people to use their wealth to support the CCP. Fan could 
not have begun this complex in Anren without political support from 
the Sichuan Provincial party and the central authorities in Beijing. 
The combination of his filial piety, his personal obligation to his father 
and the idea of creating a museum to establish a ‘truth’ came at a good 
time. The central authorities were willing to promote a fusion of patri-
otic and heroic remembering with the recognition of ‘error’ in a brief 
period from 2003 to 2012.
It was not just the museums of the Red Period that broke new 
ground. It was also the museums of the war against the Japanese 
fought jointly by the Nationalists under General Chiang Kai-shek and 
the Communist-led forces under Mao Zedong that opened a past for the 
new present. They added impetus to the rehabilitation of Chiang, which 
started slowly in the 1980s with a publication of analyses of his military 
campaigns in the war against Japan and accelerated with the promotion 
of Nanjing as the capital of the Nationalist government in the period of 
its unificatory prime, and the posting of pictures of his memorial in Taipei 
on the internet; just a few of many steps toward the unification of Taiwan 
with the mainland.2
Xi Jinping has taken his own route to claim he is representative 
of China’s traditional values, parallel to but distinct from Chiang Kai-
shek’s nationalist version of Confucianism, the New Life movement. For 
instance, he has endorsed the commemoration of the innovative Ming 
Confucian philosopher Wang Yangming and quotes from his works.
Fan Jianchuan is now mainstreaming his capacity to plan muse-
ums of military munitions and other patriotic commemorations of the 
Republican era in PRC cities, at their authorities’ requests, because of 
his fame as founder of his own museum complex. This fame restores his 
father’s reputation, with his own name sharing the stage on which the 
far bigger figure of Xi Jinping is embodied as the core of the Party, repre-
senting the civilization of China and its patriots, and rupturing from the 
Mao-era iconoclasm.
In 2018, the Jianchuan Museum Complex is building its first 
branch in the city of Chongqing. Chongqing fits the theme of rupture 
and repair as a place that has witnessed a rupture that was meant to be 
repaired. During his tenure as the party secretary of Chongqing from 
2007 to 2012, Bo Xilai launched two main political movements that 
drew nationwide attention, ‘to sing red songs and strike against organ-
ized crime’, commonly known as ‘sing red’ and ‘strike black’ (changhong, 
dahei). The campaign against organized crime and corruption, dahei, 
was a large-scale crackdown not only on petty criminals, but also on 
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business people and government officials; it targeted more than 5,000 
people between 2009 and 2011 (Wang 2013). The campaign won Bo 
a nationwide reputation as someone who gets things done and helped 
to form his personality cult locally. It was propagated as an effort to 
restore order and safety in a crime-ridden city; but it was also criticized 
by scholars and legal professionals for eroding due legal procedures, 
and was regarded as having been implemented chiefly to target Bo’s 
political rivals (He Weifang’s ‘open letter to Chongqing legal profes-
sionals’, Bandursky 2011).
‘Singing red’ was the best-known part of Bo’s ‘red culture move-
ment’, which included ‘Singing revolutionary songs, Reading classic 
books, Telling stories and Spreading mottos’. Public reactions towards 
the ‘red culture movement’ were mixed. Some welcomed the revitaliza-
tion of a Maoist-style revolutionary ethos, which helped to restore a sense 
of patriotism and national pride that had been broken by the increas-
ing individualism and materialism bred by the economic reforms. Some 
were concerned by the movement’s echoing of the Cultural Revolution 
(Demick 2011; Richburg 2011; Moore 2012).
The campaign was endorsed by the central party authorities in 
the beginning. Xi Jinping, who was then serving as vice-president, 
publicly expressed support for Bo’s work in Chongqing. But soon 
afterwards, in 2012, Bo was overthrown and the already controver-
sial campaign was brought to a halt. Bo’s ‘Sing Red’ campaign was 
condemned by the then-Premiere Wen Jiabao as ‘remnant poison of 
the Cultural Revolution’ and hence a potential threat to the reforms 
(Lam 2012, 4). On 28 February 2012, the People’s Daily ran a com-
mentary entitled ‘While reform carries risk, abandoning reform will 
bring jeopardy to the party’ (Lam 2012, 5).
The irony is that Xi is now launching a much broader and more 
comprehensive nationwide campaign to promote ‘red culture’, and some 
aspects of it are more alarmingly reminiscent of Mao’s era; for instance, 
setting himself up as the ‘core’ of the party, constitutionalizing Xi Jinping 
thought and reintroducing ‘comrade’ (tongzhi) as the official term of 
address among cadres (Leng 2016) and in public (in subway station 
announcements, for example). Is this not a re-legitimization of the ‘sing-
ing red’ type of repair work? And it is joined by an even wider and deeper 
campaign against corruption that rids Xi of Bo and many other potential 
political rivals.
So, on the national level Xi is resuming the work of rupture and 
repair that was rehearsed in Chongqing, and on the local level Fan has 
got himself the job of retelling the city’s patriotic history. From early 
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2016, Fan was in contact with the Chongqing Jiulongpo District Bureau 
of Housing on a potential collaboration of developing a local block of 
air-raid shelters. It was agreed that Fan would build eight museums in 
the block to be managed as the Chongqing branch of the Jianchuan 
Museum Complex, and the District Bureau of Housing would develop 
an adjacent commercial street. The eight museums in the Chongqing 
branch are:
Museum of Chongqing Port Culture
Museum of Vernacular Prayer for Blessing (qifu)
Museum of Ration Tickets
Museum of Chinese Matrimonial Culture
Museum of Chinese Medicine
Museum of History of Arms
Museum of the Hanyang Arsenal
Museum of Resistance War
The Museum of Ration Tickets is the only one touching on the Red 
era. During the preparation, the museum team was advised by Chong-
qing authorities (propaganda bureau and office of party history) to 
minimize its content on the Red Age, and avoid ‘unnecessary interpre-
tation’, both criticism and eulogy. In their feedback to the draft exhibi-
tion outlines, the Chongqing propaganda authority urged the museum 
to be cautious about ‘the remnant poison of Bo-Wang’ (Bo-Wang yidu).3 
The message was clearly that any sort of overt celebration of Red Cul-
ture in Chongqing would be seen as political taboo. Fan told the staff 
in work meetings to do nothing that might be problematic. Fan’s local 
repair work is therefore self-censored to follow the updated logic of 
Xi’s larger scheme.
The emphasis was then placed on wartime history. Perhaps no other 
city is more symbolically appropriate than Chongqing to be the locale of 
a resistance war museum. It was not only the wartime provincial capi-
tal of the Republic of China, but also marked the union of the CCP and 
Guomindang against Japan.
The Museum of Hanyang Arsenal celebrates the local military leg-
acy by showing how Chongqing became the military base of the Great 
Rear (dahoufang) after the Hanyang Arsenal was relocated there from 
Wuhan during the Japanese occupation. The Museum of Resistance 
War covers the whole period from 1931 to 1945, in response to the offi-
cial extension of the war history from 8 to 14 years (Zhang 2017). The 
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exhibition consists of five units: the mainstay, the front battlefield, the 
Sichuan Army, American aid and war prisoners. It repeats all the main 
themes that Fan Jianchuan had already shown in his Anren museum.
Here the approved retelling of history in a private museum 
increasingly affirms the official narrative. Nothing is said about the 
acute violence in Chongqing during the Cultural Revolution. While 
Chongqing is where the only Cultural Revolution cemetery is located, 
no attempt to ‘heal the scars’ seems to be tolerated (Yining 2010; 
Zhang 2013).
Xi Jinping has taken over Bo Xilai’s platform. In addition, he 
finds in a further past, heroes such as Wang Yangming, who, like Mao, 
sanctioned the right to rebel. Yet at the same time he clamps down on 
actual dissidence. Unable to bear the ambivalence of what he presents 
as a rupture that repairs the mistakes but accepts continuities with 
the legacy of Mao, he has promoted the slogan ‘do not indulge in rash 
thoughts’ (wang yi).
The ordinary effects of repair
If we examine the effectiveness of collecting and exhibiting the remains 
of the past in terms of how the twentieth-century history of China is 
allowed to be remembered, perhaps the most striking theme is the con-
nection made between recovering the waste of the past and its potential 
redeployment in repair. Millions of artefacts, posters, diaries, in fact any-
thing that reminded people of the past of the Cultural Revolution, were 
thrown out from ordinary households all over China. ‘Abandoning the 
past is both a tangible and intangible process. It is about broken knowl-
edge, about what no longer fits, about a mark between old and new’ 
(Martinez 2017). As Martinez goes on to say, waste and obsolescence are 
categorized and generated within a certain framing of value. Collecting 
and hoarding the waste of the past implies a very different temporality 
from the one that encourages obsolescence of all things, buildings and 
ideas of the person. When the ordering sense of a time with its past is 
vanishing, acts of retrieval intervene to assert care over the past and 
restoration of memory. Fan Jianchuan’s father, being declared obso-
lete as were many thousands during the Cultural Revolution, was par-
alleled afterwards by the wasting of all things that reminded people of 
being superfluous and dispensable, leaving an uncomfortable sense of 
disordering. Through an assemblage of person and thing, doubling the 
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effectivity of waste generates the double rupture of a sense of the past, 
both in terms of the inability to recover the value of those who suffered 
during the Cultural Revolution and the switch to consumer citizenship 
that abolishes any value in remembering what ordinary material life was 
like in the Mao era. To become a curator of discarded things, then, is to 
give them a new life, on the one hand by restoring the value of ordinary 
life at the time and, on the other, allowing representations to make allu-
sions to suffering. Repair is therefore a form of re-enactment intended to 
defeat the consequences of obsolescence.
There are over 8 million artefacts in the storehouses of the Fan 
Jianchuan Museum Complex, of which probably less than 3 per cent 
are actually on display. The main purpose of the museum is, in fact, 
to preserve these artefacts, to make it known that they are there and, 
if the collection is designated as a national treasure, to ensure their 
safety. In fact, surplus items are sold in the museum shop and given 
out on loan or exchanged with other collectors, consistent with the 
reputation of Fan Jianchuan as the possessor of the largest collection 
of Cultural Revolution memorabilia. The history that Fan Jianchuan 
has provided is intensely personal and he opposes interventions by 
experts, either historians or museologists. He chooses the artefacts 
and images, writes the captions and decides what images to use. It is 
basically Fan Jianchuan’s twentieth-century history of China, curated 
by himself and a loyal team of about ten people who have been with 
him since the time when the first museum, on the Anti-Japanese war, 
was opened in 2005.
If we concentrate on Fan Jianchuan’s representation of the Red Age, 
it is clear he does not wish to provide a ‘factual’ account of the Cultural 
Revolution. Instead, using dioramas (which are no longer fashionable as 
museum displays), his first aim is to recreate what ordinary life was like 
during the period.
The attention to detail is remarkable – even down to the way in which 
newspaper was used to insulate walls against the cold. Whilst the ‘Little 
Red Book’ is prominent, it is the detail of a shared reading accompanied 
by the drinking of tea that dominates attention. In the background are 
the ordinary everyday farm implements of a peasant household. Another 
diorama, of the village shop, is strangely adapted to the repetitive display 
of Mao era artefacts rather than food or domestic goods. Restitution, in 
fact, depends on repetition to have a maximum effect. This is no more 
obvious than in the open displays of rows of Mao figurines, making it 
impossible to forget the image of the ‘great helmsman’. Teapots and jars, 
plates and chopsticks – the everyday articles of eating and drinking, 
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Figure 2.1 Gongxiaoshe (supply and marketing cooperative) diorama 
in the Museum of Red Age Everyday Objects. Photo by Lisheng Zhang. 
Figure 2.2 Porcelain teapots, Museum of Red Age Porcelain Artwork. 
Photo by Lisheng Zhang. 
washing and cleaning are displayed in repetitive numbers rather than 
dioramic displays to emphasize the sheer quantity of artefacts produced 
to occupy every aspect of domestic life. From drinking tea in the morn-
ing to bowls for washing in the evening, by replicating daily events, the 
words and images of Mao stare out at you. Images of striking gestures 
and optimistic bright colours shine up into the faces of people eating and 
drinking their modest meals. Restitution, repetition and replication are 
the key organizing signs of the exhibits in the Museum of the Red Age.
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Figure 2.3 Mao effigies, Museum of Red Age Porcelain Artwork. Photo 
by Lisheng Zhang. 
Figure 2.4 Plate and chopsticks decorated with Maoist slogans, 
Museum of Red Age Everyday Objects. Photo by Lisheng Zhang. 
These vignettes merely hint at the effect these images have on vis-
itors. Only to the very old would they now evoke memories. They are 
rather latent memories. The museum is directed at the young, quite 
explicitly. It is Fan Jianchuan’s worry that the young will remain obliv-
ious to the past and only be concerned with the making of money that 
occupies him and his negotiations with the officials of the provincial and 
central committees of the Party. There is an active concern with retaining 
a legacy of the past, the idea that everyday life had a certain pungency 
that gave pride and fortitude to people in poor or otherwise adverse 
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circumstances. Regardless of the speed of economic reforms, the idea 
that personal virtues emanating from revolutionary ardour should still 
be there and not be obliterated by the appeal of civic consumerism gen-
erates the shared morality that brings officials to Fan Jianchuan’s door, 
ostensibly to check on the probity of the stories being told but also to 
validate the ideals being promulgated by this cultural legacy.
Recasting rupture
Events of massive rupture are the basis of recasting social worlds into 
new configurations. Events gain cohesion by their assemblage within a 
longer time frame than is realized in our case study through the forms 
offered by the museum in the public realm. We may also be dealing with 
a sequence of ruptures that in the longer term are aiming to achieve a 
more cohesive narrative. Yet similar sequences of rupture, reaction and 
repair are frequent and often terrible in their consequences. Normativity 
is asserted, and is by this very assertion never secure. Rupture as repair 
conjures ambivalence. Ambivalence becomes intolerable to the normal-
izing regime when it offers another narrative altogether.
We can see that committing past events to oblivion is rarely if ever 
completely successful, and maybe is never intended to be. Moreover, his-
torical objectivity, like its counterpart of scientific objectivity, has never 
implied the suppression of subjectivity. So the current attack on ‘his-
torical nihilism’ in China could be taken to be an expression of ambiv-
alence and of some possibilities of personal, subjective restoration. Fan 
Jianchuan may not be so unusual in China at present, in his demands to 
find a problematizing way of knowing that his father was punished and 
to have a sense of obligation to achieve this without feelings of guilt. It 
satisfies a need to find another political narrative with the tolerance of 
ambivalence about the absurdity of contradictions between a people and 
the Party that purports to represent it, reinforced by revolution. The per-
sonal is raised into the people’s trajectory, but it also scales back down to 
individual initiatives. Rupture and its subsequent repairing of ruptures 
are probably incipient, certainly repeated in China’s trajectory of revolu-
tion and reforms. A history is needed that is a more fractured and open 
coincidence of norms and histories, of nation narratives in which reali-
ties can be questioned and alternative futures can be seen enacted and 
propagated. Yet new pasts have to be created or retained that repair the 
damage of iconoclastic acts by creating a certain shape for them in the 
present. The dialectic that ostensibly creates a temporal paradox between 
rupture and repair can then be resolved by a certain amount of facticity.
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Notes
1. A large clay figure model of the Rent Collection Courtyard was copied in all media to promote 
land reform and collectivization. The original is kept in Anren.
2. There is a Chiang Kai-shek restaurant in Beijing and a Chiang Kai-shek liquor advertised on the 
web in the PRC with a picture of Taipei’s memorial to him.
3. ‘Wang’ here refers to Wang Lijun, who served as vice-mayor and police chief during Bo Xilai’s 
tenure in Chongqing. His visit to the US consulate in Chengdu on 6 February 2012 led to the 
downfall of Bo Xilai and himself.
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Times Like the Present: Political 
Rupture and the Heat of the Moment
Carol J. Greenhouse
Anthropological commentary on the current chasms in the social fields 
of politics underscores the challenges populism poses for the discipline’s 
classic association of relativism with the expansion of liberal democracy 
(see, e.g., Edelman 2016; Gusterson 2017; Hartigan 2016; Rosa 2017).1 
The unilateral exclusions of the rightward populist turn point the other 
way, toward the contraction of democracy around nativist terms of citi-
zenship. A priority on an ethnographic attitude of distance in this context 
means denying, or at least deferring, that contradiction.
Conventional relativism calls for a specific sort of indifference as a 
precondition of analysis – a non-relation that demands a ‘cool indiffer-
ence to time’ (Harms 2013, 353); however, in a context of political crisis, 
indifference would seem to compound the contradictions of relativism, 
more than resolve them. For anthropologists, this may be a conceptual 
dilemma as well as a personal one – a rupture both revealed and pro-
duced in relations rearranged by events. When cool indifference to the 
times is not tenable, is there another kind of relativity better adapted 
to heat? Is it possible to reconcile relativity and engagement? I think 
yes, once these are seen as linked problems of knowledge. The rupture 
that became visible in Donald Trump’s election to the US presidency in 
November 2016 draws attention to both the necessity and possibility 
of another relativity – one that renounces personal indifference, and is 
predicated on a conviction of co-presence to which there is no outside 
(see Fabian 2014b, 204). In what follows, I argue for a different under-
standing of relativity better adapted to the forms of political agency 
revealed and produced in rupture. Roitman’s formulation of rupture as 
a crisis of social judgement (Roitman 2013) is suggestive in this regard, 
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in its call to explore rupture as a destabilization of social knowledge.2 
The kind of rupture I am considering here upturns conventional rela-
tivism by its locations close to home, or even at home, where a determi-
nate distance is unsustainable and an everyday ‘politics of participation’ 
(Kirsch 2018, 2) is unavoidable. The kind of rupture that is my focus 
in this chapter precludes any certainty of social distance as well as any 
steady difference between inclusion and exclusion, and even between 
past and present (since indeterminate futures proliferate socially). I will 
call conventional relativity relativism, reserving relativity for this other 
formulation that shifts the focus from an optic of distance to a reflexive 
improvisational relation of nearness.
As Johannes Fabian famously observes in Time and the Other 
(2014a), this other relativity places priority on the question of what time 
it is that coevals – mutually present to each other – share, when ‘social 
life is no longer posited as existing within the “flow of time”, but as gen-
erated in an immanent field’ (Hodges 2014, 47; note omitted, original 
emphasis). Indeed, rupture does not defy time (by exceeding a flow in 
an encompassing event), so much as it renders time plural, kaleidoscopic 
and probabilistic, as the force of doubt teases social fields with a surfeit of 
times that run in every direction (possible futures running back to recon-
sidered pasts).
Under such circumstances, ethnographic knowledge is inseparable 
from self-knowledge, knowledge of others in the world, others in oneself, 
uncertain knowledge amidst a host of contingent values. Time’s arrows 
suddenly point everywhere, for better or for worse. Again, the kind of 
situation I am thinking of offers no sure scope for distance (I am not sure 
what distance I can claim now), since by definition such a rupture unset-
tles habits of time, place, scale and standpoint. Notwithstanding the 
hardening of partisanship that has ensued around the Trump presidency, 
it is still too soon to know what, out of the present chaos, will turn out to 
have been the history of … something else; however, the experience of 
temporal undecidability is instructive in itself. In that state of rupture – 
that sense of being in transition toward something unknowable from a 
past that demands reassessment – political agency is a problem of knowl-
edge hinged on many kinds of power, not just in relation to state powers 
or the strategic instrumentalities of political campaigning. States are not 
the endpoints of political agency, but rather highly immediate congeries 
of signs in circulation – diversely constituted in time and space according 
to the ways people read their own experiences of power and powerless-
ness and work them through as principles to act on. From that perspec-
tive, political agency is highly labile, less immediately attached to policies 
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than to believable powers (whether one’s own, the candidate’s or some-
thing else entirely). For the same reasons, as I shall suggest, democratic 
states are surprisingly available (ethnographically speaking) to ways of 
knowing the world not ordinarily associated with the power arrange-
ments of modern politics. These are among the makings of the different 
kind of relativity I seek for and as ethnography. In search of other think-
able relativities that do not begin a priori in the distance associated with 
division, throughout this chapter, I draw on a variety of sources, includ-
ing poetry – all of it published (though not necessarily written) in the ten 
weeks that yield the main body of this account. I do so not just to lend art 
to the conundrums of rupture, but to take guidance from poets’ instruc-
tive formulations of conscious shock as temporal crisis – a rupture felt at 
once as inescapability, involvement, intrigue and perhaps, too, as a com-
pulsion to authorship. I also draw on current theories of relativity drawn 
from (lay) literature on physics – finding in that work an understanding 
of time’s fragments as a sustainable source of heat, lending affirmative 
meaning to the heat of the moment. Indeed, the sense of relativity I pursue 
is the heat of the moment, as I shall explain.
‘A purple fog descended upon the land’3
Can ‘ethnographic “revelation” – in which unanticipated, previously 
inconceivable things become apparent – be taken seriously in anthropo-
logical discourse’ (Henare et al. 2007, 1)? This question is a trenchant 
reminder that we are always doing ethnography – always living – in times 
that we might misrecognize. Hope and dread make ironies of time – a 
multiplication of meanwhiles, pasts and futures that trump linear time’s 
hegemonic assertion of time as a cascading flume of events. Linear time 
is the time of the nation as an ‘imagined community’, sculpting histories 
and washing over differences (Anderson 1991, 192–9).
But linear time, secular and infinite, puts eternity and extinction on 
the same path, as much mapping a logic of expedient plunder as animat-
ing a vision of human possibility. Among anthropologists of late, the crit-
ical convergence of these storylines seems to mark out a rhythm of dread 
(current anthropological tropes include tragedy, the great wave, the sixth 
extinction, the end of the world).4 Linear time singularizes time’s origins, 
rendering agency generic and concealing the precarity, indeterminacy 
and ‘polyphony’ of the ‘pulses’ and ‘patterns’ in human and other life 
forms that ‘[make] life possible’ (Tsing 2016, 20–1). An account in linear 
time can find agency only after the fact, an anachronism that perpetually 
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edits difference into a single storyline that is always passing. Linear time, 
too, is Other (Greenhouse 1996; see Fabian 2014a).
By contrast, crisis has no defined channel, taking its narratable forms 
instead from procedures of diagnosis and the reckonings of experts (e.g. 
priests or pollsters), even as it makes such diagnoses suspect – open ground 
for opportunism (see Roitman 2013). But crisis also invites poetry – gath-
erings of ‘sense and sense, sense and countersense: a chance meeting at a 
place in language-time nobody can foresee’ (Célan 2017, 405). Ethnography, 
with its openness to difference, seeks out and anticipates such ‘meetings’. 
Anthropology’s ‘language-time’ (Célan’s phrase, again) is a miasma of 
futures, some of them behind us or beside us. Ethnography – even when it is 
historical – opens another way of thinking the future of the world, and our-
selves (whoever we are) in it. I take this to be the ‘revelation’ Henare et al. 
(2007) challenge us to consider when a condition of rupture explodes linear 
time. Whether as liberation or cataclysm, the question of ‘what then’ can have 
no sure answer. Stripping away the veneer of linear time from ethnography 
means first of all recognizing the other times we ourselves live personally, 
all at once, as individuals – circular (in search of second chances), branch-
ing (in crisis), fragmented (mixtures of beginnings, endings, and uncertain 
passages), no time at all (absorbed in thought) or unbundled (segments on 
the evening news, e.g. children caged in a detention centre, followed by an 
advertisement), among other arrangements. The index of these times is not 
sequence or output (identifiable as outcomes or measurable as progress), but 
the immeasurable energy they give or take from us. As anthropologists, once 
we let go of the idea of time’s shape or direction in favour of time’s energy 
for difference from itself, produced by the heat of contest and commitment, 
myriad times become thinkable – proliferating, uncontainable. The salient 
aspects of time are the social density of partnership and the ambit of imagina-
tive freedom, not a direction. In this sense, time may be strong or weak, thick 
or thin, but not forward or backward. Anyone who claims to know time’s 
direction – or even more so, to own it (e.g. ‘Make America Great Again’) – is 
aiming to draw others’ purposes into their own heat, even at the risk of being 
burned themselves.
For physicists, time is this transfer of energy. Cooler particles usu-
ally draw the heat of warmer ones (Rovelli 2016, 52–3). At a very small 
scale  – say, just two atoms (an example entirely thinkable in today’s 
material sciences; Meier 2014) – energy consumption can be equal to the 
energy produced by the resistance in the electron transfer itself (this is 
the basis of nanotechnology; Feynman 1999, 37). Time is kinetic energy – 
heat – made of connection and resistance. The transfer of energy is what 
makes the future different from the past – or rather, it is the difference 
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that literally makes the future (Rovelli 2016, 53). Kinetic energy as heat 
results from the velocity of particles in a given distribution, not their 
direction of movement as such (Reichenbach 1971, 65). Indeed, physi-
cists tell us that the ‘direction of time’ is not a dimension of space, but ‘a 
grab bag’ of other problems of a probabilistic sort (Earman 2002, 261; 
Rovelli 2016, 53).
To the extent that rupture calls into question the hegemonic tem-
poralities of offices and industries and brings credence to our own dis-
cipline’s uneasy relation to linear time (e.g. Bear 2014; Fabian 2014a; 
2014b; Greenhouse 1996; 2014; Holbraad et al. 2014; Miyazaki 2004; 
Pandian 2012; Scott 2013; Tsing 2016; Yvinec 2014), such discussions 
among physicists are suggestive. For ethnographers, too, it is useful to 
consider that past and future are not locations on a settled timeline, but 
social effects of convergence and divergence – belonging or excluding, 
acting or waiting, being one among yeas or nays or refusing to take part.5 
I am drawn to the idea that time accumulates and dissipates with the 
shifting conditions of connection and resistance, circulating and distrib-
uting the heat that will differentiate futures from each other along with 
their pasts and presents.
Heat as energy distributed by contact will be my key image for the 
personal and social times entailed in the rest of this chapter. In the tem-
poral explosion of ruptures, I find the metaphor of heat useful where 
the more orderly notion of event falters. Events may drive a recognition 
of rupture, but rupture is not in itself reducible to an event, since in the 
process of probing revealed contingencies the future may turn out to be 
behind us, even without us, as in Mary Ruefle’s poetic image of the photo-
graph that reveals a country with no people (Ruefle 2017). Erin Manning 
writes of ‘memory for the future’ (Manning 2015, 44–50), but memory of 
the future is also generative.6
For ethnographers, the heat of time – in Nemirovsky’s phrase, 
‘writ[ing] on burning lava’ (quoted in Muhlstein 2016, 42) – widens the 
critical space around routine contradictions: contradictions that promote 
austerity as the condition of increase (Davis 2015), carbon as the exter-
nality of value (Dalsgaard 2013, 82), war as the condition of peace (De 
Lauri 2013, 7–8), killing as the essence of civic order (Bonilla and Rosa 
2015), expulsions as infrastructures of growth (Sassen 2014) – among 
other examples from current anthropology. Registering the time that 
gathers around such contradictions is ethnography’s distinctive algo-
rithm. The heat of imagined ‘worldings’ (Pina-Cabral 2014; Mackenzie 
2010) gives time multiple futures, presents and pasts. In the co-present 
relationality of heat, another relativity is immanent, forging solidarities 
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not as structures but as people’s agentive experience as they live the 
times, as they know them.
But I am getting ahead of myself.
Let us shift to a different ethnographic present, to the season 
between the US presidential election in November 2016, and the inaugu-
ration in January 2017.
Ten weeks of winter: remixed notes from the field
Donald Trump campaigned on promises of repeal and reversal currently 
being seen to by his political strategists, cabinet secretaries in their own 
departments and the Republican-majority Congress.7 In its first days, the 
Trump administration reversed legislation and even long-standing doc-
trines in an explicit effort to erase the legacy of President Obama and 
much else, including constitutional and customary checks on presiden-
tial power – as is now plain in the executive orders affecting immigration 
and national security, social security and environmental safety (among 
other domains).8 The pace of events has been at lightning speed.9 The 
current havoc (a neutral term in this circumstance) is the projection of 
power that – in this concentrated and highly public form – is both wholly 
unfamiliar in US politics, and deeply consequential.
The morning after Mr Trump won the US presidential election, I 
started a log – snippets of conversation, poetry, published commentary, 
passages from anthropologists’ writings and other artefacts. Partly, I will 
admit, this was for personal reasons. But it was also to track whatever 
might later turn out to be relevant knowledge – an answering “there!” to 
an as yet unasked question. In what follows, I draw on that log, among 
other sources, to explore three questions that have dominated the private 
and public conversations as I know them from my own social and media 
horizons. I phrase them in the first-person plural – an actual but indeter-
minate (i.e. not rhetorical) ‘we’: Why didn’t we see this coming? Is the 
public a social reality? Does democracy have a future? These are heated 
questions – heated in the dual sense of their controversial substance and 
their probabilistic potential for generating renewal. They are pressing 
personal questions for many people, but they are also impersonal ques-
tions corresponding respectively to themes of relativity, solidarity and 
agency. The ease of movement between the personal and the impersonal 
may seem confounding at first; later, I will suggest that this very impasse 
might actually clarify something of what these times reveal about the 
challenges of understanding high elected office as a human relation.
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Why didn’t we see this coming?
Even on the eve of the election, most pollsters calculated the odds of a 
Trump victory as very low, even as low as 1 per cent.10 But on 8 November 
2016, as the polls rolled to a close across the key battleground states (as 
the political pundits call them), most of these being in the eastern time 
zone, the likelihood of his win jumped to near certainty shortly after sup-
per. For some people, this was a dream fulfilled; for others, a nightmare. 
I was with friends at a small gathering. People stopped eating, speak-
ing and drinking, in that order, and began to drift away. I take this sort 
of break in intimate sociability seriously, as an experience of time thin-
ning out, cooling down. Mary Ruefle again: ‘The roots of trees curled up’ 
(2017).
The outcome all but certain later that night, television pundits had 
to provide analysis without a playbook. The first assessment I heard on 
the air was that the Democrats lost because they lost touch with the prob-
lems of working people in the middle class. The same argument held that 
Trump – while seeming to be inept – had been a political genius, tapping 
into people’s unspoken anger, fears and hopes. By Day Two, these same 
pundits were calling on the American public to heal and work towards 
unity. Many people I know stopped watching the television news at that 
point, in frustration – turning to print instead, as a way of recalibrating 
the ratio of fact to opinion alone, in silence. They were not alone; nation-
ally, subscriptions to the New York Times soared in the days after the 
vote.11 Meanwhile, my local newspaper, serving a college town and rural 
county, seemed to take advantage of the proximity of the Thanksgiving 
holiday, and Christmas, to feature community events that might tran-
scend division (and not only there; see Hampson 2017).
But in the broader political space, divisions were not going away.12 
Throughout the transition between the election and Inauguration Day, 
there was mounting debate over the legitimacy of the election in light of 
intelligence briefings confirming a Russian influence campaign and (at 
that time) unconfirmed suspicions of the Trump campaign’s involvement 
(see, e.g., Blow 2017). In his first days in office, Trump hit back hard with 
policy positions communicated as executive orders – volleys that were 
in turn immediately rejoined with court-ordered stays and public pro-
tests, and again answered with new executive orders – and on and on. 
A contest thus joined in a way that fused the debates over policies to the 
debates over the legitimacy of the new president, conciliation was bound 
to be elusive.
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Meanwhile, closer to the policy front, the ‘lost touch’ analysis became 
standard. An anthropologist readily recognizes in it the template of cul-
tural relativism: red states and blue states, two cultures, two identities, in 
need of mutual translation and tolerance. The class stereotypes that popu-
late this imagery are elaborate but they rapidly fail in light of the campaign 
itself. I do not mean that people’s needs are not real or urgent. Moreover, 
it is true that Trump campaigned hard in rural areas among people who 
had never voted, and channelled the frustrations of white working people 
facing the challenges of precarity – some of them former Democrats whose 
jobs the Obama administration had saved in 2009. Clinton, meanwhile, 
spoke to the working poor and middle class in a different language, with 
proposals to improve the minimum wage, health care and free college tui-
tion, among other things. On some points, she took up proposals Bernie 
Sanders had made first, and that was a serious complication. But the larger 
political context was already shaped – emptied out, in some respects – by 
years of elite Republican obstruction to Obama initiatives and decades of 
resistance to ‘big government’. Democratic talk of ‘programs’ registered for 
Trump voters across the socioeconomic spectrum mainly as tax increases 
and more government control – paradoxically making income inequality 
and precarity into wedge issues that put business tycoons and trailer dwell-
ers on the same side.
The image of the ‘Trump base’ as gun-toting rednecks or tattooed 
bikers is supremely inaccurate; nor were Clinton supporters mainly 
coastal urban elites or women of a certain age, as the press and pundits 
might have had us believe. Trump was elected by a preponderance of 
white men, men and women over the age of 65, and, among men, mostly 
college educated (Tyson and Maniam 2016). Among whites who voted 
for Trump, many previously voted for Barack Obama (Hartigan 2016). 
Clinton voters were younger, more female, racially more diverse and in 
general better educated than Trump voters (Tyson and Maniam 2016). 
Still, the fictions remain embedded in media talking points that reiterate 
class and regional stereotypes – perhaps finding in this improvised moral 
economy of taste a new ‘geontology’ for the United States (Elizabeth 
Povinelli’s term for a formation of power built on the distinction between 
life and non-life; see Povinelli 2016, 4–5). Be that as it may, what we 
have come to think of as Trump’s core base was statistically small, not 
large enough to elect him or, even at the very end, enough to win him the 
popular vote.
The implicit relativism in such accountings relies on the translata-
bility of each candidate’s appeal to the other side, as if the electoral field 
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were normally flat and equally open to both candidates.13 But this was not 
the case. The reasons behind Trump’s victory cannot simply be flipped to 
explain Clinton’s loss. For one thing, she did not lose the popular vote 
(she won by almost three million ballots, and lost the Electoral College by 
only about 80,000 votes distributed across three states). A related point 
is the fallacy that either candidate’s supporters were available for conver-
sion to the other side.14
Many people prepared to vote for Trump were never available to 
Clinton, and vice versa. Throughout the campaign, it was said of Trump 
that he was willing to give voice to the positions people held but were 
afraid to acknowledge, id to their ego. This was no doubt true to some 
extent in some quarters, particularly at the beginning – when the polite 
response (often heard on television and in conversation) to Trump’s 
pledges to build a wall along the southern US border, unleash massive 
deportations, and institute a ban on Muslim immigration, among other 
things, took the form of welcoming open discussion of tough issues. But 
for many other people, these were repugnant non-starters. Trump’s prom-
ises had (and continue to have) multiple versions, reversals and revisions 
as the political winds shift – including winds interior to the Republican 
Party, where the leadership, unable to rein him in, finally decided to 
chance the ride and hold on. This widened a second front against Clinton, 
bringing into the mainstream what had been Congressional Republicans’ 
efforts over many years to disqualify her pre-emptively, long before her 
candidacy, including but not limited to Congressional hearings on the 
attack on the US consulate in Benghazi (Libya) while she was secretary 
of state.15 It was those hearings that revealed her private server and use 
of unofficial e-mail accounts while in office – unleashing the persistent 
sense of scandal that dogged her candidacy.
Given the long involvement of Congress and the FBI in the inves-
tigation of Clinton while she was a candidate (and even before, in her 
public service and as First Lady), the campaign of vilification against 
her was not organic in the same way that expressions of xenophobia 
and Islamophobia apparently were for some Trump supporters. But it 
became that. As Trump’s epithets of ‘lying Hillary’ and ‘crooked Hillary’ 
gained traction at rallies, the group chants (‘lock her up!’, ‘traitor!’) 
morphed into an argot of misogyny that even cable networks did not 
allow their reporters to quote verbatim (see Solnit 2017). Meanwhile, 
pulling in his allies (including former federal prosecutors), Trump 
declared himself ‘the law and order candidate’, positioning him-
self with the Fraternal Order of Police against the Black Lives Matter 
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movement  – among other moves calculated to reinforce the image of 
Clinton as outside the law. Constant reference to ‘the e-mails’ posi-
tioned Clinton herself as a virtualism. The high-ranking Republicans in 
Congress and in the party who had criticized Trump’s excesses during 
the campaign ultimately supported him, and – as of this writing – for 
the most part continue to do so.
In sum, those of us who did not see this coming were perhaps 
blinded by the fact that the two cultures argument was there from before 
the beginning, baked into the candidates’ strategic design. A conven-
tional relativism in this context would cabin ethnographic understanding 
within a reiteration of one or the other of those partisan commitments.
Is the public a social reality?
A few more pages from my log – still winter:
The state where I vote went massively for Trump (though not the 
college town where I live). At restaurants and cafés that first week, elec-
tion talk was sotto voce. The tear in the social fabric was palpable. The 
day after the election, one friend said, ‘I look around and I can’t believe 
half of my neighbours probably voted for him.’ My log notes a few mes-
sages from friends as their sense of social time unspooled from the gap: 
‘I just can’t believe it’; ‘I feel like I’m sleepwalking’; ‘I’m still mourning’. 
Some academics I know said at the time that they don’t know any Trump 
supporters, but I know for a fact they are mistaken. The rallies, among 
other things, left some of Trump’s ‘secret admirers’ (Sanneh 2017, 24) 
reluctant to admit to their support. The evasive small-talk in public 
places on the morning of 9 November might not have been indifference 
or despair, but self-preserving tact for all concerned.
To be fair, the visceral distaste between the two candidates’ camps 
was apparently mutual, if asymmetrical.16 The campaigns, run on an 
infrastructure of market shares, instantiated a politics of affect that left 
little room for intersubjectivity – appeal trumped engagement (see Martin 
2013). By this I mean that both campaigns ran on the other side’s unfa-
vourability, apparently leaving people not just with a sense of alienation 
from the other side, but also with the sense that to vote the other way 
would mean becoming another person – in the most negative sense. That 
impasse – the rending of the public as a warrant for legitimate power – 
corresponds to a restructuring of power wholly in terms of the  majority’s 
control. This aspect of the state of rupture is palpable, highly visible in the 
Congressional session coinciding with Trump’s first year in office – the 
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minority counting for the most part only as a zero, even though they were 
shy of a Senate majority by only three seats.
That zero-ing is not limited to the government of the day. The 
Trump administration has made long strides in reversing Obama-era 
law, erasing the Democratic majority of that time. The response of this 
administration to its control of both the White House and the Congress, 
in effect, is to abjure any obligation of the majority party to the minor-
ity – swallowing up the democratic possibility of a political minority 
being represented within political institutions, or by them. Reserving 
representation as the majority’s privilege in this way is a striking depar-
ture from the idea of the public as a collectivity – an idea relating civic 
life to social life that is foundational to social science. Minority politics 
have moved to the streets and other public sites of protest – evidence 
that understanding ‘politics’ as a plural noun is important to an accu-
rate description of the state of affairs.
Even before the waves of demonstrations that followed almost daily 
after the inauguration while executive orders rolled out effecting a travel 
ban from seven Muslim-majority countries, the symbolic rending of the 
public was evident in substantive ways in the cabinet choices and policy 
positions emerging from the administration. During the campaign, Trump 
surrounded himself with theorists of the white nationalist movement, 
participating knowingly in their coding of ‘worker’ and ‘middle class’ as 
white. Steve Bannon, his chief political strategist, was brought into the 
White House as a senior adviser, briefly holding a seat with the principals 
on the National Security Council. The original cabinet (turnover has been 
rapid) was stocked with billionaires and retired generals. Social security, 
voting rights, and the government agencies responsible for the social 
safety net are all under review for dismantling in the name of the taxpay-
ers. Trump’s positions on trade, immigration and domestic job creation 
varied in substance during the campaign but never wavered in their zero-
sum formula with respect to foreign workers, whether as immigrants or in 
their own homelands. The sharpest lines of alienation follow the border, 
dividing citizens from immigrants and workers from workers.
The day after the election, a friend – a woman in her 60s – wrote 
in a group e-mail that she felt as if she was ‘giving birth to a baby that 
already died’. Her grief, expressed in that harrowing image out of time, 
left me thinking about rupture as at once a mystery, an irreparable tear in 
the temporal fabric, and a social disturbance that reshapes who or what 
anyone might become. Jameson Fitzpatrick’s poem, ‘I Woke Up’ (2017), 
speaks of awakening to the perfusion of the political field as he once lived 
it without seeing – those retrospective insights culminating in a discovery:
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I thought I was not a political poet and still
my imagination was political.
It had been, this whole time I was asleep.
As with the first question (‘Why didn’t we see this coming?’), the ques-
tion regarding the social reality of the public quickly doubles back on 
itself, since it is itself in contention under the populist agenda of erasure, 
repeal, refusal and repatriation. The representational void at the end of 
the idea of the public puts politics everywhere and nowhere, as Fitzpat-
rick’s lines suggest. This brings us to the question of agency in relation to 
the dark matter of democracy’s future.
does democracy have a future?
More from the log: In the days and weeks after the election, when Trump 
supporters are asked why they voted for him by journalists and pollsters, 
the keynote response is change. One word, one man; perhaps this is the 
rejoinder to Barack Obama’s hope in the 2008 election. But where ‘hope’ 
was an invitation to spark time’s heat (e.g., the Obama campaign’s slo-
gan ‘Yes, we can’), ‘change’ claims ownership of time – the promise of a 
strong man to use his power. And now that we know more – his disregard 
for norms across a wide spectrum of public and private domains – the 
strong man looms large in public performances designed for his ‘base’. 
Among his critics, since the early days of the transition, pundits, politi-
cal opponents and ordinary people have wondered aloud if he is a threat 
to democracy. I hear this as a question they are asking about their own 
political agency.
I have referred to the dualism produced by the campaign – the two 
camps of supporters yielding a sense of the public as composed of two 
kinds of person, neither (by their own accounts) translatable or trans-
formable to the other. The absence of a middle ground has strategic 
value, as suggested by Eduardo Kohn in a superficially different context: 
‘One might say that dualism, wherever it is found, is a way of seeing emer-
gent novelty as if it were severed from that from which it emerged’ (Kohn 
2013, 57). That ‘as if’ is consistent with Kohn’s notion of iconicity: ‘Icons 
involve not noticing’ (Kohn 2013, 32) – an observation wholly apt in the 
case of this election cycle’s divisions, in which the candidates’ alleged 
excesses and deficits were apparently matters of indifference to their 
supporters. In televised focus group discussions, supporters described 
Trump’s appeal as his readiness to ‘shake things up’ – the bombast being 
(in their view) a show of his energy and earnestness, but not necessarily 
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his intentions. Clinton’s supporters emphasized her long career, but this 
made it difficult to see her as an independent ‘change’ candidate, except 
for her status as the first woman to gain the presidential nomination of 
either of the main political parties.
Even for Trump supporters, his personal comportment, the wall, 
deportations, the Muslim ban and the rest were not so much spe-
cific objects of their endorsement as they were the poetics of a power 
they deemed desirable, transforming in itself. Such poetics cannot be 
explained wholly in relation to Trump (notwithstanding its benefits to 
his candidacy); rather, they draw on forms of relation that gather heat 
to themselves well away from the capital (an image I draw from Essy 
Stone’s ‘Among the Prophets’ (Stone 2016): ‘Yes, he is a good king, how 
the K.K.K. chopped my daddy’s wood for him, winter, 1968 … ’). Indeed, 
Trump does not actually claim to speak for his supporters – rather, he 
claims to speak as them, their iconic ‘us’. The issue of public or political 
consensus does not arise, then, since the stereotypical ‘base’ – and here, 
I am not referring to his major donors or party elite – was brought into 
being by an act of self-description before the event, not by a groundswell 
of support for a particular set of policies.
As for Trump’s extreme statements and prevarications, it seems 
that some part of his success actually depended on his inconsist-
encies, and not just because they kept him in the news. By varying 
his positions on any given point, he could assert his ownership of 
meaning while continuing to tailor his message for voters and give 
queasy establishment Republicans momentary room to breathe. 
Furthermore, perhaps more fundamentally, as his own language 
floated on the winds of the moment, his positions became unanswer-
able in conversational form or standard news formats – on issues as 
disparate as Barack Obama’s birthplace, the human role in climate 
change, the Intelligence Community’s assessment of Russia’s role in 
the election, the relevance of ethics in government, and Brexit and 
the future of Europe. (By now the list is too long to attempt.) The cam-
paign and transition gave early signs of the frailty of critical discourse 
in this regard. Quotation stood in for commentary; debate gave way 
to repetition and reinterpretation. In this way, Trump’s staging of his 
personal power became unanswerable in its own terms (and so it has 
remained, even as his business and campaign associates come under 
federal indictment).
In the immediate aftermath of the 2016 election, political commen-
tator Mark Danner wrote: ‘Trump is an improviser, a performer, a creator 
of new worlds’ (2016, 14). As Essy Stone’s poem about the rural American 
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King Saul helps us see, he invites his supporters to remake themselves in 
him, to be change agents through him. He offers himself as their dou-
ble negative, redeeming their alienation (whatever their class position) 
from a privileged position all his own. Stone’s imagery reaches into rural 
America, but, again, Trump’s iconic power should not be imagined as 
reserved for the poor and uneducated. It is there for anyone’s borrowing 
or lending, a highly bankable charisma.
As with Stone’s analysis, Trump’s impunity – ‘Saul – domineering, 
cunning, powerful’ – is misread if one takes his statements as reflections of 
his supporters alone; rather, they remix powers familiar to any of us from 
our own relations and experiences. The question of democracy’s future 
thus cannot be answered only in reference to ‘them’; if democracy is a 
social fact, it must include ‘us’, too, and what we know or could or should 
know about inequality. This (at last) returns us to the matter of what rup-
ture reveals of relativity – not the hackneyed antagonism of red and blue 
cultures, but rather, the diverse ways in which people understand state 
power in relation to powers of other kinds, including their own.
Prey are hunters, too: January 2017
In How Forests Think, Eduardo Kohn urges readers to consider how 
people know themselves and the world, including their relations to the 
non- humans around them. In his monograph, this means (among other 
things) the jaguars prowling the forest. To a jaguar, he points out, the 
world is divided between prey and non-prey. For the people Kohn writes 
about, alert to the jaguar’s habits and appetite, the jaguar is a sign, 
emblematic of their own everyday canniness, valour and vulnerability, 
lending meaning to language. The jaguar does not symbolize humans’ 
power; it is itself subject to a human master (the white shopkeeper in 
town). Rather, it materializes the very significance of power from the 
perspective of potential prey who elude its bite and, in the meantime, 
also hunt jaguars.
Kohn’s analysis of the hunter/prey relation to the jaguar is suggestive 
of an approach to understanding modern state power that merits explo-
ration. I mean this seriously, not as an analogy but as an ethnographic 
prompt to consider what it is that is usually left out of discussions of high 
elective office. This new president seems to belong more to the worlds of 
appetite and charisma than to bureaucratic protocols and norms. In his 
own words, Trump sees a binary world of ‘terrific people’ who are ‘nice’ 
to him, and on the other side ‘enemies’ or ‘haters’ – categories that are 
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meaningful wholly and only as they relate to himself. The binary struc-
ture of his personal myth is easily lent to the nationalist discourse he pro-
motes, itself a binary discourse hinged on the fold where his self-vaunted 
deal-making skills conjoin his personal wealth to a vision of the national 
interest. His self-aggrandizement is essential to this convergence, appre-
ciated and even enjoyed by his supporters and apparently worth the risk 
of exposure by his critics, since in his ‘nationalist ontology’, ‘the reinven-
tion of experiential reality in the terms of the mythical realities’ (Kapferer 
2012, 99) potentially works to his benefit either way.17
In Trump’s binary world of terrific people and enemies, terrific 
people are as prone to being prey as are enemies (perhaps even more 
so, since their loyalty makes them sweeter to his purposes).18 The sense 
of rupture is clarified by this image, since it highlights the difficulty of 
knowing the difference between safety and danger, yet also the ines-
capability of a mortal need to know the risks of miscalculation. Not 
surprisingly, by the first day after the inauguration, millions of peo-
ple – not centrally organized as a group – moved to the freezing streets. 
Demonstrations continue. Those disinclined to be potential prey are 
warming themselves elsewhere, making their own heat as they seek out 
like-minded others, together gathering different futures around their 
fires both figurative and literal (staying warm on the street). No doubt 
there is fire for Trump supporters, too; the televised rallies are a perfor-
mance of heat. In a related vein, the rallies and demonstrations are also 
expressions of a diffuse but intense politicization of the body – standing 
up and turning up extend key tropes of race, gender, war, work, abor-
tion, immigration, and demanding removals (among others) into con-
tingencies of person-state relations, and, for some, adjoining physical 
selves to partisanship. Proper bodies  – living or dead – seem to be the 
confirming vital sign of Trump’s truth for his strategists, but there is a 
visceral quality of intense emotion that slips in and out of language, for 
supporters and critics alike (at least those who are following the news). 
The jaguar is not just hunter and prey, it is also everywhere in people’s 
speech, seeping into our idioms, shaping our stories, our narrative relish 
(‘Did you hear … ’), our testimonies of fear, close calls, or bravado. The 
jaguar reminds us to think of power before we think of partisanship, and 
to follow power where it leads ethnographically, uncomfortable though 
this may be.
In anthropologists’ recent work on forms of life beyond the human, 
there are suggestive resources for thinking about power unchecked and 
the agency that thickens around indeterminacy. We have much to learn 
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from people who know the world not first as consumers, but as jaguars’ 
potential prey, or as stewards of their families’ dreamings. Their alert-
ness – or ours, whoever we are – is honed at home, and the relevant 
signs, whatever they may be, prickle the skin, anything but remote or 
abstract.19 Clinton supporters wondered aloud how Trump supporters 
could tolerate his personal behaviour, failing to see how very pervasively 
familiar his behaviour actually is in terms of what passes for everyday 
normal in other settings in the asymmetric powers and vulnerabilities 
of relations between bosses, employees, partners and spouses; in situa-
tions of precarity, security and deceit; in efforts to hold others to account 
or evade accountability oneself; in their expectations of safety or dan-
ger at home or in the street – and so forth. This is not partisan knowl-
edge. These are domains of knowledge anyone might have, as they are 
widely distributed among the population at large – familiar and ‘famil-
iarized’ (Brown 2018, 18). Experiencing the campaign from home, per-
haps Clinton supporters felt they were looking at a president, drawn to 
her special qualifications, while Trump supporters were looking for a 
president, seeking familiar attributes. The closing lines from Elizabeth 
Willis’s ‘Plot’ (2016) evoke the potential for alienation in the non-rela-
tion of imposed choices:
What would you choose, a sandwich or a phone call.
What did you expect, a question or an answer.
A piano or a clock.
Take all the time you want.
These reflections suggest that our understanding of political agency 
would benefit from uncoupling the bureaucratic fact of elected incum-
bency from the charismatic power of office, since elements of that same 
charisma circulate in private life, as people rehearse their own agentive 
powers, calibrating their own experiences of acceptance and refusal in 
relation to known partners, opportunities and perils. With regard to elec-
toral campaigns, this means that the means and ends of political agency 
as imagined instrumentally by strategists might be only ambiguously 
aligned for voters and potential voters, especially with regard to what are 
conventionally referred to as interests. I am not for a moment suggesting 
that people vote in a misguided or mystified way, only that our situations 
as hunters and prey are fundamentally problems of knowledge about the 
world as we know it or wish it to be – uncommon knowledge of a world 
we share.
86 RUPTURES
One implication of these reflections is that presidential powers – 
which is to say, powers as they circulate from different parts of the forest 
through high elective office (not just for Trump), and perhaps the pow-
ers of other high offices – break the bounds of democratic discourse, 
notwithstanding their centrality to the institutions of democratic gov-
ernment. Their escape is by reference, away from representation and 
individual liberty, toward realized and unrealized experiences of hunt-
ers who are also prey: inequality, manipulation, vulnerability, pride 
and vindication, are among the relations that may be elided as partisan 
attitudes. 
Now: visible heat
Let us return to the present.
We seem now to be in an open moment of preoccupation shared 
across disciplines with the significance of temporality and difference as 
means and ends not only of human understanding, but humanity itself.20 
Time is gathering heat in multiple senses – material, conceptual, polit-
ical, cross-disciplinary.21 Once we think of living in time not just as an 
ethnographic topic, but also as ethnography’s ethic (see Mauss 1967, 
35, on the contract as ‘uniting two moments in time’)22, then subject 
and object, means and ends, fieldwork and authorship, subject disci-
plines and self-discipline, students and teachers, thinkably fold together, 
potentiating what Durkheim – introducing his idea of organic solidarity – 
refers to as the ‘warmth’ of ‘a form of life sui generis’ (Durkheim 1984, 
lii).23 This is not a cosy image. On the contrary, it is a challenging one, 
Durkheim prodding his readers with the heat that is gained or forfeited 
when people find value or lose it in their engagements with others. If we 
are searching for sources of a future politics beyond the fantasy of market 
shares and consumer choice (‘a piano or a clock’ as Stone puts it), the 
eloquent explorations of non-human worlds currently enlivening anthro-
pology are full of implication. The registers of state power – quasi-occult, 
impersonal, inhuman – gain legibility in the immediacy of close personal 
experience. We are used to thinking of a president as an elected individ-
ual, but far less so about how the presidency comes to life (if indeed it 
does), with the president giving it human form and a locus of responsibil-
ity. This aspect of the presidency (its coming to life) is not accomplished 
by an election alone. It comes to life – if it does – diversely, in actual 
encounters, skin-side out, amongst ourselves, as already discussed.
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I reiterate the point to explain my interest in the question of how 
people know and live their own agency in relation to the inhuman aspects 
of state power in their everyday experiences.24 Agency is not something 
an individual does or does not have; rather, it circulates, lent and bor-
rowed, waxing and waning, changing the scope and scale of the human 
vis-à-vis the inhuman, as they discover their own thinkable relevance. 
The intimate registers of agency and their creative movement away from 
inevitability deliver heat to time. In this sense, agency is not in time; it 
is time, indeterminate and potentiating heat. Lifting the brackets from 
other forms of life and non-life offers fresh possibilities for understanding 
contemporary state powers amidst powers of other kinds, including the 
powers of ordinary people unexpectedly gathered together. Those con-
nections ‘gather sense’ in a world in which we are also present, anything 
but indifferent or apart. 
Hence my hopes for anthropology as a source of timely renewal 
not just within the discipline, but also beyond it. Explaining the electoral 
outcome that brought Donald Trump to office or prognosticating about 
how Democrats will respond in 2020 – or before then, given the widening 
gyres of criminal investigations – are issues that will continue to occupy 
political strategists and activists in the United States. For anthropologists 
here and elsewhere, an explanation of the lines of antagonism in 2016 
or their shifting horizons in the midterm elections of 2018 is likely less 
urgent than understanding the connections between all forms of political 
energy and the diversity of people’s practical experience of democracy 
(or lack of it) in their own lives. It would seem that Americans who voted 
this way or that, or not at all, had different experiences, tolerances and 
expectations in the moment – experiences and attitudes not in them-
selves subject to red/blue binaries. Acknowledging those experiences 
and attitudes as ‘ours’ as well as ‘theirs’ (the division suspended in the 
jaguar’s appetite) restores the co-presence that relativity requires. In con-
trast to the conventional construction of the present moment as a battle 
between ‘red’ and ‘blue’ cultures, this other relativity offers no ‘outside’ – 
that is its ethnographic advantage, the heart of its realism.
To be clear: to argue for ethnographic relativity is not an argument 
for either personal neutrality or absolute difference. I am not looking 
away from the sharp edges of political division, the tactics of political 
power, or the vastly moneyed interests on this same terrain. Rather, my 
effort is to look through them, to the complexities and possibilities they 
reveal and conceal regarding anyone’s agency, solidarities and sense 
of democratic possibility – the three questions posed earlier. Once one 
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recognizes (like Fitzpatrick’s political poet) that there is no place apart, 
relativity widens the space for personal conviction and action as mutually 
necessary prompts for knowledge, discipline and engagement. If there is 
a methodological point to this discussion, it is to suggest that a relativism 
that frames ethnography with lines of red and blue is unsustainable, as 
it can only totalize and essentialize social life in partisan political terms. 
That move is already established in the populist playbook. Ethnography 
drives in the other direction, drawn by discipline and need into the midst 
of social times ‘when any heat at all rises and becomes a visible thing’ 
(Burleson 2017).
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Notes
1. Accounts of the populist turn in Europe and the United States now abound. For one influential 
analysis see Müller (2016).
2. I am indebted to Janet Roitman for her discussion of crisis at the London conference.
3. Ruefle 2017.
4. ‘Tragedy’ (Scott 2013); ‘the great wave’ (Povinelli 2016); ‘the sixth extinction’ (Kolbert 2014); 
‘the end of the world’ (Tsing 2016) – all tropes from current anthropology.
5. For physicists, convergence becomes more likely as the entropy of systems increases with isola-
tion or containment, and divergence becomes more likely as entropy decreases with openness 
(see Earman 2002, 261–2). The direction of time has no opposite (see Reichenbach 1971, 
207–11).
6. Cf. ‘Tragedy is irreparable’ (Steiner 1979, 8); ‘possible redemption from the predicament of 
irreversibility’ (Scott 2013, 165). In this sense, ‘historicity’ is fundamentally different from 
‘temporality’, the experience of living in time (Scott 2013, 12, 21). Rupture is irreparable but 
not necessarily irredeemable; its temporality is irreversible but renewal is not necessarily fore-
closed.
7. The 2016 election yielded Republican majorities in both chambers of Congress; after the 2018 
elections, the House of Representatives was retaken by Democrats.
8. Legislative steps toward repeal of ACA (Reuters 2017; United States House of Representatives 
2017).
9. One day’s front-page headlines give some sense of this: ‘Trump sets off backlash with attack on 
civil rights icon’; ‘The assault on health and safety begins’; ‘Pick for Labor Department has long 
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history of fighting labor laws’; ‘Trump calls NATO “obsolete” and floats Russia nuclear deal’ 
(New York Times, 15 January 2017: 1). The pace accelerated, and reached deeper, after the 
inauguration on 20 January.
10. On 6 November, Sam Wang’s assessment put the probability of a Clinton win at 99 per cent 
(Wang 2016).
11. In the week following the election, the New York Times added 41,000 new digital and print 
subscriptions – ‘a drastic uptick’ (Spayd and Gershkovich 2016; New York Times 2016).
12. Almost a month later, on 4 December, a local Indiana newspaper ran a front-page story with 
a full two pages inside about the recent development of an encampment by the Traditional 
Worker Party – a white nationalist movement that has found a congenial home nearby (Bavis 
2016).
13. For anthropological accounts of the campaign and election, see Political and Legal  Anthropology 
Review’s online ‘Emergent Conversations Part 5’ (Edelman 2016 and Hartigan 2016).
14. I say ‘fallacy,’ since once they became their parties’ respective nominees, the two leading candi-
dates essentially ran against themselves. By this I mean that for potential supporters on either 
side, ‘no’ – for the most part – would have meant not voting at all. Over the past 60 years in US 
presidential elections, but never more than in 2016, high ‘unfavourables’ correspond to very 
low voter crossover (Wang 2017).
15. On pre-emption as ‘a new dominant’ see Brian Massumi’s analysis of the George W. Bush ad-
ministration’s unilateralist doctrine and the campaign to mobilize public perception in the 
run-up to the war in Iraq (Massumi 2015, loc. 55).
16. In any case, the antagonisms went far beyond the reach of any accommodation of divergent 
interests – even beyond discussion. ‘Talking heads’ from the two sides adopted a strategy of 
talking over each other when they appeared on the same televised panels (as did the candi-
dates at the vice-presidential debate).
17. Bruce Kapferer’s assessment of the ethnographic value of ontology in his study of nationalism 
in Sri Lanka applies here: ‘[C]ertain dynamics connected with the re-formation of the person 
in ritual contexts were, through the mediation of a nationalist discourse, expanded into a pop-
ulist ideological discourse of nation and identity’ (Kapferer 2012, 443).
18. Along the way to his inauguration, pundits and members of both parties assured themselves 
that when he became the nominee, or when he was elected, or when he began to govern, 
Trump would change his behaviour to become presidential (the term commonly used). This 
has not happened; it seems he cannot, or will not, alter from himself (to borrow a phrase from 
Holbraad and Pedersen, quoted in Holbraad et al., 2014).
19. The reference to ‘prickling the skin’ is indebted to Pearson 2015.
20. Recent discussions (in anthropology and philosophy) of ontology – construed as ‘the material 
and conceptual structures’ of ‘emergence’ (Grosz 2008, 1) – have contributed new formula-
tions of social life to anthropology, and new formulations of anthropology itself (although not 
entirely or necessarily from within the ‘ontological turn’; Hodges 2014, 46).
21. Anthropologists and sociologists ‘have reopened the question of capitalist time’ and ‘global 
time’ (Bear 2014, 3). Lawyers have turned to temporality as a feature and function of legal 
pluralism (von Benda-Beckmann 2014). Environmentalists and community activists find in 
‘temporal belonging’ a conceptual and practical counterweight to the fracturing effects of a 
public sphere conceived in liberal terms as separate from nature (see Bastian 2012, 2; Bastian 
2014).
22. My thanks to James Boon for the reference to Mauss in this context.
23. In her published lectures on chaos, territory and art, philosopher Elizabeth Grosz evokes ‘cos-
mological imponderables – among the most obvious, the forces of temporality, gravity, mag-
netism’ as ‘among the invisible, unheard, imperceptible forces of the earth, forces beyond the 
control of life that animate and extend life beyond itself … in which life folds over itself to 
embrace its contact with materiality…’ (2008, 23). I appreciate this image since, as I under-
stand these words now, they suggest sustainability, indeterminacy, and energy as each other’s 
conditions of possibility.
24. My usage of non-human differs from that of philosophers and literary scholars who associate 
themselves with ‘the nonhuman turn’ (see Grusin 2015), in that those discussions are ground-
ed primarily in Western philosophical traditions. My own interest derives primarily from eth-
nographic accounts that dwell with people’s relations with non-humans (as in Kohn’s analysis) 
and the non-living (which turn out to be alive; see, e.g., Povinelli 2016).
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Inner Revolution: Reaction and 
Rupture in a Danish Lutheran 
Movement
Morten Axel Pedersen
In the world of faith and the gospel, leaping has to be done! But in 
the world of earthly reality, which politics for instance is, leaping 
is an impossibility … so when political system-creators or ideolog-
ical politicians nevertheless seek to leap via revolutions, then they 
destroy the natural development and effectively molest and tyran-
nize the humans. (Krarup 1987, 14; translated by the author)
So goes a telling citation from Conservative Essays, one among a num-
ber of books published over the last 30 years by Søren Krarup, a former 
Lutheran priest and a retired MP for the Danish People’s Party, who is 
widely considered to be the leading intellectual and political figure of 
Denmark’s national-conservative right. What Krarup is suggesting in the 
citation, with explicit reference to the nineteenth-century Danish theo-
logian and philosopher Søren Kierkegaard’s notion of ‘leaps of faith’,1 is 
that in Christianity there can be only one kind of rupture, namely the 
‘inner revolution’ needed to re-enter the kingdom of God of which Man 
was originally an inseparable part, but from which he has since been 
evicted and detached. Any attempt to change or improve this primordial 
fall or rupture in the form of progressive reforms, let alone political rev-
olutions, are not just utopian and totalitarian but evil and ungodly. For 
the same reason, as Krarup argues in the chapter ‘The Anti-Totalitarian 
Kierkegaard’ (1987), there is a direct relationship between existential 
leaping and reactionary politics:
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[T]he conservative rejection of leaping within a temporal dura-
tion is a consequence of the necessity of leaping in the religious or 
eternal world, where God cannot be known but only be an object 
of faith, and where no human has direct or natural access to the 
divine and truth. Since God is not of this world, you are in this world 
not supposed to relate to society and politics in a god-like and abso-
lute way. Or with reference to [Kierkegaard’s] expression, it is just 
because the relationship to eternity demands leaping that leaps do 
not belong to the dimension of time. (1987, 14; translated by the 
author)
This chapter is based on fieldwork within the small but highly influen-
tial Danish Lutheran movement Tidehverv (in which Krarup and others 
from his family have for several generations played a central role), as 
well as a historical genealogy of Danish concepts of freedom (frihed) 
in nineteenth-century theological and cultural political discourse. By 
combining ethnographical and historical perspectives, I show what it 
means to subscribe to and practise a doggedly Lutheran and explicitly 
Kierkegaardian form of Christian faith, which celebrates the existential 
‘leaps’ (spring) that are induced from sudden and always unexpected 
encounters with God. Crucially, these ruptures must take a strictly inte-
rior and existential, and not exterior and political, form. Thus, from the 
perspective of my interlocutors it is not just immoral but downright sac-
rilegious to try to bring about any human progress and societal devel-
opment in the world, especially change couched in and executed in the 
name of political revolution (i.e. of the sort discussed by Humphrey and 
Rowlands et al., this volume). My ambition in what follows is to unpack 
some of the historical processes and cultural dynamics that undergird 
this peculiar combination between a theology that celebrates inner rup-
ture and a politics, which is all about resisting outer revolution. Pre-
cisely how and why is it that ‘Christian leaping’ becomes anathema to 
societal progress and a precondition for ‘genuine conservatism’? And 
what are the wider lessons gained from the case of Tidehverv not just 
for influential anthropological work on Christianity and ethics/free-
dom (Robbins 2004; Keane 2007; Laidlaw 2014), but also the burgeon-
ing literature on ethno-nationalism and conservative identity politics 
in Denmark and elsewhere in Europe (Gullestad 2006; Hervik 2011; 
Gingrich and Banks 2006; Thorleifsson 2016; 2017; 2018; Kublitz, this 
volume)
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‘What is old, is good’
In spite of its explicitly anti-revolutionary and self-proclaimed reactionary 
discourse, Tidehverv is an apposite choice of study for the anthropology 
of rupture. Indeed, rupture features in the name of this Lutheran move-
ment. Thus, the Danish word tidehverv is derived from a fin de siècle Ger-
man journal called Zeitwende, a term that denotes a ‘rupture between two 
eras’ (Larsen 2006). Established in 1926 by four male theology students 
in reaction to a time they lamented to be ‘too modern to respect the ele-
mentary human’, Tidehverv for the first decades of its existence fought its 
battles with other branches of the Danish Protestant church. Its original 
arch-enemy and raison d’être was thus the ascetic Inner Mission that had 
risen to prominence in various parts of rural Denmark and deprived inner- 
city Copenhagen areas as part of the pietistic awakening that had swept 
across Protestant Europe in the late nineteenth century (Bramming 1993). 
Indeed, the fathers and families of several founders were devoted follow-
ers of the pietistic lifeways portrayed in Danish novels and films such as 
Babette’s Feast or Breaking the Waves. In that sense, it could be argued, the 
bigger societal rupture lamented by Tidehverv’s founders was ironically 
replicated on the smaller level of family via their separation from their 
Inner Mission background. But crucially (also for understanding the role 
of fathers and their offspring in Tidehverv today), this cut was done in a 
way that was intended to be respectful to these fathers and to continue the 
patriarchal social, cultural and moral order more generally. This notion of 
a benign, productive and necessary ‘interior’ rupture can also be detected, 
as I shall now demonstrate, on a more theological and existential level.
Conservatism is a word that one hears all the time in relation to 
Tidehverv. Its many theological critics as well as left-wing politicians and 
commentators frequently accuse the Krarup family for being ‘old-fash-
ioned’ and ‘reactionary’. What these critics seem to fail to understand 
is that, among Tidehverv adherents, being old-fashioned is a badge of 
honour. Søren Krarup and other Tidehverv figures like to call themselves 
‘genuinely’ (ægte) conservative as opposed to what other national-con-
servatives like to sarcastically dismiss as the ‘so-called Conservative 
Party’. As he rhetorically asks in Conservative Essays,
But progress must happen, mustn’t it? We need to develop and 
move ahead … The only thing that is given for time and develop-
ment surely is that they take care of themselves … Rather than say-
ing, along with 1968 ideology, that everything that is old is wrong, 
we need to say, in tune with people’s experience [den folkelige erfa-
ring]: what is old, is good! (Krarup 1987, 126–7)
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As I will show, this arch-conservative injunction is taken quite literally by 
certain participants in the annual Tidehverv summer meeting, a week-
long event of theological and cultural political talks, debate and gossip 
that is held at a folkehøjskole (‘people’s high school’ for adult learning) 
located in Southern Jutland close to the German border.
The obligatory after-dinner psalm-singing session was over, and 
groups of attendants were clustered around the dozen sofa tables scat-
tered around the open fireplace that occupied the centre of the højskole 
study. Steaming hot black coffee and lavish servings of old-school Danish 
pastries were being consumed as the conversation slowly reached its 
usual menacing level, interspersed as it was with frequent outbursts of 
loud laughter and occasional swearing. At one table, an MP from the 
Danish People’s Party was engaged in a heated theological discussion 
with a female pastor from a rural parish; at another, two prominent 
members of the Society for Freedom of Speech (Trykkefrihedsselskabet) 
were bantering and gossiping with a young nurse, a retired professional 
musician and a civil servant from a major provincial town. As for myself, 
I was still at this early point still trying to figure out which table, and 
conversation, I should try to join for the rest of the evening. Judging from 
my experiences from the two previous evenings, there was every reason 
to assume that it was going to be a long night. But above all, I realized, 
I was in urgent need of a drink and, perhaps, a cigarette; for although I 
had stopped smoking years before, there were still certain rare moments 
that I experienced with such intensity that they compelled me to make 
an exception. This was one such moment. After all, I had reached (and 
‘survived’) the third day of my first Tidehverv summer meeting, an event 
that over recent years has been widely hailed (or feared, depending on 
how one sees things) as the intellectual heart of Denmark’s ascending 
national-conservative right, and which for several decades has exercised 
an extraordinary influence among not just Danish theologians but also 
on Danish national politics (Grosbøll 2007; Pedersen 2017). There was 
too much new ethnography, and too many epistemological and ethical 
quandaries, for me to process.
So (heeding the lesson I had picked up the previous evening from 
watching other, mostly male meeting participants), I grabbed the Tuborg 
beer that I had already purchased before the psalm-singing began from 
the impromptu kiosk selling beers, cheap wine and other necessities, 
and went outside. As is usually the case at Tidehverv gatherings, several 
groups of smokers were huddled under the thin overhanging roof that 
was providing at least a measure of cover from the summer drizzle. Most 
of these groups of men and women were engulfed in heated discussions, 
so I went up to three young gentlemen who were occupying a corner for 
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themselves, with shy and somewhat quizzical expressions on their stern- 
looking faces. I had already noticed them the previous day; indeed, they 
were hard not to take notice of. They seemed to be constantly keeping 
together in tightly knit groups of almost identically looking young men, 
dressed in what might be described as the standard uniform of Danish 
national-conservative intellectuals: sharply pressed suits or neat tweed 
jackets accompanied with ties or bow ties, as well as freshly polished and 
shining formal leather shoes. All them were smoking, two of them ciga-
rettes, the last one what looked like an expensive pipe. ‘Excuse me, do 
you have a light? (undskyld, har du ild)’, I asked as I walked up to the 
group with a polite smile. The tallest and most dapper of the three young 
men looked straight at me and shot back, with a friendly but nevertheless 
serious tone, ‘Do you mean the tinderbox (fyrtøjet)?’ Here, I could not 
help laughing (indeed, I thought he was making a joke), enquiring: ‘The 
tinderbox? That’s a rare word to use!’ At which point the man pulled out 
a Ronson lighter, lighting my cigarette while lecturing me (accompanied 
by nods from the two others): ‘Well, no reason to use a new word when 
there is an old one that works perfectly fine, is there?’
Not all men at the annual summer meeting are dressed in suit and 
tie (although a fair number of the younger male theology students are), 
and I have never experienced anyone else making an issue out of the 
fact that smokers in Denmark and elsewhere in the world tend to use 
disposable plastic lighters instead of more old-school technologies for 
making fire. Nevertheless, while the above example can be described 
as an extreme outlier and therefore not representative of Tidehverv as 
such, it does, I think, capture the very explicit manner in which ‘being 
conservative’ is something that is celebrated in formal and informal dis-
cussion and is also practised at Tidehverv events. In many situations, this 
constant highlighting of ‘conservative’ ideas and deeds takes the form of 
criticism and ridicule of norms and values associated with the so-called 
‘cultural radicals’ (left-wing progressive artists and intellectuals, more 
on whom below). Preferences for ecological and organic food, for exam-
ple, are referred to as ‘ridiculous’ (latterlige), as are all references to ‘cli-
mate-friendly’ and ‘green’ products and solutions more generally. As a 
female priest told me during an interview, giggling as she recalled what 
was clearly a fond memory:
Do you remember last year when a [recently employed] staff mem-
ber from the kitchen introduced the menu for the final dinner, 
making a big thing out of the fact that all the vegetables were eco-
logical? [Indeed, I did remember the situation all too clearly – it was 
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in fact one of the things I had jotted down in my notebook before 
crashing to bed that same night following another whisky and the-
ology binge.] He [the staff member] was so surprised, I will never 
forget the confused look on his face when the entire room burst into 
laughter once he started bragging about ecological food. He just 
could not understand what was going on. I actually felt quite sorry 
for him, but it was also so funny!
Another issue around which the practice of ‘being conservative’ revolves 
is drinking and, perhaps to an even higher extent, smoking. While many 
other Danish Christians also drink (and smoke) when meeting for social 
and/or theological purposes, Tidehverv stands out for the sheer quantity 
of alcohol consumed and the proportion of people who at a given time of 
the day may be observed outside puffing on their cigarettes and/or pipes. 
As Agnete Raahauge, current editor in chief of the Tidehverv journal and 
de facto leader of this movement, concluded her traditional welcome 
address at the 2017 summer meeting:
One more thing: I have been again this year been instructed by our 
hosts that it is strictly forbidden to drink your own alcohol on the 
premises [laughter, of the knowing sort that indicates everyone 
knows that people won’t obey]. However, and in keeping with the 
procedure of previous meetings, our hosts have also on my request 
promised to procure large amounts of cheap wine, so that we shall 
be able to meet our often substantial needs for alcohol without 
going bankrupt [more giggling]. And finally, I have promised to 
make sure to remind you that smoking is strictly forbidden inside, 
so please remember to go to designated outside areas equipped 
with ashtrays when the need arises! [here Raahauge made a rhe-
torical pause, directing her gaze at the people occupying the front 
rows with a mock-stern expression]: I know that, until a few years 
ago, especially certain older members chose to ignore this smok-
ing ban during especially late-night whisky-drinking sessions. But, 
seriously, we cannot have that any more! [grumbling sounds and 
reluctant nods].
As it happened, several middle-aged men did turn out to have brought 
their own single malt whisky to the gathering, which was revealed with 
much bluster and beaming expressions at every night at some point after 
midnight, which was also when a few daring individuals started lighting 
up cigarettes inside in defiance of the rules.
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Elsewhere (Pedersen forthcoming), I have discussed how this 
‘obligation’ to drink and smoke is part of a wider ‘ethics of anti-piety’ 
undergirding Tidehverv’s theological project, and how this ethics can 
be traced back to the pietistic theology professors (as well as in several 
cases, fathers) against whom the four Tidehverv founders had revolted. 
For present purposes, however, let me point to the two most significant 
and political ‘others’ in opposition to whom my interlocutors worked so 
hard to define themselves, namely Islam and ‘cultural radicals’. From a 
Tidehverv vantage, as I have also described elsewhere (Pedersen 2017), 
Islam and left-wing green progressives have more in common than what 
separates them. Notwithstanding the fact that Muslims believe in a God 
whereas cultural radicals proclaim not to do so, what unites them is the 
shared notion that it is possible for human beings to better themselves 
by adhering to explicit and normative rules or rights. And precisely for 
this reason – because Islam is a ‘law-religion’ (lov-religion) and because 
progressives have ‘elevated human rights to their religion’ – both are ide-
ological abstractions that disobey God by infringing on his territory by 
either (in the left-wing atheist project) announcing His death and replac-
ing Him with ‘totalitarian human rights’ and other ‘abstract humanist 
universals’, or – in what some would see as the opposite thing but from 
the Tidehverv vantage amounts to just the same sacrilegious moralism – 
by formulating religious laws for how to believe in Allah and to be a pious 
Muslim, as if one, anyone, could second-guess God’s intentions.
Yet, as my interlocutors keep telling themselves in publications and 
seminars, as well as over coffee and lunch and not least those intense 
late-night drinking sessions, God’s will cannot be known by man, for He 
is forever removed from and eternally distant from the sinners He cre-
ated, and later manifested himself through an act of unfathomable divine 
grace and love, so it is only by succumbing to the irresolvable paradoxes 
of a human, all too human, existence full of impossible choices and end-
less suffering that one can obey God and be a slave of His will, without 
ever fully knowing how, when or indeed whether one succeeds in doing 
so. This, then, is why seemingly pedestrian and profane issues such as 
ecological good and anti-smoking campaigns take on such an inordinate 
importance. Along with pursuing a wealth of other ‘genuinely conserva-
tive’ practices, things and ideas, which taken together constitute a distinct 
and fine-masked system of signification that Tidehverv members learn to 
master, every element of their personal and theological being is invested 
24/7 in the fight against cultural radicals, Islamists (well, all Muslims 
really) and other forces of political revolution and social rupture.
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A genealogy of Danish freedom
But how did political revolution and societal progress become anath-
ema to Tidehverv, and why is it that ‘Christian leaping’ and other forms 
of inward-oriented ruptures are not just permitted but required for the 
Christian subject, according to so many adherents of this Lutheran the-
ological movement? To address these questions, we need to go back into 
history. Accordingly, in what follows, I shall make a foray into the gene-
alogy of the modern Danish nation state, with particular focus on con-
cepts of individual agency and more specifically freedom (frihed). This 
will involve a discussion of how three concepts of frihed map onto three 
different Danish cultural-cum-theological/political movements, whose 
origins are frequently traced back to three prominent nineteenth- 
century intellectuals, but are still vibrant and influential in contempo-
rary Denmark. I am referring to the movements Grundtvigianismen, 
Tidehverv and Cultural Radicalism. These are associated, respectively, 
with the priest, poet and politician N.F.S. Grundtvig (1783–1872), 
who, among other things, is celebrated for his psalms and is credited for 
sowing the seeds for the Danish co-operative movement and pedagogic 
tradition; the philosopher and theologian Søren Kierkegaard (1813–
55), who (alongside his part-contemporary, Grundtvig) had lasting 
influence on the Danish Protestant church, including Tidehverv itself; 
and literary critic and public intellectual Georg Brandes (1842–1927), 
father of the Modern Breakthrough and so-called cultural radical move-
ment, which (to the regrets of conservatives, and in productive tension 
with some Grundtvigians) has dominated Danish arts, culture and edu-
cation ever since (as illustrated, for example, by the contribution from 
Stine Krøijer on Danish left-radical politics in this volume). Since liter-
ally hundreds of books have been written on Grundtvig, Kierkegaard 
and Brandes, and given that all three were extremely prolific writers, 
I have neither the space nor the expertise to engage with their author-
ships and specific influence in any comprehensive manner. Instead, I 
shall attempt to provide a more general overview of the broader nine-
teenth-century intellectual, political and theological landscape from 
which first Grundtvig, then Kierkegaard and finally Brandes arose to 
fame, by homing in on the specific ideas about agency, subjectivity and 
freedom that more or less implicitly may be said to undergird their 
thinking.
According to Webb Keane (2007, 49–50), a key theme within the 
Protestant Reformation ‘was the idea of restoring agency to its proper sub-
jects. To reveal more directly the ultimate divine agent meant liberating 
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individuals from the domination of illegitimate clerics and their rituals, 
and restoring people to their own principled agency.’ However, as Keane 
also stresses,
the point here is not that Protestantism introduces agency, or even 
individualism, into a world that had formerly lacked them … But … 
Protestantism … foster[s] particular kinds of self-consciousness about 
agency and the possibilities for human action – for instance, what may 
or may not be accomplished by human agents, what by divine ones. 
(2007, 52–3)
This observation captures a central preoccupation of nineteenth-cen-
tury Danish theological and political-philosophical discourse as well 
as my Tidehverv interlocutors, namely how ‘principled agency’, to use 
Keane’s term, is optimally fostered. Still, there are subtle as well as not 
so subtle differences between the specific ways in which these ‘particu-
lar kinds of self-consciousness about agency and the possibilities for 
human action’ have been promulgated and played out in different Prot-
estant ethnographic contexts. Denmark is a case in point. Here, I sug-
gest, competing vernacular politico-theological theories of virtuous 
agency rub off against each other in the three freedom-notions of frisind, 
frimodighed and frigjorthed, which may be described as partly overlap-
ping, part conflicting ideals about what it means to think, speak and act 
independently and virtuously as an individual and group/people/nation 
(cf. Laidlaw 2014). None of these three Danish concepts of freedom cor-
responds fully to standard Western ideas of political liberty, economic 
choice and political-economic security of the sort widely associated with 
the French, Scottish and American enlightenments (Rothschild 2011; 
Rose 1999; Pedersen and Holbraad 2013). Rather, frisind, frimodighed 
and frigjorthed are each imbued with distinct theological-cum-political 
moral inflections, which can be traced back to the nineteenth century, 
when a middle-sized Northern European empire in the course of a few 
decades was reduced to a monolinguistic and monocultural nation state; 
a process that led to the collapse of the alliance between conservatives 
and national-liberals and the birth of a more inward-oriented but no less 
muscular and romanticist identity politics (Østergaard 2004). Nowhere 
is this more clear than in the oeuvres of Grundtvig, Kierkegaard and 
Brandes, as we shall now see.
As Denmark’s folk hero number one, the poet, priest and politi-
cian N.F.S. Grundtvig is today celebrated for his lasting contribution 
to Danish arts and culture (he was, among other things, the author of 
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many of Denmark’s most popular Christian psalms), and for the broader 
theological, cultural, nationalist and indeed pedagogical movement 
(Grundtvigianismen) that he spurred (Allchin 1997; Buckser 1996). 
Thus, Grundtvig is celebrated for having planted the seeds for two 
lasting institutions emerging from the national awakening and quest 
for self- organization among Denmark’s farmers in the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries; namely, on the one hand the coopera-
tive movement (andelsbevægelsen) and on the other the high school 
(højskoler; vocational schools especially for young adults of the same 
kind where the annual Tidehverv meeting takes place) with a unique 
pedagogic tradition (Michelson 1969). But Grundtvig also had a pro-
found impact on Danish Christianity as a whole (Allchin 1997, 80–3). 
Indeed, faith and nation are inseparable for Grundtvig, for whom 
a full love of God and trust in God requires a full love of and trust in 
the people (Backhouse 2011, 81; see also Vind 1999). In keeping with 
the Lutheran celebration of emotions as a vital source of spiritual rap-
port with God, this is precisely what Grundtvig’s emphasis on collec-
tive singing during sermons and in the community more generally is 
all about: a fusion between the Holy Spirit and the spirit (ånd) of the 
people: ‘The spirit of the people is the necessary presupposition for liv-
ing Christianity … Only when Christians everywhere make common 
cause with the natural person [Natur-Menneskene] in this respect, only 
then will Christianity and Popular Culture [folkelighed] generally, and 
especially in Denmark, come into their original, free and only proper 
natural relationship’ (cited in Backhouse 2011, 81). Thus, according 
to Grundtvig, ‘man, apart from the nation to which he belongs, is an 
abstraction’, and the Danish folk is imbued with a unique capacity 
but therefore also unique responsibility in this respect. For ‘[w]here 
the German gift to history was an awareness of the need to preach 
Christianity, it now falls to the Danes to give life to the Word by fusing 
the historical-cultural with the spiritual … Denmark is the place where 
the “Christian” and the “Human” will be united’ (2011, 88).
So, Denmark, as Grundtvig summarized his fatherland’s predica-
ment in characteristic florid language, is nothing but ‘history’s Palestine’. 
From this national-theological perspective, the Nordic peoples, and 
especially the Danes, had emerged as not just the vanguard of humanity 
but as the second incarnation of God’s chosen people, only now in the 
landscapes of Scandia inhabited by noble savages with Viking blood and 
vibrant warrior lore. In the words of Steven Backhouse, ‘[h]istory, says 
Grundtvig, ha[d] now developed to a point where there [was] a need 
for “a people” whose task it is to demonstrate to the world authentic 
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Christianity. It was to the Northern peoples [and] to Denmark, Queen of 
the Northern races, that the Divine mission to the world falls’ (2011, 69). 
‘It is for this reason’, as Backhouse goes on to explain, ‘that Grundtvig 
was thankful for the 1848 war with Prussian Germany and the Slesvig-
Holsten crisis, for it helped to awaken a sense of hitherto dormant 
Danishness’ (2011, 83, 85). This was a notion that really struck a chord 
in war-fatigued nineteenth-century Denmark, as evidenced from the fact 
that a saying with the same message, hvad udadtil tabes skal indad vindes, 
is now part of the general historical knowledge and cultural repertoire of 
most adult Danes.
Let us now turn to Søren Kierkegaard, the famous Danish philoso-
pher and theologian, who, along with his part-contemporary Grundtvig, 
was to have a lasting influence on the Danish Protestant church and the-
ology, including Tidehverv. Now Kierkegaard respected and was well 
acquainted with Grundtvig’s work, but he was also a vocal critic of his 
cultural-cum-political project. In fact, Kierkegaard’s entire theological 
oeuvre was arguably a reaction, if not to Grundtvig in particular, then 
to the peculiar Hegel-inspired amalgamation of Protestant pietism and 
muscular national-liberalism, which occupied a dominant position 
at Copenhagen University and the city’s intellectual salons in the mid- 
nineteenth century. At issue was not just what Kierkegaard dismissed 
as the self-righteous and hypocritical pompousness of the clergy, or the 
moralism and self-pity to which the well-trodden path to piety could lead. 
More than anything else, Kierkegaard’s problem with Grundtvig revolved 
around his ideas about Christian faith and subjectivity. For whereas 
‘Grundtvig prioritizes a person’s “culture-relation” over their “God-
relation”, and thinks that “man”, apart from his nation, is an abstraction 
… Kierkegaard forcefully maintains that the abstraction occurs when 
one defines the individual as a mere component of a transgenerational 
cultural herd – which is the vision Grundtvig seems to hold’ (Backhouse 
2011, 90). Indeed, from a Kierkegaardian perspective, Christian faith can 
only be located at one scale, namely that of the individual, whose rela-
tionship to God is autonomous from and bypasses whichever social and 
cultural group, community or nation to which he or she may happen to 
be part.
We recognize here Kierkegaard’s existentialism, which has been the 
subject of so much philosophical and theological (and, of late, anthro-
pological) work. This is a project that could be characterized as radically 
individualist, in that the single human (hin enkelte) is posited as the ulti-
mate ground and arbiter of not just moral judgement but also faith. For 
Kierkegaard, unless moral and religious thinking, actions and feelings 
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are not based on individual acts of daring decisions, then such thoughts 
and deeds do not qualify as truly ethical let alone Christian. For the same 
reason, ‘Christian faith … requires a terrifying inward struggle’ (Evans 
1989, 348). Or as Nigel Rapport summarizes Kierkegaard’s project:
human truth, Kierkegaard felt, the truth of the individual human 
situation, possessed a moral quality. To submit to majority opinion, 
to what was merely conventional, was an act of cowardice, and a 
consequence of a lack of respect for one’s own integrity. Similarly, 
positing abstract entities such as ‘humanity’ or ‘the public’ was a 
means merely of eschewing and absolving individual responsibility 
for what was done, thought or said. At all costs one ought to resist 
the comforting temptation of according abstractions a separate 
reality … It was morally incumbent on one to draw forth notions of 
the individual and the subjective. (2002, 171)
In my discussion of Tidehverv’s micro-history below, I shall explore 
certain concrete ramifications of this radical individualism, especially 
with respect to the question of what constitutes true Christian ethical 
and moral action. For the time being, I wish to conclude my genealogy 
of Danish freedom by considering the so-called ‘Modern Breakthrough’ 
which reached its peak in the fin de siècle years around 1900, and its rela-
tions to the post-First World War period, which saw not only the rise of 
increasingly polarized social and political movements, but also signifi-
cant turmoil within the Danish Church (Folkekirken) itself, including the 
birth of Tidehverv.
The origin of cultural radicalism can probably be traced back to the 
Danish literary scholar and public intellectual Georg Brandes as well as 
other figures associated with Denmark’s ‘Modern Breakthrough’ (which 
might just well be translated as the ‘Modern Rupture’), as it was insti-
gated by an influential group of writers and intellectuals who explicitly 
revolted against what they dismissed as Copenhagen’s inward-looking 
and conservative cultural establishment. But to an even higher degree, 
cultural radicalism is associated with an influential constellation of 
left-leaning scholars, intellectuals and artists which reached its zenith of 
influence in the interwar and post-war period, but which has remained 
very present in intellectual, political and public debate ever since (Bay 
2003; Jensen 1976; Seidenfaden 2005). According to Bredsdorff, post-
war Denmark, with its rising anti-Soviet sentiment and its cold war para-
noia, at this historical juncture was in dire need of
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an alert and brave cultural radicalism; a mind-set built on respect 
for humanity, which is international in outlook and which is infested 
with [belastet med] a social conscience. There is a need, too, for a 
spiritual heresy [åndeligt kætteri] that exposes convention, hypoc-
risy, and all jargon and clichés; a spiritual openness that does not 
just restrict itself to the surface of things [ser på etiketterne] but 
adopts a firm stance towards the underlying realities. There is a 
need for an ethics set free from [frigjort; here meaning ‘liberated 
from’] the Church and from conservative convention. There is a 
need for an impatience, which does not wish to postpone progress 
until it has become a given or a regression. (1955, 57)
It is in formulations like these – in their unapologetically modernist and 
almost nihilist insistence on a violent break with tradition and (espe-
cially) with all religion, and in their radically humanist if not vitalist cel-
ebration of the autonomy and limitless potentiality of all human beings 
in their unique mental and bodily capacities – that the influence from 
Brandes and other figures associated with the Modern Breakthrough 
shows most clearly. It certainly is telling that one of Brandes’s most 
famous essays (an introduction to Nietzsche, which the latter praised as 
one of the best accounts of his work that he had come across) was enti-
tled ‘Aristocratic Radicalism’ (2014 [1897]). As Brandes bombastically 
summarized the Nietzschean project (2014 [1887], 35), ‘without the 
ability to feel ahistorical, there can be no happiness’. Reminiscences of 
this ‘aristocratic radicalism’ can also be recognized in Denmark’s 1968 
‘youth rebellion’ and its aftermath, including the systematic critique of 
authorities, including university professors and the wider intellectual, 
artistic, literary and societal establishment. Just consider the following 
long passage, which is Brandes’s attempt to summarize Nietzsche’s prob-
lem with Bildung, one of the most central concepts of nineteenth-century 
German romanticist humanism (Bruford 1975) and closely related to its 
Danish sister concept of dannelse:
The culture-philistine regards his own impersonal education as the 
real culture; if he has been told that culture presupposes a homoge-
nous stamp of mind, he is confirmed in his good opinion of himself, 
since everywhere he meets with educated people of his own sort, 
and since all schools, universities, and academies are adapted to 
his requirements and fashioned on the model corresponding to his 
cultivation. Since he finds almost everywhere the same tacit con-
ventions about religion, morality and literature, and with respect 
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to marriage, the family, the community and the State, he finds it 
demonstrated that this imposing homogeneity is culture … [Yet 
this] is not even bad culture, says Nietzsche; it is barbarism forti-
fied to the best of its ability, but entirely lacking in the freshness 
and savage force of original barbarism; and he has many graphic 
expressions to describe Culture-Philistinism as the morass in which 
all weariness is stuck fast, and in the poisonous mists of which all 
endeavour languishes. (2014 [1897])
While Brandes and most of the other figures associated with the Mod-
ern Breakthrough were explicitly critical of religion in general and of 
Christianity in particular (Allen 2012), secular modernity has itself been 
described as a ‘species of hedonism shot through with Christian ambi-
tions for humanity’ (Gray 2011, 25). For the same reason, I suggest we 
can conceive of cultural radicalism as a secular-humanist subspecies 
within Denmark’s wider vernacular political theological landscape. As 
was found to be the case with the two explicitly Lutheran political the-
ologies of Grundtvig and Kierkegaard, cultural radicalism is thus closely 
tied up with deep-rooted but largely tacit and undertheorized eight-
eenth- and nineteenth-century idea(l)s and assumptions about what 
makes someone a virtuous subject and a truly free and proper citizen in 
the Danish body politic. For as Brandes put it in his Nietzsche essay, with 
explicit reference to Kierkegaard (of whom he wrote another influential 
book), the key question with which the Modern Breakthrough was con-
cerned was ‘how to find oneself; how to dig oneself out from oneself’ (2014 
[1887], 21; emphasis added).
I have now completed my genealogy of modern Danish  subjectivity. 
One key finding to emerge from this account is the three distinct con-
cepts of freedom, which in crude terms can be mapped on to the key 
nineteenth- and twentieth-century politico-theological movements 
(Grundtvigianismen, kulturradikalismen and Tidehverv) and associ-
ated cultural heroes (Grundtvig, Kierkegaard and Brandes). Thus frisind 
(‘open-mindedness’), following Grundtvig’s peculiar combination of 
nineteenth-century romanticism with ideals from the Enlightenment and 
liberalism, denotes a liberal openness towards the perspectives of other 
people, but also (and this is of utmost importance to many right-wing 
contemporary adherents of Grundtvig) a right and obligation to defend 
one’s own perspectives and to stand one’s ground. Like cultural radical-
ism, frigjorthed (‘uninhibitedness’) may be traced back to Brandes and 
the Modern Breakthrough. Owing to its close ties with the ideal of a cos-
mopolitan individual freed from the shackles of tradition, religion and 
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small-mindedness (småborgerlighed), it denotes generic tolerance and 
openness towards everything different, including the right and again the 
obligation to perpetually seek out and experience such new horizons in 
one’s own life with regard to literature, art, sexuality, pedagogics, food 
and so on. As for the concept of frimodighed (lit. ‘free daring’), it shares 
with the two other concepts of frihed the injunction to be true to one-
self, but differs in the absolute and unforgiving way it is attainable only 
via continual struggle with various adversaries (modstandere) via which 
the freely daring person can fully become who he or she is. Indeed, fri-
modighed is celebrated by Tidehverv adherents, who associate it only 
with heroes (hædersmænd) with the integrity and guts to stand their 
ground and speak their mind, be that in the context of heated theologi-
cal controversies (about gay marriage, for example) or pressing political 
matters (such as the current refugee crisis) that spark controversy in both 
private and public contexts (see Pedersen 2017; 2018).
Inner revolution 1.0
With these points about past and present Danish concepts of freedom and 
faith in mind, we can now turn more specifically to the question of rup-
ture, and particularly the tension between outer political revolution and 
existential/spiritual ‘leaping’. To repeat the central question of this chap-
ter: why is it that, according to my Tidehverv interlocutors, any notion 
of social progress and political revolution is not just utopian but sacrile-
gious? One answer, I suggest, can be found in the fact that Kierkegaard’s 
(and by implication Tidehverv’s) ‘fundamentally existentialist’ theologi-
cal project can be understood as a radicalized form of pietism that takes 
its world-renouncing asceticism to its logical and necessary conclusion. 
To make this argument, I draw on the work of one of few anthropologists 
who have dared to pose big questions about what, for lack of a better 
word, might be referred to as modern European civilization. I am refer-
ring to Louis Dumont, who in German Ideology boldly suggested that:
German culture had already adopted individualism in … its first or 
‘former’ advance … the Lutheran Reformation. The Reformation 
applied individualism to the religious level, while it left out the 
socio-political level. In eighteenth-century Germany, Lutheran indi-
vidualism had developed and spread into what is called pietism, a 
purely internal individualism which left untouched the sentiment 
of belonging to the global cultural community. In the second half of 
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the century, pietism is confronted with what I would call the second 
wave of individualism, that of the Enlightenment, and later on of 
the French Revolution … [T]he Reformation ‘immunized’ Germany 
against the Revolution, and Herder’s [work] may be seen as a coun-
teroffensive of the German community, supported by Luther’s indi-
vidualism, against the latter form of individualism. (1994, 10)
What Dumont suggests is that the French Revolution assumed a pecu-
liarly involuted form in Germany; a process set in train both by the fact 
that its condition of possibility had already been established with the Ref-
ormation, and by the fact that the authoritarian political climate of late 
eighteenth-century and early nineteenth-century Prussia was not condu-
cive to explicit political discontent or overt revolutionary agitation and 
action. The result was the emergence of a counter- or perhaps alter-rev-
olutionary subjectivity infused with both Protestant technologies of 
the self (introspection, guilt, etc.) and humanist ethical ideals (Bildung 
and other nineteenth-century German notions of self-cultivation and 
spiritual development) – or what Dumont aptly calls ‘a jealous interiority 
devotedly attended to’ (1994, 20). Thus, Dumont goes on to explain:
the German Enlightenment differed from its Western counterpart 
in that it was religious. The Enlightenment in the West, and, top-
ping it all, the French Revolution, took a path from which Germany 
gradually distanced itself … [I]n retrospect, it looks as if German 
culture, being outdistanced, had wanted to reassert itself and in so 
doing had produced in its turn an unheard-of development of the 
human mind … [This] allowed the Germans to react in their own 
way to the secular Enlightenment of the West … The Revolution 
was received in the mind, in the pattern set by the Reformation. 
(1994, 19–20; original emphasis)
In the spirit of Dumont’s macro-comparisons, and with a nod to scholars 
such as Kapferer (2010), Iteanu (Iteanu and Moya 2015) and Robbins 
(Robbins and Siikala 2014), who have spurred a renewed anthropolog-
ical interest in his work, I propose that, sufficiently adjusted, Dumont’s 
analysis of the German case might be extended to the Danish one too. In 
fact, I shall go far as suggesting that both Grundtvig and (especially) Kier-
kegaard can be understood as extreme versions of the so-called ‘purely 
internal individualism’ that Dumont identified as a unique feature of Ger-
many’s ‘religious enlightenment’. Beginning with Grundtvig, the analogy 
between the German and the Danish case is straightforward; after all, as 
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I described above, Grundtvig’s ethno-nationalist and romanticist cultur-
al-theological project in many ways calls to mind similar philosophical 
and intellectual developments in Germany in the nineteenth century.
As for Kierkegaard, the comparison at first glance seems more dif-
ficult, for how to reconcile his radical individualism and anti-authoritar-
ianism with what Dumont calls the dominant ‘community holism’ and 
spontaneous subordination to political and social authorities in the con-
text of post-Reformation and post-Enlightenment Germany? One solu-
tion lies in the realization, already hinted at in these discussions, that 
Kierkegaard’s project itself was a reaction to the Enlightenment; only in 
his case it was a reaction to Grundtvig’s Hegelian (and thus German) 
Enlightenment. Thus understood, Kierkegaard’s theological and philo-
sophical project emerges as a reaction to a reaction, which takes the form 
of what might be described as a double involution, namely not just the 
‘inner revolution’ that Dumont identified in the German context, but also 
the inner rupture associated with Kierkegaard’s notion of the angst-rid-
den introspective self.
In that sense, then, Kierkegaard’s theological and philosophical pro-
ject emerges as an extreme version of what Dumont called the German 
Enlightenment. At issue is a distinct subject-position, namely what might 
be described as a doubly involuted post-Christian subject, who has not 
just undergone the ‘inner revolution’ Dumont associated with German 
post-Enlightenment philosophy and cultural politics, but has been sub-
ject to a further inner revolution in the Danish context that has given 
birth to a radically introspective or, if you like, ‘fundamentally existen-
tialist’ self.
Inner revolution 2.0
We can now answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter, 
namely why all notions of political revolution and societal rupture are 
anathema to Tidehverv, and why existential leaps or ruptures are not just 
permitted but required of the genuine Christian believer. As should be 
clear by now, one plausible answer to this question can be found in the 
deeply Kierkegaardian underpinnings of Tidehverv; for it is precisely this 
double-involuted and radically introspective self that can be identified in 
Tidehverv’s theological, ethical and political project. What seems to be 
at issue is an (irreversible?) transformation from a dimension of exten-
sive or ‘social’ relationships between different people and their spirits/
gods to a realm of intensive relations between different perspectives or 
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‘voices’ within a self-relational subject. Much as with Christian conver-
sion in Mongolia, Melanesia and elsewhere (Holbraad and Pedersen 
2017, 246–63; cf. Robbins 2007), in the context of certain Danish Chris-
tians there is a strong emphasis on ongoing self-rupture. Indeed, as we 
saw, faith in Tidehverv is conceived as a sort of ‘inner leaping’; a mode of 
belief that must never cease to question itself lest it becomes sacrilegious. 
Counter-revolution, then, but as an involution of revolution, or to coin a 
term, inrevolution!
Tidehverv’s ‘truly Christian’ (and thus also ‘genuinely conservative’) 
subject thus emerges as someone who is obliged to be radically introspec-
tive and make himself subject to perpetual inner rupture; not only because 
this is his duty and only path to salvation, but also because it helps to roll 
back, via frimodige existentialist actions, all evil-cum-utopian attempts by 
socialist revolutionaries, liberal progressives and Islamist fundamentalists 
to institute rupture and leaping within the realm of political life. This does 
not imply that one should seek to refrain from being involved in politics, or 
societal affairs more generally. On the contrary, one is welcome – meant 
even – to partake in political infighting on several levels ranking from the 
local and the national to the international and global. The stakes, after all, 
could not be higher, for this is a struggle over not just our right and obliga-
tion to remain only human, all too human, but also over God’s sole right 
and responsibility to be our god. Accordingly, the purpose of politics is to 
ensure that it remains just that – concrete politics as opposed to abstract 
dream work by keeping us away from committing the ultimate sin of con-
fusing ourselves with God, confusing the immanent plane of human poli-
tics, earthly life and natural law with the transcendental realm of eternal 
truth, ubiquitous love and divine grace.
To substantiate this point, let us delve a little deeper into the way 
in which certain late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century theologi-
cal and philosophical problems have continued to inform the Tidehverv 
project. Consider again Krarup’s chapter on ‘The Anti-Totalitarian 
Kierkegaard’ (1987). The reason why Kierkegaard, according to Krarup, 
was ‘pre-eminently anti-totalitarian’ is that his life:
from its beginning to its end revolved around maintaining the total-
ity of God’s reign and possibility, with Man as a sinner facing God 
relegated to be a single individual given by his vocation and back-
ground [hin enkelte i kald og stand] … whose existence is framed by 
earth and temporality, and who is incapable of creating a totalitar-
ian paradise in which perfection, truth and classless human happi-
ness shall rule inhibited and eternally. (1987, 27)
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This is why refusing to accept humanist conventions of political discourse 
shows superior faith and personal integrity. For only the ‘knight of faith’ 
has the ability, guts and character needed to pursue the socially and exis-
tentially challenging quest of ‘sinning boldly’, as the title of another of 
Krarup’s books goes (citing Luther). Or as Torben Bramming explains 
in his book about Olesen-Larsen (one of the Tidehverv founders and a 
noted Kierkegaard authority in the theological establishment):
During decisive moments of life even the greatest human is emp-
ty-handed facing God, who requires us to decide. This is a decision 
that is made by the single individual … It [involves] thinking in con-
tradictions, but this thinking in contradictions does not merely have 
a rhetorical purpose; on the contrary it reflects the ambivalence of 
existence; indeed, one might say that it is the essential condition of 
the existing human which it lives out on a daily basis. (1999, 88–90; 
translated by the author)
Here, the Christian believers can never be certain (that would be too 
easy), but must face the paradoxes of being suspended between eternity 
and time, between the concrete immanence of mankind and the abstract 
transcendence of God. Only via constant leaps of faith is ‘the knight of 
faith’ able to momentarily straddle (but never overcome) the absolute 
ontological divide between God and man, between transcendence and 
immanence, eternity and time.
Existentialist effervescence
The question remains, of course, how is all this done in practice? What 
can humans do to ensure that they keep on ‘thinking in contradictions’? 
How does one go about embracing, with all the gusto expected from 
the ‘knight of faith’, the human, all too human, predicament of ‘bold 
sinning’? Elsewhere, I have explored this via ethnographic analyses of 
selected sociological, political and theological tensions surfacing in the 
annual Tidehverv summer meeting and in the individual biographies 
and political lives of key figures from this movement (Pedersen 2017; 
2018; forthcoming). Let me, therefore, for present purposes and by way 
of conclusion, home in on one specific dimension of Tidehverv sociality 
that encapsulates what has been a central concern in this chapter. I am 
referring to the prominent role played by alcohol, drinking and drunk-
enness during the summer meetings as well as (judging from what 
112 RUPTURES
has repeatedly been emphasized to me) other and more private social 
gatherings amongst Tidehverv (and national-conservative) circles. Evi-
dently, as we saw, drinking occupied a central place in the Tidehverv self- 
imaginary, including in the identity work that is constantly performed by 
my interlocutors in order to distance and differentiate themselves from 
‘boring’ (kedelige) and ‘pious’ (fromme) religious groups, whether Chris-
tian or Muslim. To be sure, many other Danish Christian and/or political 
groups also drink when they meet, ‘but that’s different. Their discussions 
are boring and they are not serious like we are’, lectured a senior Tide-
hverv priest when I raised this objection. As one of the aforementioned 
young conservatives told me with a grin on his clean-shaven face dur-
ing the 2017 summer meeting (which coincided with Roskilde Festival, 
the biggest, oldest and most famous Danish rock/pop music festival with 
up to 100,000 participants), ‘This place is the national-conservative 
Roskilde!’
But that is not all. In addition, I would suggest, there is also another 
and a deeper dimension to this emphasis on drinking and drunkenness in 
Tidehverv contexts. As I have already tried to convey in my introductory 
ethnographic vignettes, something more serious and, if you like, existen-
tial or even transcendental is at stake during these sessions of late-night 
boozing. More precisely, I propose, one reason why people find it to be 
so important to indulge in these five-, six- or seven-hour-long binges is 
that it makes them ‘become who they are’, to borrow an expression from 
one of my interlocutors (Pedersen 2018). Certainly, one is left with a 
clear sense (speaking here from personal experiences gained from what 
Fiskesjö aptly coins participant-intoxication (Fiskesjö 2010) that the par-
ticipants of these intense micro-gatherings are working hard at being a 
particular kind of person. That is, they are striving towards being frimo-
dige individuals, who are not afraid (in fact, find solace and a happiness 
in) disagreeing with and being contrary to others, including peers with 
whom they might have been in perfect agreement just before. While this 
obligation to disagree entails the risk that people may end up being more 
permanent adversaries (of which there have been several examples over 
the years), the ideal (and often the reality) is that, at some point well 
into the night or in some cases the early morning, all matters of concern 
(anliggender) that needed to be discussed and disagreed about (as well 
as all the wine and whisky bottles) have been depleted. At this point, and 
at this point only, the table of drinkers can break up and return to their 
individual quarters, having once again been lucky enough to experience 
a degree of freedom and self-completion, which according to many meet-
ing participants is not surpassed in any other domain of their lives.
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Might there be some kind of connection between this culture of col-
lective drinking at the summer meetings and Tidehverv’s more general 
celebration of existential leaping and inner rupture discussed above? 
Embarking on a train of thought that shall here remain sketchy but that 
I hope to develop in future work, I would tentatively suggest that we 
are faced with a sort of extended or distorted ‘collective effervescence’. 
According to established wisdom, this arch-Durkheimian concept is used 
to denote social events characterized by an usually intense sense of unity 
and connectedness, which for the same reason is often associated with 
sacred and transcendental domains of human existence. Now on the face 
of it, the recurrent and ritualized after-dinner boozing sessions described 
above would fit this definition well. Also during these memorable sum-
mer nights, people seem to experience a beefed-up version of several 
social relations and social norms that they cherish the most. As such, per-
ceived from the vantage of the ethnographic fieldworker, these events 
are marked by a dense social atmosphere where the most sociologically 
sacred Tidehverv values are made temporarily visible.
But we can take the analysis one step further. For is there not a sense 
to which a different, more introspective transcendence is also brought 
about during these bouts of collective effervescence? I would tentatively 
infer that, simultaneously with the intensification of social relations that 
is perceived to take place between participants at the intersubjective level, 
a concurrent intensification is also experienced to occur within each (or at 
least some) of them in form of what might be called ‘existentialist effer-
vescence’. And that, I would further venture, is the ultimate and deeper, 
or dare one say ‘sacred’, purpose of all that drinking and debating during 
the summer meetings and other Tidehverv gatherings: the enactment, in 
the realm that could be referred to as self-relational or intra-subjective, of 
an almost spiritual and mystical ‘leaping into’ a complete version of the 
person that I ‘really am’ (that is, of the person that I would like to be). And, 
crucially, it is exactly this experience of ‘a jealous interiority devotedly 
attended to’ (Dumont 1994, 20) that can only be ascertained via repeated 
inner ruptures, but never any outer revolution.
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Note
1. While this term is commonly associated with Kierkegaard, it has been disputed whether he ever 
used it himself. He did, however, discuss ‘leaps’ (spring) on many occasions, including the ‘qual-
itative transition’ involved in becoming a Christian believer (McKinnon 1993).
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Blurring Rupture: Frames of Conversion 
in Japanese Catholicism
Tobia Farnetti
This chapter explores the struggles with rupture of a small Catholic com-
munity in the east of Tokyo. Rupture is here conceptualized in two ways. 
On the one hand, following Robbins (2007), it is a temporal break: a radi-
cal interruption of previous modes of existence in favour of new ones. On 
the other hand, rupture is also here understood as a spatial relationship, 
as the radical division of a minority religion and the wider society sur-
rounding it. In Tokyo the two go together as conversion into the Chris-
tian life entails significantly breaking with urban Japanese society and 
its rhythms. The community of the Church of the Holy Family struggles 
with both forms of rupture, imposed on them by both the priest himself 
and the general understanding of religiosity and its place in society out-
side the church. What follows focuses on the ways in which people deal 
with these imposed ruptures in the face of their own feeling and desire 
for continuity.
The work of Joel Robbins especially (e.g. 2007, 2010) has identified 
the importance of temporal ruptures for the Christian world view and 
imagination. Conversion is identified as the breaking point with the past, 
a divine invasion into the self that leaves everything changed – a radi-
cal juncture that spurs people to cut with the old traditions and replace 
them with new virtuous ways of life (e.g. Meyer 1999; Engelke 2004; 
Keller 2005; Keane 2007; Vilaça 2014). The scholar of religion Lewis 
Rambo (1993) had already come up with a similar framework with its 
identification of seven stages of religious conversion. While the process 
of conversion involves the totality of seven stages, this pivots on a ‘cri-
sis’, which he defines as a rupture in world view that precipitates change. 
The rest is dealing with the world post-rupture through the processes of 
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readjustment, reconciliation and reinterpretation that many anthropol-
ogists have studied in converted groups (e.g. Lienhardt 1982; also Kan 
1991; Scott 2005; Vaté 2009; Chua 2012).
These processes of reinterpretation and reframing of the past are 
engaged both by the individual, in their understanding of their own life 
history, and by communities at large, usually as a consequence of mission-
ary activity. Rupture needs not only to be an existential transformation of 
the self but it is often a collective transformation, and hence signifies a 
breach with many things that fall under the rubric of ‘tradition’: rituals, 
institutions, rhythms that gave meaning to the community’s life before 
conversion. Indeed, Robbins’s own concern with rupture emerges from 
his previous work with the Urapmin of Papua New Guinea (Robbins 
2004). Here Robbins focuses on the existential impact of conversion on 
the Urapmin, whom he understands as locked in an incomplete transi-
tion between the ‘traditional’ value system and the Christian one they 
recently adopted. In other words, the question of conversion and rupture 
here becomes one with the question of culture change and its implica-
tions. The Urapmin, Robbins argues, have indeed adopted Christianity 
but they are yet to fully integrate it in their own way of life. They still live 
between two cultural systems that are in the process of being synthesized 
and yet are still distinct, and this disjuncture manifests itself in moral 
contradictions. The Urapmin, that is, still possess two distinct frames for 
understanding their behaviour and these often clash without resolution, 
leaving people trapped between conflicting values.
When the Christian mission encounters non-Christian cultures, 
sometimes pre-existing cultural meanings are altered and yet the wider 
cultural categories remain untouched, a process that Robbins calls 
‘assimilation’.1 Here the indigenous cosmos adapts itself to incorporate 
foreign elements and yet it remains structurally unchanged, and hence 
able to propagate itself. The difficulties experienced by Portuguese mis-
sionaries working on the evangelization of the Tupi in sixteenth-century 
Amazonia provide a vivid example of this process (see Viveiros de Castro 
2011). To the missionaries’ frustration, the Tupi appeared to appropri-
ate only those aspects of Christianity that validated their own cosmology 
and allowed the continuation of their culture. Similarly, Robbins under-
stands the Urapmin engagement with Christianity to have been initially 
a form of assimilation – a ‘utilitarian conversion’ motivated by traditional 
non-Christian values (2004, 115).
Conversely, a successful mission fostered a situation where people 
cease to try to reproduce ‘traditional’ systems and embrace the new cul-
ture as a ‘whole’, as a self-conscious effort accompanied by the eradication 
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of old values (cf. Ortiz 1995, 102–3). Robbins calls it ‘adoption’ and 
defines it as the moment in which people take on the new cultural system 
‘on its own terms’ (2004, 115), when the old culture stops providing the 
frame for action and Christianity takes its place. If assimilation implied 
the rejection of full conversion in favour of continuity with the past – 
those attempts to protect cultural boundaries that Shaw and Stewart 
(1994) branded ‘anti-syncretism’ – adoption spells the full embracing of 
that radical temporal rupture demanded by Christian conversion.
In the 1990s the Urapmin were on the road to adoption; that is, they 
had incorporated Christian values but not fully completed the transition 
to the new culture. People had indeed radically turned away from their 
traditional way of life, yet their social and economic structure remained 
the same as it was before (see also Robbins, this volume). This fracture 
engendered moments where ideas about social structure came into con-
flict with Christian ideas of the moral person, leaving the Urapmin with 
intense moral conundrums (Robbins 2004, 35). They were living with 
‘two cultures’, or rather in the difficult space between them.
Robbins’s model has been criticized for treating ‘Urapmin tradi-
tional culture’ and ‘Christianity’ as two ‘wholes’ (e.g. Rumsey 2004; cf. 
Hirsch 2008) and not recognizing the hybridity that already preceded 
Urapmin conversion. In the Japanese context, treating Christianity and 
indigenous culture as bounded wholes is, however, somehow fitting, 
given that people themselves – priest, congregation and the average 
urban dweller – seem to treat the two systems, despite the indubitable 
presence of hybridity, as clearly distinct homogeneous wholes and hence 
the transition between one and the other as a radical shift. In the Church 
of the Holy Family, whose community this chapter focuses on, people 
struggle with this transition and try to maintain their own sense of con-
tinuity with people, institutions and social forms of Japanese society 
despite the pressures from both inside and outside. Unlike the Urapmin, 
however, people here are not afflicted by moral anguish and often fail to 
conform to Christian precepts in order to participate in the ‘old culture’ 
unperturbed, deliberately keeping these deeds away from the priest’s 
eyes and ears. Taking as an ethnographic fulcrum the community’s expe-
riences of drunkenness and intoxication, which are explicitly banned 
by Catholic dogma as conveyed by the priest and yet engaged in by the 
community on a weekly basis, the chapter investigates the way in which 
people try to find continuity in the face of rupture. Looking at the ways 
in which people at times let the Christian frame of meaning encompass 
social and cultural forms belonging to Japanese mainstream society 
while at other times allowing mainstream society to encompass Christian 
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elements, the chapter argues that something peculiar happens in those 
secret drunken nights. In the blur of drunkenness, it is impossible to dis-
cern which culture is providing a frame for action: frames become images 
until one cannot tell which side is encompassing which, which is figure 
and which is frame. In this haze rupture and continuity are blurred, and 
activities branded as sin by the church can become themselves funda-
mental parts of the Christian life.
The picture: the Church of the Holy Family 
and its community
The Church of the Holy Family is a small Catholic church in one of 
Tokyo’s poorer eastern neighbourhoods in the part of the city known 
as shitamachi, ‘down town’. The building is simple and unadorned and 
stands in a yard that is shared with the Christian school next door, which 
also comprises a small community centre and the church offices. A sin-
gle cherry tree stands in the middle of the car park. The inside is una-
dorned in a way that, although uncommon for the usually ostentatious 
style of Catholic sacred design, is perhaps more in line with Japanese 
aesthetic sensibilities. Upon entering one is met, on the two sides of the 
main door, by two stoups for the holy water mounted respectively by a 
statue of St Francis Xavier, the missionary who brought Catholicism to 
Japan in the sixteenth century, and the Virgin Mary. Small stained-glass 
windows follow the aisles on the two sides, separated by wooden carv-
ings of the Stations of the Cross, and the nave is in shadow even during a 
bright day. The pews are wooden and so is the simple crucifix behind the 
altar. Overall, a sober atmosphere of simplicity pervades the building, 
which remains mostly empty during the week. In the afternoon, when all 
the cars and bikes have left and the churchyard has returned to its usual 
stillness, the church runs a Sunday school for the children. A few people, 
mainly self-appointed ‘aunties’ (obachan), help with the running of the 
school where the children learn Christian songs, stories from the scrip-
tures and play together for the rest of the afternoon.
The upkeep of the church is taken care of by volunteers, a core of 
about ten retired people who clean, cook and are responsible for admin-
istration. The liturgical activities, on the other hand, are run entirely by 
the priest, whom everyone simply calls ‘the priest’ (shimpu-sama). His 
sermons are simple and relatable – they talk about keeping faith in hard 
times of loss and grief, to trust in the Lord (kami-sama) when things don’t 
go the way you desire, of the love of God being reflected in the family 
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and between co-workers. When he preaches from the pulpit he becomes 
agitated and talks too fast, stutters, turns red and waves his hands in the 
air. Waiting outside the door after Mass, calm and composed, he greets 
people leaving the building, inquiring about their health and families.
The priest is very much the moral beacon of the community. 
Although the prescriptions of Catholicism are laid out in the holy books, 
the relationship with the scriptures is not always an easy one for the com-
munity. The Bible is not a central object of devotion as in other Christian 
communities around the world (cf. Robbins 2012) – rather it is engaged 
with only in Bible class once a week and through the hard-to-follow ser-
mons of the priest on Sunday. The strong emphasis on the importance 
of the scriptures one finds in many ethnographies of Christianity is here 
eclipsed in favour of other activities.
In the Church of the Holy Family the language of the scriptures 
is obfuscated and, above all, difficult. The unintelligibility of the scrip-
tures does not trigger processes of intense engagement with the Bible as 
is often found in narratives of American Protestantism. Carapanzano’s 
(2000) account of Evangelical literalism, Bielo’s (2008; 2009) portrayal 
of the intense processes of Biblical exegesis and knowledge production in 
Bible studies classes and Malley’s (2004) description of the way people 
link Biblical readings with their own life circumstances are all examples 
of the ways in which people place the word of God at the very heart of 
what it means to believe. For the community of the Church of the Holy 
Family the scriptures do not have such aliveness and do not demand such 
vehemence. Instead they become inert, a chore, something that is not 
part of the vibrant life of the community but a duty that simply has to be 
done (cf. Whitehouse 2000) – sometimes easily, when one can be carried 
by the lull of the ritual of Mass, and other times more onerously, when 
one tries to decipher them at Bible study class.
It is instead through participation in church activities that identifica-
tion with Christianity is felt most strongly by the community. The ritual of 
Mass is felt to be important and everyone enjoys participating in it. However, 
when asked for details about the ritual itself or the readings of the day, peo-
ple claim ignorance and defer to the priest. This self-proclaimed ignorance 
is never met with frustration but with a placid acceptance – people do try 
to listen to the Gospels but they are not moved, do try to go to Bible study 
class but it’s too difficult to understand. People do not seem to be motivated 
to spend more time studying and asking questions about the meaning of 
the scriptures; what seems to be important instead is being there – being 
at Mass and participating in it. Saito-san, for example, felt strongly moved 
when she was asked to do the first reading from the pulpit at Mass and she 
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spent hours rehearsing the few lines of the book of Isaiah. ‘T: “Was it inter-
esting?” S: “Yes very interesting.” T: “What do you think it means?” S: “Oh 
I do not know … it’s difficult … I don’t understand it”.’
While modesty undoubtedly plays a part in the answer, the point 
of the rehearsal was never to let the meaning sink in but rather a purely 
formal concern with getting the reading right in its delivery. Of course, a 
rehearsal is about performance, and yet the engagement with the scrip-
tures through the repetitive reading of a few lines of the Old Testament 
was never for Saito-san a spiritual or meditative act. In the same way, the 
most moving parts of Mass are singing together (especially when one is 
leading the choir), participating in bringing the offerings to the altar, and 
simply being there and being seen. Communion is not only a moment of 
recollection but also an occasion to dart one’s gaze around and see who 
is there, bow slightly to greet people and smile at friends. For the same 
reasons the informal reception in the community hall after Mass and 
the time spent in the churchyard outside are extremely important, and 
people often head off afterwards to spend time together in a café or at a 
sushi restaurant. Time spent together is, for the community, where the 
Christian life truly ‘happens’, where the self-determination as Catholic 
believers is performed, embodied and most acutely felt.
However, this does not mean that people would rather see the 
church abandon those activities. Even though the Bible is hard to under-
stand and the rituals are sometimes tedious, people cherish them and 
they wouldn’t want them to be any ‘friendlier’. Indeed, many people 
assert that they chose Catholicism because of its rigid structure, because 
it felt old and legitimate (cf. Brown 2017). People like the formality of 
Mass, and someone went so far as to propose that Latin hymns be intro-
duced in the choir’s repertoire. There is indeed a certain anxiety about 
authenticity: people are concerned with how their church, their rituals 
and even the aesthetics of their leisure time resonate with their origi-
nal source, Catholicism in Europe and the USA. The rituals, meetings 
and classes’ strict adherence to the Italian and American model is what 
makes people feel connected to a transnational Catholic community. It 
is not a loose feeling of an international communitas, a spiritual commu-
nity united in the love of God, that holds the church together in people’s 
minds but instead a formal resemblance. ‘When I went to Mass in Italy’, 
says Fukuzawa-san, dreamily showing a picture of herself posing in front 
of the Coliseum, ‘it was just like in our church!’ The rigid formalism of the 
Catholic spiritual life is also what distinguishes the community from the 
Protestant churches in the neighbourhood – ‘see … our church looks like 
a real church … the other churches just look like normal houses’.
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The point here is that the community’s understanding of Christianity 
as extremely social, as something to do with the collectivity, is not opposed 
to the dogmatic form of which the priest is understood to be the keeper. 
The dogma and formalism are for the community fundamental to their 
identity as Catholics, even though they do not need to fully understand 
it. Form is here precisely what it is meant to be – form – and it does not 
demand the grasping of meaning. However, this more ‘communitarian’ 
form of religiosity is not entirely part of the Catholicism the priest is 
painstakingly teaching the community. In church these religious forms 
seem almost an emergent phenomenon, something that the community 
does in order to sit more comfortably in partial foreignness of Roman 
Catholicism. The priest values the commitment to community, yet he still 
wishes people would engage with scriptures and dogma in the ways that 
he is trying to teach them.
The community’s engagement with the church is however genuine 
and marked by a deep commitment. In fact, one could say that the com-
munity is doing extra work in engaging the church beyond the bounds 
of what is expected of them. The faith as promulgated by the priest is 
highly dogmatic and does not give the community the tools to build and 
strengthen community: it provides a centre of gravity around which to 
build such community but not enough occasions and means to do so. Life 
at church satisfies a certain craving for form and exerts a strong centrip-
etal force that allows people to come together.
However, how to perform and foster community is another mat-
ter. Time in church is always too short and too sporadic, and people are 
constantly creating spaces of sociality outside it where they can live the 
Christian life together, as a community. Church only lasts a few hours on 
a Sunday and on Thursdays at Bible study class. People need more, and 
thus create occasions to be together meaningfully as Christians. It is in 
these spaces, this chapter argues, that the struggle with rupture is most 
strongly felt.
The frame: rupture in a minority religion
Christianity in Tokyo today is very much in a minority. On a national scale 
the number of Japanese people partaking in any Christian denomination 
amounts to less than 0.9 per cent, of which only 0.4 per cent is Catholic. 
In the Archdiocese of Tokyo, the number of Catholics amounts to about 
0.5 per cent and similar numbers are seen in the surrounding diocese of 
Saitama and Yokohama. The demographics tend to be largely constituted 
 BLURRING RUPTURE :  FRAMES OF CONVERSION IN JAPANESE CATHOLIC ISM 123
by the middle class of the main urban agglomerates with the exception, 
albeit dwindling, of the countryside in the Nagasaki area. The numbers 
of Japanese Catholics have been steadily decreasing since shortly after 
the post-war boom (Mullins 2011), and it is mostly the influx of migrants, 
mainly from the Philippines and Korea, that allows the percentage to stay 
the same. Most churches provide services in Tagalog, Korean and other 
languages along with the Japanese Mass, and church membership – the 
church studied here being an exception – tends to be ethnically quite mixed.
While Shinto shrines are ever-present features of the urban land-
scape, the statistical imperceptibility of Christianity is visually reflected 
in the scenery of the city, where churches are few and often tucked away 
in back streets. This invisibility is partially reinforced from within: one’s 
faith is rarely mentioned, public displays are not encouraged apart from 
rare occasions such as the first part of the Mass on Palm Sunday, held 
in the churchyard. Christianity, and even more Catholicism, is truly a 
Figure 5.1 Outdoor service under the cherry tree on Palm Sunday. 
Photo by the author. 
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minority religion – small, scarcely visible, unassuming. Discourses of 
rupture, coming both from within and without the bounds of the com-
munity, keep it separate and circumscribed.
In its minority status, the perception of Christianity in Japan today 
is a complex matter. It is grouped under the category of shūkyō – a word 
translatable as ‘religion’, but that does not comprise the amalgam of 
Buddhist and Shinto practices in which virtually everyone partakes. 
Buddhist and Shinto weddings, funerals, shrine visits, ancestor worship, 
local festivals – all of these fall under the wider notion of dentō – ‘tradition’ 
– together with tourist vistas, kimonos, local delicacies, common architec-
tural elements, imperial regalia, and the blend of syncretic elements and 
secular daily practices that people simply define as ‘part of their culture’. 
In other words, the Shinto and Buddhist elements that pervade the life-
style of a Japanese person are not necessarily a religious expression, but 
parts of a wider life-world of signifiers that constitutes – in the collective 
imaginary – being Japanese. Foreign religions on the other hand are, in a 
real sense, ‘religions’ – and they imply a certain break with that horizon 
of signifiers that grounds one in the culturally specific being-in-the-world 
of Japan.
When one says shūkyō the image that generally forms in people’s 
minds is, inevitably, one of the numerous ‘new religions’ (shin-shūkyō) 
that cropped up just after the Meiji reformation and more intensely after 
the Second World War (e.g. Clarke 2000). ‘New religions’ are viewed 
negatively or with suspicion, especially after the Tokyo subway sarin 
attacks by the group Aum Shinrikyo (Oumu Shinrikyō) in 1995. Most 
people today see members of new religions as dangerous and, fundamen-
tally, as outsiders. Catholicism is not a shin-shūkyō itself, although many 
groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses and other modern denominations 
are considered Christianity-based new religions. Yet the word shūkyō 
recalls, if not the extremism of new religions, a certain dissonance with 
Japanese society and its structures; with the family, its rhythms of inher-
itance, marriage, burial and so on. For the non-religious person being 
affiliated with religiosity is difficult, potentially dangerous (abunai) and 
embarrassing.
Because of this perceived distance between ‘religions’ and majority 
culture the post-Meiji history of Christianity is not an easy one. Christians 
in Japan have gone through many challenges, from discrimination to out-
right violence (see Ghanbarpour 2015). The Church of the Holy Family 
was established as part of a missionary effort from the Tsukiji parish to 
spread Catholicism in the east of Tokyo. During the riots that followed 
the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905, churches, representing 
 BLURRING RUPTURE :  FRAMES OF CONVERSION IN JAPANESE CATHOLIC ISM 125
‘the West’, were a prime target for the rioting masses, and the Church 
of the Holy Family was burned to ashes. Today there are no tensions 
between church and neighbourhood, and the community does not like to 
talk about the difficulties that they encountered in the past.
One can find a strong parallel in the story of Ishigawa-san who, 
together with his wife, runs a non-denominational Protestant church 
in the same neighbourhood. The church is hosted in the remains of 
American Second World War army barracks, and when they took over 
from a foreign pastor, about 30 years ago, the community was hostile 
and diffident. ‘It was horrible’, Ishigawa-san says before a candle-lit ser-
vice, ‘people would break our windows at night. I was so scared.’ Their 
attempts to spread the word of God were met with silence, hostility and 
threats. While things are different today, some of these sentiments linger 
in a muted interiorized way and, despite all the politeness and kindness 
that suffuses relations between neighbours, Christians are still seen with 
a measure of suspicion.
The gulf between Christians and mainstream urban society is, how-
ever, not only asserted from the outside, but also from within. While 
things such as festivals, visiting shrines and keeping a household shrine 
(kamidana) are perceived in the mainstream as ‘tradition’, the priest him-
self marks them as religious activities. In so doing, participation in these 
activities, which are by most people perceived as important moments of 
bonding with family or the local community, is equated with taking part 
in rituals from other religions and worshipping false idols. For the priest, 
kami worship, together with Buddhist worship, is incompatible with the 
doctrine of Catholicism and its one and true God.
This creates considerable problems if one has close family mem-
bers who are not themselves Christian. Important rituals such as bon or 
the New Year celebrations are incompatible with the Christian life, leav-
ing Japanese Christians in an awkward situation that creates, in practical 
terms, a real chasm between believers and non-believers. The same can be 
said of important rituals of passage, such as shichi-go-san, in which chil-
dren from the church cannot participate. In other words – given that both 
kinship and community life are largely mediated through Buddhist and 
Shinto institutions such as Shinto weddings, Buddhist funerals, Buddhist 
remembrance rituals – conversion to Catholicism does engender the sense 
of rupture that Robbins has identified as being at the heart of the Christian 
experience. In line with Robbins, this sense of rupture has a strong tempo-
ral dimension – activities that characterized one’s former life are now part 
of a prohibited and amoral alien world. However, the rupture is, as we have 
seen, also markedly spatial insofar as Christians are bound to spaces that 
are separate from the surrounding world, spaces where different rituals 
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and activities happen in parallel with the world outside. This is reflected 
in the positioning of family graves, which are usually placed in Christian 
cemeteries outside Tokyo or, if sharing land with the non-Christian dead, 
in out-of-the-way parts of bigger existing graveyards. The families of a part 
of the community, for example, are buried at one extremity of the famous 
Yanaka cemetery in Ueno, out of the way on a downward slope next to the 
fence that overlooks the railway lines.
The Christian ban on cultural forms considered part of everyday 
life outside the church effectively maps, from conversion onwards, an 
alternative life-course: one that inhabits different spaces, that demands 
different rituals and that eventually enforces this separation even after its 
ending. In the face of these strong discourses of rupture – with one’s for-
mer self, non-Christian kin and the city around them – people in the com-
munity have to live with their own strong sense of a continuity between 
themselves and the urban world that surrounds them.
Conversion and continuity
The temporal rupture elicited by conversion, as we have seen, has been 
understood by scholars studying Christian communities to be the defin-
ing existential experience at the heart of the Christian life. This seems to 
Figure 5.2 A Christian cemetery at the edges of Tokyo. Photo by the 
author. 
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resonate in the way both the priest and the mainstream discourse of Jap-
anese urban society understand the place and meaning of the Christian 
life. Yet the community at the Church of the Holy Family has very different 
stories of conversion that seem to emphasize not a rupture but rather an 
unproblematic continuity that sees entering into the faith as a chapter in 
a continuous life-narrative.
For the vast majority of people in the community, their personal 
Catholic legacy does not stretch backwards for more than one generation. 
Many inherited their faith from their parents or older siblings, who had 
themselves converted sometime after the war. In that period, I was often 
told, Christianity promoted itself as a religion of pacifism and love in a 
country traumatized by decades of aggressive nationalism and the atomic 
bombs that ravaged Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Christianity reso-
nated with the new national pacifist consciousness as well as asserting its 
presence by investing heavily in volunteering and welfare activities. People 
who converted had in most cases been at a Christian school at some point 
during their education. Christian schools were, and are, a middle-class 
aspiration, and the vast majority of parents who sent their children to these 
schools simply wanted the perceived benefits of a Western education with-
out considering the Christian teachings that came with it. Many times con-
version had been simply a by-product of such education. Yoshida-san, for 
example, was sent to a Catholic kindergarten and then to Christian schools 
for most of his primary and secondary education:
At that time people wanted Western life; the clothes, food, houses, 
movies. My mother sent me to Christian school and asked me to 
not believe in Jesus, only learn love and Western culture from the 
Christian teachers. In senior high school (kōkō) I did not follow her 
advice and when she finally allowed me, I was baptized.
Others, such as Sasaki-san, did not convert until much later. He was bap-
tized in his fifties when, nostalgic about his youth, he remembered fondly 
the times at Catholic school and developed an interest in Christianity that, 
within a few years, led him to become an active part of the church’s com-
munity. Maeda-san’s story is a bit different. Now in his seventies, he was 
first exposed to Christianity when his wife started to frequent church more 
assiduously after the birth of their first child. Her mother was Christian but 
she had not paid much attention to it in her youth. Later in life, when she 
stopped working to be a stay-at-home wife (shufu), she started to visit the 
local church en route to shopping for groceries. Her interest in Christian-
ity grew and she soon started to fill her time with the church’s activities. 
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Shortly afterwards her husband started to attend as well, and both are 
today part of what constitutes the core of the church’s community.2
‘I developed an interest’ (kyōmi wo mochimashita) is a phrase I heard 
often when I asked about conversion. No intense religious experiences, 
hierophanies or moral epiphanies. No conversions in time of illness, loneli-
ness and despair. The way people talked about their conversion was aston-
ishingly mundane and lacked the radical temporal and existential quality 
that much anthropology on Christianity has understood as the core of con-
version. The gradual and casual nature of the community’s experiences 
of conversion tell a very different story – one where conversion is only a 
chapter in the longer and continuous trajectory of one’s personal history.
For people at the church of the Holy Family, conversion came as a 
slow process and deliberate decision. Christianity came as a flavour or an 
afterthought, something that was investigated in one’s spare time, at the 
edges of the everyday. While stories of gradual conversion are not unique, 
the point here is that baptism and conversion do not leave the person and 
the world any different. Although people do gain a new social circle and 
new routines, there is a sense that things are, at a fundamental level, the 
same as they have ever been. Everyone I spoke to, for example, has very 
fond memories of their hometown (furusato), of its (Shinto) festivals, 
Figure 5.3 Fukuzawa and her friends, holding a picture of themselves 
on holiday a few decades ago. Photo by the author. 
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its shrines and their experiences as young women and men. The strong 
bonds developed in secondary education are for many Christians still the 
most important relationships in their lives; not parts of a previous life 
but core building blocks of an enduring sense of identity and continuity.
Fukuzawa-san, for example, meets every two months for dinner 
with two of her oldest friends. Throughout their youth they periodically 
travelled together in both Japan and Europe. They are somehow extraor-
dinary people for the place and time they grew up in, three women cher-
ishing their bond, travelling without men and having successful working 
lives. At every meeting they drink and look at pictures of their travels – of 
them smiling in front of a rural shrine in Kumamoto or in a restaurant 
in Florence. Her friends are not Christian (and, as we shall see later on, 
their activities in the restaurant are not that Christian either), but for 
Fukuzawa-san these meetings are extremely important – they punctuate 
her time, infuse a sense of belonging and nostalgia in her life and create a 
sense of continuity. The timeline existing in and through those meetings 
and pictures has nothing to do with the timeline of her conversion; her 
life is not a two-part narrative of before and after, but a snaking continu-
ous one of growth, adventure and friendship in which her conversion only 
provides a background element.
‘Don’t tell the priest’
Bans on such things as festivals and shrine worship are not perceived by 
the community as coming from the dogmas of the church, but rather from 
the priest himself. This does not mean that people believe these restrictions 
to be his arbitrary whim. Rather the priest is, in this small community, the 
only real connection with the wider church and the very source of moral 
and spiritual authority. This section focuses on one of these banned activi-
ties – drinking – a moment where the community’s sense of continuity comes 
into direct friction with the rupture that the priest’s prescriptions demand. 
This friction, as we shall see, does not leave people suffering moral torment 
and guilt as in the case of the Urapmin, but rather to unproblematically act 
behind the priest’s back. Days of celebration, for example the one described 
next, exacerbate this tendency and bring the very core members of the com-
munity to act, in secret, in direct conflict with the priest’s prohibition.
After a day trip with the community, the coach parks in front of 
the church and people pour into the yard. Saitō-san, a lady in her sev-
enties gives people knowing looks while the community slowly starts 
to disperse. A few days back Saitō-san invited some of the community’s 
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members to a drinking party (nomikai) after the trip and, upon inviting 
me, emphatically whispered: ‘Don’t tell the priest!’ When the crowds 
disperse, she walks over to some of the people who purposefully stayed 
behind, among them Kimura-san, a younger member known for his som-
breness. She asks: ‘Are you coming with us?’ Kimura brings his hand to 
the back of his head, sucks air through his teeth and says: ‘I have to wake 
up at 5 a.m. for work, I want to come but … it’s a bit … ’ As Donald Keene 
beautifully pointed out, ‘Japanese sentences are apt to trail off into thin 
smoke’ (1955, 26) – and Camille Paglia has added: ‘a vapour of hanging 
participles’ (1990, 174). ‘It’s a bit … ’ – the silence hangs in the air for 
only a second before Saitō-san’s hand falls heavily on his arm: ‘Just come 
for one drink, won’t you?’
Drinking is an important part of Japanese urban social life. Brian 
Moeran (1986) suggestively painted the cities of Japanese industrial cap-
italism as comprising two worlds: a world of light, populated by salary-
men and housewives moving between office buildings and department 
stores, and the world of darkness, belonging to the entertainment dis-
tricts: the mizu-shōbai, the ‘water trade’, made of izakaya,3 bars, hostess 
clubs and snack-bars. Even thirty years after Moeran was writing, before 
the bubble burst and the ‘Japanese miracle’ gave way to enduring eco-
nomic crisis, the world of darkness is in full force and entertainment dis-
tricts cluster around many rail and underground stations.
From the industrial surroundings of the church we enter the neon-
lit alleys full of izakaya, bars and karaoke parlours. When we arrive at 
our destination one of the elders of the community stands up and gives 
a short speech thanking everyone for the good day and encouraging all 
to have fun and drink plenty. Drinking starts and the atmosphere gets 
raucous, glasses are filled and speech soon starts to get slurred. The con-
versation moves between recent church activities and members of the 
community. ‘Have you seen such and such recently? Is the baby born 
yet? I heard she went down to Fukuoka to stay with her mother.’ There is 
no elephant in the room, no acknowledgement of sin through omission. 
All conversations rotate around the church, around its activities and its 
members. The priest is frequently mentioned, always with respect and 
affection, and yet we are doing something that the priest has explicitly 
banned the community from doing.
On a Friday night around the entertainment districts of Tokyo one 
is likely to see scenes of extreme loss of control: ‘throwing up, urinat-
ing in public, dancing on train platforms, falling asleep stretched out on 
the seats of a train, making passes at or otherwise insulting someone 
normally shown respect, speaking openly about things that usually go 
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unsaid’ (Allison 1994, 45) are common behaviours at these times and 
places. Such scenes dramatically clash not only with the demeanour one 
expects in the ‘world of light’, but with the usual personality of one’s 
acquaintances as well. In Tokyo there is an extreme leniency towards 
inappropriate drunken behaviours, and what is said while drunk is often 
quickly forgotten the day after.4 In my experience one can go so far as 
to say that drinking and drunkenness are positively valued if the social 
occasion is appropriate – being drunk (yotte iru) is a desirable condition 
and drinking to get drunk is explicitly many people’s intent when going 
out.
Catholic morality works explicitly against this tendency. The loss 
of control, the breaking of boundaries, the spectre of addiction are all 
hurled at the community from the pulpit as examples of sinful behaviour 
and spiritual loss. Around the end of December – when most workplaces, 
voluntary groups and associations hold their end-of-the-year drinks 
(bōnenkai) – warnings about the spiritual and physical dangers of alco-
hol intensify. True community, says the priest, is not the one you reach 
through intoxication but the one you reach through love and care. The 
priest here is targeting the age-old Japanese trope that intoxication pro-
vides a ‘frame’ for egalitarian relationships (see Nakane 1970); that in 
the communitas of drunkenness one can express one’s true self and let go 
of the façades that one has to wear navigating the hierarchies of everyday 
life. ‘That is not real community; real community is in the heart.’
Yet that night people leave the restaurant drunk, and this is not an 
exception but one of many such occasions. Suddenly people are out on 
the streets again; it is dark now and the cold evening air wakes everyone 
up. A few people bow goodbye, but someone pulls my sleeve gently and 
asks ‘Won’t you come for another drink?’ A few others nod, more sleeves 
are pulled and the group sets off into the chilly air of the night, where 
insistent touts insist on showing their menus and try to pull people into 
their restaurants. Kimura-san, who was reticent from the beginning, tries 
to leave but finds himself agreeing to another drink. ‘Just one … then I 
really have to go.’ Eventually another restaurant is chosen and the same 
ritual starts.
Clapping, more food and drinks come to the table, more laughing. 
Kimura-san finally manages to slip out. Then everyone is outside again, 
a few people disappear in the night and four of us wander drunkenly to 
another izakaya. That night I have to carry one of them all the way home: 
she quietly sings songs of her childhood and tries to make me sing along; 
she mumbles apologies and praises my kindness while I pull her weight 
on my shoulders. I leave her at her door after helping her find her keys.
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People in the community often furtively organized dinners at their 
houses with the explicit intention of getting drunk – planning ahead what 
we would be drinking and who should bring what. Inevitably the alcohol 
would not be enough, and from drinking good French wine one would 
end up drinking whatever they could find in their cupboard, or making 
a trip to the corner shop to buy cheap liquor. While the main topic of 
conversation throughout all the drunken evenings I have participated in 
is always the church, there is no hint of moral torment, of guilt. Asking 
about the prohibitions over dinner one gets joking replies such as ‘ah it’s 
bad, isn’t it’ or an upward glance at the sky, the joining of hands as if in 
prayer and, with a smile and childish voice, ‘I am sorry, Lord’ (gomenne 
kami-sama).
Dual encompassment and the blurring of rupture
People’s engagement with the church suggests that what we are seeing 
is neither a form of assimilation nor a form of resistance. One could be 
tempted to see the community on a similar trajectory as the Urapmin 
were in the 1990s, moving from traditional to Christian culture – their 
efforts to foster community outside the church still locked in the old 
framework, into old behaviours that clash with their new culture. What 
is fundamentally different, however, is that the Urapmin were haunted 
by this friction, while here people seem to pay it no heed.
In Robbins’s analysis, assimilation and adoption are understood 
as processes whereby one culture comes to frame another (cf. Bateson 
1972; Goffman 1974), where one of the two cultures gives meaning and 
motivation for engaging in elements of the other. A good way to under-
stand this process is Dumont’s (1980) notion of ‘encompassment’, which 
he saw as the ground for his theory of hierarchy: encompassment is a 
part/whole relationship in which contraries can coexist. Dumont calls 
this relationship ‘the encompassing of the contrary’ (1980, 239) and 
gives, fittingly here, a Biblical example. Sexual differentiation in the 
Garden of Eden is predicated on a double relation – Adam and Eve are, as 
members of the human species of opposite sexes, in a binary opposition. 
However, given that Eve was created from Adam’s rib, that he is the orig-
inal member of the species from which she was created, he encompasses 
her; a relationship of identity is established between the two.
‘Encompassment’ provides a useful lens through which to understand 
the assimilation/adoption paradigm. The assimilation of Christianity in 
other cultures is a situation where the traditional culture encompasses 
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Christian elements. The relationship is hierarchical: only the categories 
change and not the relationship between them – the image changes but 
the frame remains. The Urapmin were going through the opposite pro-
cess: they were slowly encompassing elements of their traditional culture 
(e.g. notions of big-manship) within the Catholic framework. Robbins’s 
point is that this encompassment is incomplete and the hierarchy has not 
yet been properly established. Given that the two ‘cultures’ were at times 
equally important, not hierarchically encompassed, their friction gener-
ated torment and guilt.
When turning to the church’s practices in Tokyo, however, it is hard 
to determine which direction this encompassment is working in. When 
people are out drinking, they are encompassing Christianity with the 
wider norms of Japanese society. They are asserting continuity by acting 
like any other non-Christian person, but within this frame understand-
ing themselves as Christians. In other words, this can be understood as 
a form of assimilation where Christianity has been encompassed into 
the wider framework of Japanese society: the content has changed, 
now a Christian community instead of a group of friends, but not the 
framework – everything is understood through the categories of urban 
Japanese modernity.
On the other hand, the opposite is also true. People are encompass-
ing elements of their old life into their Catholic one. Their understand-
ing of Christianity is precisely what is giving meaning to their meetings 
and the drinking is encompassed within that understanding. People are 
first and foremost Christians engaging in what they understand as the 
Christian life – drinking is not antithetical because it is encompassed into 
Christianity, hierarchically subordinated to the wider framework that 
gives meaning to people’s lives as Catholics. In the same way, people’s 
engagement with the church was deeply motivated by their desire to lead 
a Christian life, a desire that brings them to explore territories uncharted 
by the sparse schedules and activities provided by the church. In other 
words, it is hard to determine if the process is one of assimilation or adop-
tion – which of the two cultures is encompassing the other.
When zooming out to a wider canvas, to the wider scale of urban 
Japanese modernity, one finds the same difficulties. Since the Second 
Vatican Council (1962–5) ‘inculturation’ has been part of the Catholic 
Church’s strategies to make the faith resonate with non-Western cul-
tures. Christian dogma, for instance, condemns ancestral worship as it 
runs contrary to its ideas of afterlife, and yet many Christians in Japan 
today have an ancestral altar in their house and honour the spirits of 
their ancestors (see, e.g., Reid 1981; 1989). While before Vatican II the 
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orthodox line was to encourage people to dispose of them, with the pub-
lishing of a pamphlet called ‘Guidelines for Catholics with Regards to the 
Ancestors and the Dead’ (sosen to shisha ni tsuite no katorikku shinja no 
tebiki; 1985) people were allowed to pay respect to ancestral altars as 
long as all Buddhist iconography and devotion be replaced with Christian 
forms (see Swyngedouw 1984; 1985; also Mullins 2011). The same is 
true of many other activities, such as the maintenance of Christianized 
family graves, virtually indistinguishable from traditional ones if not for 
a small crucifix carved next to the family name.5
When one looks away from Christian spaces and to the surround-
ing urban culture of modern Tokyo, a similar logic is at work. Within the 
products of mass culture, especially manga, anime and video games, 
Christian – and overwhelmingly Catholic – symbolism and themes crop 
up everywhere (e.g. Suter 2015). These imaginary spaces are inhabited 
by people on a daily basis and bleed into the ‘real’ world through adver-
tising, messaging applications, corporate branding, fashion and gadgets. 
Appadurai (1996) has argued that imaginative spaces acquire a new 
power with modernity, and indeed modernity and Christianity do seem 
to share a special relationship in Tokyo (cf. Doak 2011). Christmas, white 
weddings, churches and crosses; all these are appropriated and fused 
into the wider fresco of Japanese modernity.
For example, while the nation-building of the past has cast Shinto 
weddings as one of the necessary rites of passage of the Japanese per-
son, today two-thirds of weddings celebrated in the Tokyo metropolis 
are Western-style ceremonies. ‘Western style’ here means Christian, even 
though the vast majority of the ceremonies are Christian only in appear-
ance. These wedding chapels are usually in expensive hotels in the centre 
of town, modern halls with neon crosses, off-white walls and futuristic 
interior design in transparent plastics and glass. The pastor perform-
ing the ritual is a Western actor reading a script and the ceremony is a 
short affair that follows the ritual steps immortalized in the last scene of 
nearly every romantic comedy (Fisch 2001; LeFebvre 2015). In the light 
of this insistent presence of Christian signifiers in the landscape of urban 
modernity, one needs to consider whether Christianity really is only a 
minority culture, a figure in the background, or perhaps a much more 
prominent figure in the scene. There is, in other words, an ambiguity as 
to the place of Christianity within its encompassing frame.
One finds, both on the community scale and on a wider societal 
one, an ambiguity as to exactly what is encompassing what. When 
the community partakes in Shinto festivals and rituals or gets drunk 
with non-Christian friends, one could indeed say that Christianity is 
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encompassed into the old culture that surrounds it. However, when peo-
ple move their grave to a Christian graveyard, or change their ancestral 
altar for a Christian one, they are performing an act of adoption; it is 
Christianity which is successfully encompassing the old culture. We find 
in the life of the community an oscillation, to borrow Edmund Leach’s 
famous term (1954; 1972), where people successfully manage to some-
times let one system encompass the other, while at times the opposite 
is true. People manage to let Christianity encompass the social forms of 
majority culture – in their dealing with the altars, with life and death rit-
uals – and, at other times, let the social habits of majority culture encom-
pass their Christian identity.6
Drinking, however, seems to achieve both simultaneously. When 
people transgress the priest’s restrictions they are not, in their minds, 
acting against Christian values but they are precisely living the Christian 
life. As we have seen in those drunken hours the conversation is domi-
nated by topics to do with the church, and one cannot possibly argue that 
what people are doing is actually simply taking the formal elements of 
Christianity and encompassing them within the wider framework. The 
opposite is obviously not true either – Christianity is not encompassing 
Japanese social modes of interaction because both the priest and social 
perceptions of their faith are vocally telling people that this is not pos-
sible. Those meetings seem to contain, simultaneously, both kinds of 
encompassing acts.
Evenings of drinking exist in a continuum with the life of the 
church; they are just another facet of it (cf. Pedersen, this volume). Yet 
they also exist in a continuum with people’s life outside it, with the other 
meetings they have with their friends and family. In those nights there 
is no difference at all between the Christian life and wider Japanese 
society, between intoxication and piousness, between the world inside 
the church and the world outside it. The two blur and become one, and 
thus people feel no moral afflictions. Instead of clashing, the two systems 
blur, and in that hazy space rupture disappears, if only for a few hours. 
In those moments people are indeed breaking the rules of Christianity, 
framing their Christian endeavours within the framework of urban 
Japanese sociality, interpreting their actions through the latter. However, 
the drinking itself is understood through their Catholic life, as a means 
to be a group, to build bonds and a strong Christian community. Being 
Christian is never hidden, it is never ignored – it is indeed the whole 
point of drinking, of breaking the priest’s restrictions. Through a series 
of figure ground-reversals, through a dual encompassment where inside 
encompasses outside and vice versa, the two ‘cultures’ blur and become 
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indistinguishable. In these moments sinning can be the very Christian 
life and being Christian can mean its opposite: participating in heathen 
rites, intoxication and so on. It is impossible to point out which of the 
two frames is encompassing the other – which system is giving meaning 
to people’s actions: by partaking in activities constitutive of life ‘outside’ 
they come closer to the ‘inside’, and by converting and coming ‘inside’ 
they find a community to be built through the ‘outside’.7
Conclusion
This chapter has investigated the ways in which people try to achieve 
moments of continuity in the face of intense discourses of rupture. The 
chapter has worked with two big ‘wholes’ – Christianity on the one hand 
and ‘urban Japanese modernity’ on the other. It has tried to show how 
people oscillate between the two, letting one encompass the other, bridg-
ing the gulf of rupture every time they go into and out of church. In the 
haze of drunkenness, a double encompassment is achieved – the two cul-
tures overlap and blur, sinful activities become virtuous, transgression 
becomes the performance of the Christian life.
Given the Christian insistence on rupture, it is not surprising that 
this chapter has worked, like Robbins, with two extreme outcomes of 
culture contact and change: rupture, with a new Christian cosmos, or 
continuity, with the continuation of the old culture. There is of course a 
middle way, one where the two ‘cultures’ come to a sort of Hegelian syn-
thesis. This is close to what much anthropological literature has called 
syncretism (e.g. Shaw and Stewart 1994) or creolization (e.g. Hannerz 
1987; Stewart 2007). What we find here is, however, not one of those 
cases. Rupture is a daily reality for the community, one that they struggle 
with and that they cannot ultimately overcome. The fleeting blurring and 
identification of the two cultures only lasts for a few hours, and rupture 
is imposed on them as soon as they walk around town or into church. At 
the same time, what we are seeing here is most likely not a process with 
a definite direction and outcome as it was for the Urapmin but, as is tes-
tament in the absence of friction between the two, this does not seem to 
be the case in Tokyo.
People have no intention of giving up many of the things the priest 
wants them to give up. ‘Giving up’ is not something the community does 
lightly: even giving up chocolate at Lent usually lasts only a few days 
(and, in recounting their failure to abstain, people do so with the same 
levity with which they talk about their drinking). They are not striving 
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towards total conversion and stumbling on the way. They are, however, 
not trying to assert their sense of continuity either, for their activities are 
hidden from the eyes of the priest. One might comment that, if the com-
munity had its way, the Catholicism of its members would develop into a 
syncretic form. This might be the truth, but it might also be overlooking 
the community’s craving for form and dogma. The affectionate transgres-
sions of the priest’s dogma might not mark a desire to be rid of them, but 
a particular affective way of engaging rupture. People are not challeng-
ing rupture, but creating spaces so that continuity can coexist with it.
Notes
1. Robbins is here relying on Sahlins’s model (1985; 1992); ‘assimilation’ here also encompasses 
what for the latter is a third process – ‘transformation’.
2. Even the story of conversion of one of the key figures of Japanese Christianity – Uchimura 
Kanzō, the founder of the Non-Church Movement (mukyōkai) – is underwhelming and gradual 
(Ch. 1 in Uchimura 1985; also Mullins 1998).
3. A drinking establishment that also serves small dishes of food such as skewers, fried chicken, 
pickles and fried noodles.
4. Cf. Moeran (1997) for an important counterpoint.
5. Note that the only activities that are encompassed are Buddhist, never Shinto. Shinto, with its 
perceived polytheism, seems to be much more threatening to the Church than Buddhism. Altars 
and graves are reinterpreted and encompassed, but never household shrines or amulets.
6. Cf. Daswani (2011) and Werbner (2011) for the use of an oscillatory model in non-Western 
Christian contexts.
7. Here saliently morality has not been part of the picture, and the notion of encompassment tried 
to capture the same process without its moral dimension. However, morality has, albeit brief-
ly, surfaced in the ethnography. In Robbins’s analysis the Urapmin experienced what Bateson 
(1972, 201–27, 271–8) has called a ‘double-bind’: an emotionally distressing dilemma where 
one receives two conflicting and mutually negating messages. Kimura-san, whom we have seen 
unsuccessfully trying to avoid drinking with the community, is the closest example I have seen 
to a moral double-bind. As in the notion of encompassment, for Bateson there is a hierarchical 
element to the double-bind: a verbal message is framed by non-verbal ones that directly con-
tradict the first. Kimura-san was stuck between the priest’s dogma – thou shall not drink – and 
a situation where drinking was encouraged if not required. While he would have never stated 
this publicly on the night, when asked on different occasions he confirmed that his reticence 
and discomfort were explicitly to do with the awareness of the ‘wrongness’ (warui) of the act. 
Kimura-san is, one could say, only encompassing one way – he is the kind of Christian the priest 
wants the community to be and is hence, paradoxically, struggling to be part of it.
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Writing as Rupture: On Prophetic 
Invention in Central Africa
Ramon Sarró
Introduction
In this chapter I would like to pay attention to dynamics of ruptures 
linked to prophetic imagination in Africa. Prophets bring new religious 
discourses and convince followers that they have to abandon old reli-
gious cultures and convert to these innovative ones. Tempting as it is to 
analyse the prophetic work as rupture, as an effort at redirecting people’s 
imagination towards the ‘new world’ and towards the future, it would 
yield a very partial view on the work of prophetic imagination. In several 
prophetic movements I have been studying in West and Central Africa, 
the invitation of the prophets is not only to make a break with the past, 
but to critically reassess the past in order to understand the predicaments 
of the present too (Sarró 2018a). In other words, rupture and repair, to 
borrow the phrase from Rowlands, Feutchwang and Zhang’s chapter, are 
more often than not the two sides of the same coin, especially in places 
where the past is remembered with a combination of pride and suffering, 
as is often the case in Africa.
The dyad of prophecy and invention is mediated by the unknown 
(Paine 1995). The ways prophets bring the unknown into the familiar 
could be analysed in many different social fields, but in this chapter I will 
focus on only one: writing systems. Writing has been seen by many schol-
ars, certainly those endorsing Pan-Babylonists and other civilizational 
views of humanity, as the historical rupture par excellence. Indeed, a 
very popular book stated in its title that ‘history begins at Sumer’ (Kramer 
1956), precisely because anything prior to the emergence of history 
was – and according to many authors today still is – considered as human 
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‘pre’ history. The emergence of writing works like a totemic operator that 
distinguishes a certain ‘we’ from a certain preliterate ‘they’ and that has 
been used to explain (or mystify?) the transition from mythical existence 
to logical thinking. Although as far as philosophy of history goes this 
is today an outmoded problematic epistemology, the fact remains that 
access to writing is regarded in many parts of the world as one of the most 
important achievements that individuals and societies may boast, their 
true coming of age.
But how do you access the alphabet? There are two ways: either you 
learn to use an existing alphabet or you invent your own from scratch. 
The invention of the alphabet has been a topic of research of both his-
torians and anthropologists. Ethnographic evidence shows that in many 
places creative individuals, very often considered as prophets by their 
publics, have invented their own way to transcribe sounds into graphic 
symbols. The most famous individuals studied by anthropologists would 
include Sequoyah, a Seneca Indian who, despite being illiterate, was able 
to invent a syllabary (Foreman 1938), that of the Hmong prophet Shong 
Lue, who invented an alphabet in Vietnam (Smalley et al. 1990) and that 
of Souleymane Kante, whose visions gave birth to the N’ko alphabet in 
Mande West Africa (Vydrine 2001). Building on those cases, over the last 
decade, I have been investigating the emergence of an alphabet in Congo 
and the biography of the man who invented it through divine revelation.
Like many other alphabets, this one is closely connected to a pro-
phetic movement, in this case to the Church of Simon Kimbangu, an 
institution based on the message of the prophet Simon Kimbangu (1887–
1951). Since 1921 this Church has been making great efforts at bringing 
something ‘new’ to the Bakongo people of central Africa, while at the 
same time making them proudly aware of their cultural roots. The writing 
system, Mandombe (an expression that can be glossed as meaning ‘the 
writing system of the Africans’), was invented by a man called Wabeladio 
Payi (1958–2013). In 1978, after having some dreams in which Simon 
Kimbangu promised to send a mission for him, young Wabeladio spent 
nine months praying in a room, and in 1979 finally received a revela-
tion. He realized that the lines separating the bricks on the wall against 
which he was praying could be interpreted in such a way as to give rise 
to graphic symbols, ‘graphemes’ to use his word.1 In a subsequent dream, 
God told him that his mission was to investigate the graphic symbols of 
the wall.
Wabeladio then started to investigate the mathematical and 
geometrical properties of the different figures he could draw with the 
lines of the wall. In 1985, six years after his initial revelation, he wrote 
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an insightful unpublished report on the relationship between creativ-
ity (in art and technology) and geometry (Wabeladio Payi 1985). By 
1994 he started to ascribe phonographic qualities to the symbols he was 
creating, and a proper alphabet (a syllabary at first) was born. It was, 
therefore, a very long process, which lasted many years, although in the 
popular imagination of his followers his invention is telescoped to the 
1978 dream and presented as an invention of a ‘sudden genius’ instead 
of a long process of investigation, incubation and experimentation.2 In 
his inventive process, Wabeladio started by analysing the mathematical 
and geometrical aspects of the lines and of the figures, making an intel-
lectual regression to what I would call ‘the elementary forms of rupturing 
life’. Like the pre-Socratic philosophers, like Ramon Llull, like Descartes, 
like the Cubists, Wabeladio realized that if you really want to start anew, 
you must start from geometry. And, indeed, he became a sophisticated 
geometer, offering something that was so absolutely new that peo-
ple could not relate to it at all, and only a few understood what he was 
doing. The names of the graphemes he was inventing were, at first, sui 
generis concepts, bearing total independence from any other graphic 
system, and with no cultural connotations at all for any possible public. 
The very concept of mandombe, a Kikongo word, was not invented until 
1994. Between 1978 and 1994, Wabeladio was referring to its invention 
as écriture imbriquée, a clever pun as the French imbriquée means both 
‘overlapping’ and ‘made out of bricks’. In the 1990s, he started to rename 
all the elements of the writing system, including the name of the system 
itself. Thus, the names of the two basic elements upon which the entire 
alphabet rests, which resemble 5 and 2, were changed from solita and 
aldo (two entirely invented concepts) to pakundungu and pelekete, two 
onomatopoeic nouns of great connotation in the ‘affliction cult’-oriented 
culture of the Bakongo. Pakundungu represents the grave sound and pel-
ekete the acute sound of the two ngoma (drums) that must be present in 
all Kongo ritual. The names of the more complex graphemes he devel-
oped, upon which syllables are constructed, were renamed from canne 
(‘walking cane’, in French) to mwuala (‘royal sceptre’, in Kikongo). This 
renaming and cultural rerooting on his invention in the Kongo imagery 
was a rather late development. At the beginning, and for a long time, no 
matter how impressed people were with the young man’s drawings and 
three-dimensional geometries, they could not relate to the invention, and 
Wabeladio was a rather solitary thinker with little impact. He even had to 
make a break with his matrilineal family, who were convinced the young 
man was wasting his time with the invention and suspected he was either 
bewitched or mad. He only started to gain public acceptance when he 
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managed to rephrase his quasi-surreal language and imagery in a way 
that resonated with people’s histories and experiences, and particularly 
with the messianic matrix inherent in Kongo cultural roots.
Kimbanguism and the spread of Mandombe
Since its beginning in 1978, the Mandombe alphabet and art have been 
strongly associated with the Kimbanguist Church, and they are taught in 
Kimbanguist centres in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in its neigh-
bouring Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), in Angola and in the diaspora. 
A succinct description of this Church is therefore in order.
Kimbanguism was born among the Bakongo people in 1921, when 
Simon Kimbangu, a young man educated at the Baptist mission of Wathen 
(Ngombe-Lutete) and often described in colonial sources as a ‘prophet’, 
started to heal, make prophecies and even, oral history claims, make mir-
acles in Lower Congo, then part of Belgian Congo. He became especially 
famous after allegedly having brought one dead woman to life on 6 April 
1921. This is considered by members of the Church today as the official 
date of the start of his miraculous activities. Why Kimbangu was consid-
ered a prophet and whether he can be, sociologically or theologically, 
considered a prophet is a debate within the Kimbanguist Church itself. 
The official line within the Church today is that Simon Kimbangu was the 
incarnation of the Holy Ghost (Kayongo 2005); whether he can or cannot 
be considered a prophet is becoming less and less relevant.
The fame of Kimbangu, healing and making miracles on top of 
the hill of N’kamba, spread like bushfire throughout the Lower Congo 
regions. According to some accounts, thousands of people from the entire 
region and also from the French colony of Congo and the Portuguese col-
ony of Angola came every day to be healed by him.3 People made long pil-
grimages in order to deliver or destroy ritual objects linked to traditional 
cosmology, in a clear effort to abandon practices and start a new society 
afresh. As soon as the movement began on 6 April, the Belgian govern-
ment decided to ban it, under pressure not only from local authorities but 
also from Catholic and Protestant missionaries, as well as from merchants 
who feared the movement might have a negative effect on their activities. 
Kimbangu was taken and imprisoned in September 1921, following two 
months of fierce persecution in the hills and forests around N’kamba. The 
Kimbanguist movement, however, continued clandestinely and despite 
persecution by the Belgian authorities (MacGaffey 1983; Diangienda 
Kuntima 1984; Mélice 2009, 2010).
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The Kimbanguist Church was finally recognized by the Belgian state 
in 1959, just one year before Independence, and it became one of the two 
major religious institutions in independent Congo (or, as it would later 
be known, Zaire, and today the Democratic Republic of Congo) under 
Mobutu’s rule in the 1960s. Today, it is still one of the major Churches 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as being a huge interna-
tional institution. Its members often assert that the total number of 
Kimbanguists worldwide is around 17 million, but a complete census has 
not yet been undertaken. Moreover, at the moment, an internal schism is 
making it difficult to establish precise numbers and memberships (for the 
schism, see Sarró et al. 2008; Mélice 2011; Apo Salimba 2013).
The Church’s slogan is ‘Kimbanguism: Hope of the World’, and 
its theology is indeed very much based on messianic hope (Sarró and 
Mélice 2010; Sarró and Santos 2011; Sarró 2015), with a political the-
ology centred on the restoration of the Kingdom – identified both with 
the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Kongo – around the holy city of 
N’kamba (also known as N’kamba-New Jerusalem). N’kamba was Simon 
Kimbangu’s birthplace and is today the spiritual and administrative cen-
tre, as well as the most important pilgrimage site, of the Church. It offers 
a paradigmatic case for the study of political theology and for theoret-
ical comparisons with other messianic-oriented religious communities 
based on notions of suffering and on the restoration of a divine-political 
kingdom.
In 1960 Kimbangu’s coffin was transferred from Lubumbashi, where 
he had died nine years earlier, to a mausoleum built in his natal village 
of N’kamba. In the late 1960s the Kimbanguist Church was inducted into 
the Ecumenical Council of Christian Churches, and N’kamba was offi-
cially declared the Church’s central headquarters. It would be impossible 
to summarize the current configuration and theology of the Church in 
the space of this chapter, but it is important to emphasize that the suffer-
ing of past Kimbanguists is very present in the Church’s liturgy and sym-
bolism. Thus, for example, there are said to be 37,000 seats in the main 
temple in N’kamba, which equals the number of Congolese families who 
were forcibly displaced and taken away from their homes by the colonial 
authorities in a futile effort to put an end to the movement.
Today, Kimbanguists form one of the biggest religious communi-
ties in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and also in the Republic of 
Congo and Angola. This fact cannot be stressed enough in understand-
ing Mandombe’s widespread acceptance in the public sphere. Over 
the last twenty years Mandombe has been used within the Church to 
transcribe Biblical and other texts. And, by the time Wabeladio passed 
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away, there was a fierce debate, especially in the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, about whether Mandombe should be ‘secularized’ and taught 
outside Kimbanguist circles too. Wabeladio created CENA (the Center 
for the Study of Mandombe) in 1995. Between 1996 and 2012 CENA 
created teaching centres (called nsanda) across the national territory, 
covering the entire Lower Congo, but also parts of Bandundu, Province 
Oriental, the two Kivus, Equator, Kasai and many countries outside 
the Democratic Republic of Congo. In Kinshasa, each of the 22 local 
municipalities (or ‘communes’ as they are called) had one teaching 
centre by the time Wabeladio died. It is probably fair to say that some 
10,000 certificates were granted by the different teaching centres over 
that period. This means that 10,000 people had learned the rudiments 
of Mandombe by 2012. These rudiments could be acquired in three 
months by literate people, but could take up to six months if the stu-
dents did not know how to read and write. Mandombe teachers were 
always connected to professional pedagogues so as to improve their 
teaching techniques. ‘For those who are literate, we explain the prin-
ciples of Mandombe, but for those who are illiterate, we teach them to 
draw without any theory whatsoever’, one of the teachers explained 
in an interview in 2012. There was never a shortage of teachers, for 
one thing learning Mandombe did was to encourage people to become 
teachers of the alphabet.
In a tour I did with Wabeladio across the Lower Congo in summer 
2012, I noticed the enthusiasm of some elderly people in truly remote 
places in the forests of Mayombe who, while being illiterate in the Roman 
alphabet, could nevertheless write and read in Mandombe (although 
I did not find anybody who could read with fluency). I was equally, if 
not more, impressed by the enthusiasm of young people who worked in 
the nsanda on a cooperative basis, having their own cassava field and 
orchards. The different nsanda I visited in the urban and rural areas that 
year in Lower Congo – including Mbanza Ngungu, Kinsantu, Matadi, 
Boma, Muanda, and several small forest villages between Boma and 
Tchela – were all quite big, and in some of them I was received by thirty 
or forty people. The word I heard most often when asking why they were 
learning Mandombe was ‘identity’. Mandombe was an alphabet sent by 
God to a Mukongo man, and it was their duty and pride, as Bakongo, to 
learn how to read it and write it.
Such huge numbers of enthusiastic people do not mean, however, 
that all of them used Mandombe. As Wabeladio explained to me, a lot 
of people learned it but they very rarely used it and ended up forgetting 
how to.4 In order to encourage people to keep using it, the Mandombe 
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League was created in the late 1990s. This encouraged Mandombe users 
to write to each other. Because, obviously, postmen were not expected to 
be able to read an address written in Mandombe, these letters were sent 
through CENA itself. They were taken from the nsanda in the sender’s 
village to Kinshasa; from Kinshasa they went to the nsanda in the recipi-
ent’s village. This allowed the people at the headquarters of Mandombe 
in Kinshasa to keep tight control of the League’s progress. Up to 2012 
they were very happy with the huge number of letters that were circu-
lating among the different centres every year. The League also organ-
ized social visits to help people to get to know each other. In 2011, for 
instance, Wabeladio hired a van in Kinshasa and took many Mandombe 
students to pay a friendly visit to some nsanda in the southern province 
of Bandundu.
Mandombe: the world on the wall
In 1978, when he was 21 years old and a Catholic, Wabeladio had a 
series of disturbing dreams in which he saw the late prophet Simon Kim-
bangu calling him. Against the will of his Catholic family, he decided 
to go to N’kamba-New Jerusalem, the Holy City of Kimbanguism (in 
Lower Congo), to find out why he was having the dreams. The journey 
to N’kamba was full of mysteries, especially when Wabeladio got stuck 
to the ground for several hours in the middle of the path, unable to 
move; a ‘miracle’ (his own words) still today haunting him. Yet it was 
also fruitless. On his way back from the Holy City, he decided to report 
the mysterious trip to the leader of the Church, Joseph Diangienda Kun-
tima (Kimbangu’s son), who lived in Kinshasa. The latter told Wabeladio: 
‘My father [Simon Kimbangu] is preparing you for a mission; you have to 
pray and pray and the mission will be revealed to you.’
Wabeladio then went to the town of Mbanza Ngungu, where part of 
his family was based, and prayed for nine months in a small room, until 
one day he noticed that the lines between the bricks on the wall were 
drawing the two figures 5 and 2, as bricks do. He sensed that the message 
was hidden in these two figures. That night, he dreamt that an insect was 
drawing with its saliva the figures 5 and 2 repeatedly on his skin, until his 
entire body looked like a wall.
That was the confirmation, and from then on he started to ‘study 
the symbols’ as he says, a process that would take him ‘from the simple to 
the complex’ (i.e. from the two elementary symbols 5 and 2 to a complex 
and mysteriously symmetrical script and numerological system).
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I have no room to describe all the implications of Wabeladio’s 
invention of Mandombe, which became a very popular alphabet to tran-
scribe Kikongo and Lingala, as well as a very ingenious form through 
which to create art by following the geometrical principles underneath 
Mandombe. Some artists in Kinshasa have specialized in Mandombe 
art, also called Kimbangula. By 2009, when I met Wabeladio Payi, the 
alphabet was being taught in hundreds of specialized centres all across 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as in Congolese diasporas in 
Africa and Europe.
The fact that Wabeladio’s invention was grounded on a brick wall 
is in itself a good place to start drawing some implications from his work. 
It is of course a coincidence that he saw the writing on a wall in 1979, 
the same year that Pink Floyd were producing their album The Wall, but 
it is a thought-provoking coincidence. Take archaic walls such as those 
of Jericho’s falling apart, or that in the cavern described by Plato, which 
deludes us into believing in shadows, or take modern ones such as the 
vile one separating Thisbe from her lover Pyramus, the ambivalent one in 
the 1909 poem by Robert Frost ‘Mending Walls’ (Frost 1914), the exas-
peratingly never-ending one in Kafka’s novella The Great Wall of China, 
written in German in 1917 (Kafka 2007); take the walls that gave power 
to imagination by becoming canvases for so much rebellious graffiti in 
Paris 1968 (Besançon 1968). Whenever and wherever they appear, walls 
and bricks have been used as metaphors for several aspects of human 
existence. There has also been a close connection between spirituality 
and walls. Thus, in the Old Testament’s Book of Daniel we learn about 
King Belshazzar, who sees a mysteriously disembodied hand write on his 
wall the Hebrew words mene mene teke uparshim, an apocalyptic mes-
sage that only the prophet Daniel could decipher (Daniel 5: 13–24).
The connection between seeing forms on walls and getting inspira-
tion – divine or artistic – is very old. Leonardo da Vinci made a method 
out of it, instructing young artists to look for accidental stains on walls in 
their search for art forms (Turner 2011). Walls have also been very impor-
tant for the development of new forms of art in the twentieth century. In 
a letter to A. Pieyre de Mandiargues in 1957, Jean Dubuffet, an artist to 
whom I will return, wrote that he got inspiration just by looking at walls, 
and that all his art was linked in one way or another to walls (Webel 
2008). But probably the most astonishing connection between walls and 
artistic creativity is the work of Fernando Oreste Nanetti (1927–94), an 
Italian artist who spent much of his life in a mental hospital in Tuscany 
on whose walls he inscribed more than 70 metres of drawings and texts 
(Peiry 2016).
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Bricks and walls are indeed good to think about and to imagine. 
British psychologist Liam Hudson proposed a brick test to assess indi-
vidual creativity. It consisted in asking subjects what things could be 
made out of bricks (Hudson 1966). Some people could give more than 
15 different answers to the question. I doubt, however, that anyone ever 
answered: ‘an alphabet’. In their recent book on creativity, John Kounios 
and Mark Beeman write: ‘If you look at a brick, you’ll probably think of 
it as a part of a building or a wall. But you could also think of it in other 
ways: as a paving stone, a doorstep, a paperweight, or a walnut cracker’ 
(Kounios and Beeman 2015, 8). Other ways there are indeed, but surely 
it is still Stone Age compared with Wabeladio’s usage of bricks as the 
bases for an alphabet!
In truth, Wabeladio did not invent the alphabet with the bricks, but 
rather with the mathematical relations in the lines between bricks. As 
in some spiritual ladders imagined by medieval thinkers such as Ramon 
Llull’s (which consisted of seven steps, and then God as the eighth, final 
one), the materiality of the brick (or of the stone in Llull’s case) was the 
first step towards the most immaterial principles and ultimately towards 
knowledge of God. In his writings, of which sadly only very few remain, 
he argued that for ‘creative imagination’ (his words) to construct beauty 
it must abide by arithmetical principles. Here he would have been a good 
interlocutor of Paul Valéry. In an article on aesthetic invention in which 
he wrote against romantic views that glorify pure, boundless imagina-
tion, the French poet and thinker argues that not even the imagination of 
the poet is entirely free of constraints, as he or she too has to comply with 
strict rules of composition (Valéry 1957).
Theoreticians of creativity seem to agree that invention does not 
work out of the blue. It works by invoking and playing with knowledge 
and images stored in our mind and in a dialectical relationship with the 
surrounding human and physical environment. Some authors have argued 
that madness is an exception, and that ‘outsider artists’ can create truly 
innovative art because they are free from any connection with other peo-
ple and free from the ‘asphyxiating culture’, ready to deliver themselves to 
the invigorating faculty of forgetfulness, as Dubuffet, the founder of the 
art brut movement, put it (1968). A lot of writing on delusion and on the 
so-called art brut follows this problematic assumption and portrays out-
sider artists as the maximum exponents of genius, free from the subjuga-
tion of received aesthetics and from other structures of domination and 
subordination. Dubuffet’s idea that artists must develop their ‘faculty of 
forgetting’ to get away from the tyranny of culture and develop genius is 
suggestive. Unfortunately, he never told how one develops such a faculty.
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The view that connects true artists with mad people, so dear to 
Dubuffet, needs to be qualified in two ways. First, very often what we find 
in outsider art is not a free association of disconnected elements, but on 
the contrary an obsession with detail, repetition, geometry and symme-
try. This was characterized in 1922 as the ‘decorative urge’ (Smucktrieb) 
by Heidelberg psychiatrist Hans Prinzhorn, one of the founders of the 
study of what was later to be known as outsider art (quoted in Cardinal 
1972, 18). Secondly, we should remember that, as Lévi-Strauss put it in 
Tristes Tropiques, ‘human societies, like individual human beings (at play, 
in their dreams, or in moments of delirium), never create absolutely: all 
they can do is to choose certain combinations from a repertory of ideas 
which it should be possible to reconstitute’ (Lévi-Strauss 1955, 160; my 
emphasis). Notice that Lévi-Strauss, who was surely aware of the usages 
that surrealism and other rebellious art schools were making of delu-
sion, notes that his denial of absolute creation includes delirium. Clearly 
inspired by Lévi-Strauss, French physician and philosopher Henri Laborit 
wrote in an essay on discoverers: ‘Most likely, creative imagination does 
not create anything; it discovers relations of which one was still not 
aware’ (Laborit 1970, 38; my translation). This capacity to combine, to 
find new relations, has ever since Lévi-Strauss and Laborit been explored 
more systematically by creativity scholars. Kounios and Beeman write: 
‘We define creativity as the ability to reinterpret something by breaking 
it down into its elements and recombining these elements in a surprising 
way to achieve some goal’ (2015, 9), a definition that not only accords 
very well with the notions expressed by Lévi-Strauss and Laborit, but 
one that is also very appropriate when thinking about the invention of 
Wabeladio, based as it was on breaking down the perceived wall into 
its composite elements and then reconstructing something different out 
of the elements. In a study on technology and invention, Brian Arthur 
(2009) stresses the cumulative effect of these combinations and reinter-
pretations: the more we innovate through combination, he argues, the 
more elements we create for future combinations to emerge. It may there-
fore be problematic to thwart incipient innovations such as Mandombe, 
since nobody really knows what further combinations they will give rise 
to in the future, and therefore what greater inventions we may be avert-
ing with our early judgement. Wabeladio once told me that should he 
have the conditions to develop his invention, it would be very useful in 
the future to develop architecture and even the construction of space-
ships. Sadly, he died at the moment when the University of Kinshasa was 
finally showing some real interest in his creativity and scientific promise, 
and had hired him despite his lack of any formal university degree.
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Connection and combination seem to be at the heart of most theories 
of creativity. I would like to propose a more balanced view in which dis-
connection is at least as important as connection. I believe that invention 
consists in a double act of separation, a double rupture. Firstly, the inventor 
must disconnect elements from their context of origin (as Wabeladio sep-
arated lines from the bricks) so that they can be ‘originally’ recombined; 
secondly, they must disconnect the final product from specific influences 
(in the case of Wabeladio, he received a lot of technical feedback from 
Kinshasa artists, mathematicians, linguists and theologians). Only an art-
ful disconnection between the process of creation and the final product 
will yield a product that will appear to the public as having been created 
by an individual genius (with the help, in this case, of God). One could 
put this idea in dialogue with Gell’s notions of technology/enchantment 
(Gell 1994) or Graeber’s works on fetishes and creativity (Graber 2005), 
but also with theories of influence and artistic creativity. In two different 
but related studies on those topics, literary critic Harold Bloom (1973; 
2011) has argued that influences are accompanied by anxiety; authors 
must present themselves as original, even knowing they are building on 
models and ideas created by someone else. What he called ‘anxiety of influ-
ences’ he could as well have called ‘anxiety of inventors’. Inventors have 
to make sure that their invention will not be attributed to anybody else. 
They also have to make sure that the influences are duly acknowledged, 
but in such a way that the resulting work is perceived, first and foremost, 
as their creation, not as a sum of different parts. Furthermore, for their 
invention to be a contribution to humanity, they have to disconnect the 
result from their own personal or parochial concerns and link it instead to 
universal concerns. Wabeladio offers a paradigmatic example. He learned 
from God, he learned from the landscape and from the built environment, 
and he learned from his peers and from scholars. He took very good notice 
of the comments and feedback he received and made every single effort to 
meet university professors in Kinshasa and elsewhere to discuss with them, 
and he deeply impressed some of them. His life was one of learning, but 
nobody doubts, not even those who helped him with the most technical 
aspects, that Mandombe is Wabeladio’s invention.
Absolute beginners
Rupture was a fundamental aspect of Wabeladio’s life and work, and the 
burgeoning literature on rupture in anthropology has indeed helped me 
understand his relationship with his background and ambitions. This 
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literature has been refreshing as it has allowed us to understand why and 
how so many thousands of young people today want to lose their roots 
and live as ‘absolute beginners’ (to borrow the title of a famous novel 
on London youth in the 1950s; MacInnes 1959), usually in urban areas 
far away from their rural traditionalist elders. That said, an exaggerated 
stress on rupture may have two limitations. One is that we risk portray-
ing rupture as being irreversible or definitive in cases where it is not. 
Very often a longue durée approach shows that rupture is dialectical. One 
breaks up now to make up later, as Wabeladio did with his tradition and 
even with his maternal family, with whom he split when he was in his 
mid-twenties but reconnected two decades later. The other pitfall is that 
by insisting on the importance of rupture today we may lose sight of its 
relevance to understand the past and its role in the making of history 
in general. Humans have always been rupturists. Socrates, the founder 
of Western philosophy, was condemned to death for persuading youths 
in Athens to follow their ethical principles and make a clean break with 
their elders’ instructions. The Old Testament (let alone the New Testa-
ment, where rupture with kin ties and obligations is explicit in many of 
Jesus’ teachings) is full of young people rebelling against their elders. 
More recently, one of the interpreters of the birth of modern history, 
Alexis de Tocqueville, highlighted, in his The Old Regime and the Revo-
lution (Tocqueville 1856), on the force of breaking with the past for the 
birth of modern France (although his main point was, precisely, that 
even the revolutionaries ended up creating a continuity with the past 
rather than a rupture with it).5 Robespierre was reported to have said 
‘in order to achieve our mission, we need precisely the opposite of which 
existed before’ (Guigon 2007). Not to mention the glorification of the 
écart absolu by Fourier and other utopian and revolutionary thinkers, 
later inherited by Dadaists, surrealists (Guigon 2007) and, especially, 
proponents of art brut such as Dubuffet and his follower Michel Thévoz, 
author of an insightful essay on the connection between art brut and the 
invention of alphabets aptly entitled Le language de la rupture, the lan-
guage of rupture (Thévoz 1978). Let me finish this digression on rupture 
with an apocryphal phrase attributed by Dadaists to Descartes in 1918 
(on the cover of the third issue of their journal Dada): ‘I do not want to 
know if there have been men before me.’ Although scholars have proved 
that the founder of modern philosophy never wrote this thought, at least 
not in these exact words (Behar and Carassou 1990, 91), the idea is cer-
tainly in the spirit of his philosophy, especially of his 1641 Metaphysical 
Meditations. He needed to ground his certainty on himself, not on the 
authority of tradition. Now, the paradox is: why did Dadaists, who were 
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also trying to make a break with the past, need the authority of Des-
cartes? Even when breaking with tradition, people need a tradition from 
which to unpick stitches. We are inescapably historical animals.6
Like Descartes’ case, Wabeladio’s is particularly good in showing 
that for ruptures to be effective, they need to be solidly grounded. His 
efforts to root his new certainty in geometry were an avatar of many prior 
historical ruptures, also grounded on mathematics or geometry. Think 
about the importance of geometry for the birth of Western philosophy in 
pre-Socratic thinkers such as Pythagoras, breaking up with prior myth-
ical models. Consider Renaissance thinkers such as Leonardo da Vinci 
breaking away from medieval cosmology by grounding human beings 
on the certainty of numbers. Think about the (religious) importance of 
geometry in the fathers of modern philosophy such as the above-men-
tioned Descartes, or Pascal, or Spinoza, for whom geometry was a secure 
way to ground the human in a supra-individual order of reality in the 
new post-medieval world, in which humans were detached from the 
great chain of beings and in which they had to look for certainties within 
themselves, not in the expanding infinite universe.
Wabeladio’s life tells us that he was advancing solidly in the path of 
creativity by making more and more complex associations. The death of 
the creator froze the elaboration of a writing system that was in constant 
transformation. Its evolution might be usefully compared with that of the 
Vietnamese writing system invented by the prophet Shong Lue (Smalley 
et al. 1990). Despite being a revelation, Shong Lue kept transforming it, 
and different versions of it existed at different times, the last one being 
the easiest and most effective. Surely Mandombe would have continued 
to be transformed too, and I suspect that it would have evolved towards 
simplification. As I witnessed in a presentation in Kinshasa in 2011, 
Wabeladio was often accused by his detractors of having created a too 
cumbersome writing system. He agreed that the writing was a bit too 
difficult, and he was in fact working towards a way to make the syllables 
less complex. He told me that God had sent him some ideas in a dream as 
to how to simplify the writing, and he was putting them to work. This was 
the reason why he did not want Mandombe to be computerized. Whoever 
invented a software for Mandombe would stop the flow of creativity and 
deter Wabeladio from improving the invention. He would only accept the 
introduction of software if this was done by someone working very close 
to him, so that he could keep on introducing the necessary modifications, 
many of which came directly from God. This had not happened by the 
time of his death. However, some people have invented different soft-
ware possibilities (at least one in France and one in Canada) and I am 
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sure that, if Mandombe is to persist, one form or another of computeriza-
tion will become standard in the future.
The presence of the persona of Wabeladio in his invention can 
be understood in two opposite ways: secular and spiritual. One could 
argue that Wabeladio wanted people to know that he and nobody else 
had invented Mandombe. Like Ulysses shouting his name to Polyphemus 
after having blinded him (a moment that, according to Horkheimer 
and Adorno [2002], was like the birth certificate of the Western self), 
Wabeladio wanted Mandombe to be shouting his name to us: ‘Remember, 
Wabeladio was the name of he who created me!’ That would be one plausi-
ble interpretation. But having known the man, I would insist on the other 
interpretation. Wabeladio wanted his biography to be known because it 
was the only way in which to erase himself from his invention. By making 
sure everybody knew the extraordinary revelation he received in 1979, 
he was making sure we understood that his invention was rooted in a 
transcendent domain. In his public presentations (or ‘demonstrations’, as 
he called them), Wabeladio used the concept of ‘we’ quite often. Thus, he 
would not say ‘I thought that by rotating the false element I could gener-
ate new keys’ but rather ‘we thought that by rotating … ’. In a lecture he 
gave in Matadi in 2011, someone in the audience asked him why he was 
using the first person plural. Wabeladio answered that it was because he 
was not doing this by himself, but with the spirit of God working through 
him. One could argue that for him, as for Spinoza, mathematics was a 
supra-individual structure, a matrix weaving the entire world, an infinite 
geometrical grid providing individuals with a sense of dependence on a 
transcendent order.7
Conclusion
Wabeladio was indeed an ‘absolute beginner’. He made himself from 
scratch the day he observed two symbols on a wall of bricks, and he 
offered ‘the new’, in the form of an alphabet and of an artistic system, 
to his Bakongo publics. At first, the concepts he invented to refer to his 
invention were totally out of the blue, and the materiality on which the 
invention was based (the brick) was, as far as Kongo traditions of mak-
ing go, rather unusual. His life was accompanied by conversion from 
Catholicism to Kimbanguism and by painful rupture with his family, 
especially his mother’s brother, the authority in the family. His inven-
tion, Mandombe, is a paradigmatic locus where the need for inventors to 
be clever at making their invention is realized, but they have to be even 
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more clever at presenting the final product to the public. They have to 
present it in a way that the influences, the roots of the invention, are con-
cealed, perhaps forgotten, lest they are accused of copying, not creating 
from scratch. I could say with Deleuze that they have to inscribe differ-
ence upon repetition, but I will rather say with Harold Bloom that they 
have to inscribe genius upon influence.
Wabeladio noticed that he had to keep on experimenting with 
connections and disconnections if he wanted people to follow him. 
If he continued with his incomprehensible language and imagery, he 
would be taken as mad (as indeed he was for a long time). He rescued 
himself out of madness by reconnecting his original invention with 
something even more original, like the sounds of the healing drums of 
the Bakongo. But it was a very clever move, for it gave legitimacy for 
his publics to accept Mandombe and to see him as its ‘inspired inven-
tor’ (a category used by Simon Kimbangu Kiangani, the head of the 
Kimbanguist Church, to refer to Wabeladio in 2005), bringing together 
his prophetic dimension with his creative one. As Robert Paine argued 
(Paine 1995), the voice of prophecy (Ardener 1987) and the logics of 
scientific discovery are different but complementary dimensions of our 
relationship with the unknown. Wabeladio brought together the two. 
Like a prophet, he received from God and revitalized culture. But he 
also explored three-dimensional, descriptive geometry with true scien-
tific spirit and methods. Elsewhere I have described prophets as ‘mas-
ters of connection’ (Sarró 2018a) and, following Dozon (1995), I have 
characterized their imagination as a work of synthesis. With his unique 
capacity to synthesize and to connect the seemingly unconnectable, 
Wabeladio simultaneously introduced the new and revalued the old.
Notes
1. In this chapter I offer some theoretical reflexions on prophetic invention, without entering into 
the very complex descriptive geometry of Mandombe as a graphic system that gives rise to both 
art and writing. The inner geometrical workings and the aesthetics of Mandombe have been 
dealt with in another place (Sarró 2018b).
2. For a genealogy of the Western notion of ‘genius’ and a criticism of the suddenness of inventions 
attributed to a genius, see Robinson (2010; 2011).
3. A good collection of early sources on Kimbanguism is currently being most carefully edited by 
Jean-Luc Vellut (2005; 2010). A very detailed account of the early days of Kimbanguism, based 
on Baptist sources, is the unpublished doctoral thesis by Mackay (1985).
4. Such being ‘hard to learn, easy to forget’ must of course be a common feature of scripts in gen-
eral, and not only of Mandombe.
5. Caroline Humphreys offers, in her chapter, a thoughtful view of French Revolution as rupture. 
This works as a good companion to the 1962 historical novel El Siglo de las Luces by Cuban writer 
Alejo Carpentier, which offers not only a powerful reflection on the making of modern Europe, 
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but also on the role of rupture, and of the symbolism of the guillotine in particular, in the mak-
ing of the Atlantic world.
6. At least ‘we’ are the relatively healthy people, psychiatrically speaking. Some psychiatrists, such 
as Eugene Minkowski (1927), argued that in schizophrenic delusion historical consciousness 
disappears, and the temporal atrophy is compensated for by a spatial hypertrophy. For the 
schizophrenic patient, according to Minkowski, everything is here, now, and ‘here’ becomes a 
hyperconnected space where everything can be contemplated, like seeing ‘the world in a grain of 
sand’, as the famous poem by William Blake goes.
7. I am grateful to some comments in this Durkheimian direction that both Maurice Bloch and 
Bruce Kapferer made in different presentations they heard about the mathematical aspects of 
Mandombe.
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Slow Rupture: The Art of Sneaking 
in an Occupied Forest
Stine Krøijer
Introduction
In 2012, a group of radical environmental activists took up residence in 
a little forest in the Ruhr district in Germany to counter the expansion of 
lignite mining in the area. Like many other environmental activists across 
Europe, the group had lost confidence in the ability and willingness of 
politicians to come up with solutions to catastrophic climate change 
and environmental destruction. After a decade of spectacular summit 
protesting from 1999 to 2009, during which the extra-parliamentar-
ian left mainly directed their protests at meetings of heads of state, the 
global financial institutions and later the United Nations (UN) climate 
negotiations (Graeber 2002, 2009; Juris 2008; Krøijer 2013, 2015; 
Maeckelbergh 2009), radical environmental activists in Europe turned 
their anger directly towards the largest carbon emitters. Among these 
so-called ‘carbon bombs’ is the German electricity utility company RWE 
(Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG), which, according to the 
company itself, is one of Europe’s largest emitters of carbon dioxide and 
is responsible for running an 85 square kilometre lignite mine adjacent 
to the old growth forest occupied by activists. In order to prevent the con-
tinuous expansion of the mine, activists have established a number of 
tree-sits in the forests, and engage in a mix of ecotage (sabotage on behalf 
of the environment) and civil disobedience directed at mining installa-
tions.1 In the forest occupation where I did fieldwork, tree-sitting and 
other direct actions went hand in hand with experiments in alternative, 
sustainable livelihoods based on the conviction that people must rewild 
and harmonize their life with nature.
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This chapter takes its point of departure from this change of focus in 
environmental activism, which today exceeds the approaches historically 
favoured by radical left or anarchist circles. Already in 2001, after the sum-
mit protests in Genoa where an activist was shot and killed at close range 
by the Italian police, the Italian Disobedienti called for the abandonment 
of summit protesting, a rethinking of tactics and a return to the building 
of local alternatives and autonomies in villages, neighbourhoods and 
social centres (Krøijer 2015, 140). After failed attempts at influencing the 
austerity measures of the European Union in the context of the financial 
crisis that swept the continent after 2007, and a few years of UN climate 
‘summit hopping’, activists such as those in the small forest in Germany 
have increasingly redirected their time and attention to local environmen-
tal struggles. Based on my on and off fieldwork since 2014 in the German 
anti-coal movement and in the forest occupation, this chapter analyses the 
implications of taking the climate struggle to the mines and power plants, 
as well as to daily life in such contexts, and describes the forms of activism 
that have flourished after ‘the anarchist travelling circus’ (Goaman 2013) 
abandoned the scene of the heads of state. I describe how ‘slowing down’ – 
instead of relying on spectacular confrontations and clashes with the police 
and the heroic narratives about it (cf. Krøijer 2015) – has become a strat-
egy for producing and staging a rupture with the structures of domination 
inherent to capitalism that are perceived also to impede, in various ways, 
actions that address the climate crisis. This change in the temporality of 
rupture and the slowness with which it is performed is, I argue, intimately 
tied to efforts aimed at developing a different, closer relationship to nature, 
to rewild or even become nature oneself. In this line, dwelling in trees, 
mimicking animals and learning so-called ‘primitive’ living skills are ways 
of living and acting that aim to create a radical break within capitalism. By 
cultivating their connections to non-human beings, such as trees and wild 
boars, the activists enact what I call a ‘slow rupture’. The performance of 
slow ruptures both challenges ideas of rupture and revolution found on the 
radical left as well as standard anthropological thinking about rupture. In 
this sense, the new forms of action produce a form of rupture with rupture.
The introduction to this volume argues that the Modern World 
began with a rupture. This modern form of rupture is epitomized by the 
French and Russian Revolutions, tied as they were to the epochal idea 
of the ‘progress of man’ (sic) through the sudden, radical and complete 
change afforded by the revolutionary moment. These historic events have 
made a strong imprint on political thinking about radical change and 
anthropological ideas about what rupture is and could be, which have 
lingered in anthropological writing on the subject. This is particularly 
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clear in the work of the Manchester School where Max Gluckman’s dis-
tinction between revolutions and rebellions has haunted anthropology, 
in the sense that it demands from researchers the passing of judgement 
on the extent to which social uprisings, protests, upheavals, crises and 
proclaimed revolutions are producing enduring and fundamental social 
change (Gluckman 1963, 8; Turner 1969, 125–32).
One way in which to challenge the association between rupture and 
revolution is pursued by Humphrey (this volume). She provides a view 
of the cuts, contradictions and ruptures within the French Revolution, 
which impeded the construction of a collective revolutionary subject and 
narrative. Inspired here by Isabelle Stengers’s ‘cosmopolitical proposal’, 
I intend to go another way by arguing that it is possible to influence the 
fundamental nature of something without this change being either sud-
den or complete. In addressing the philosophy of history, Stengers argues 
for the slowing down of reasoning ‘to arouse a slightly different aware-
ness of the problems and situations mobilizing us’ (Stengers 2005, 994). 
Following this, slowing down might in itself be a move that challenges 
conventional ways of thinking, enacting and scaling rupture. The radical 
environmental activists described here are involved in an operation anal-
ogous to that of Stengers by producing a pause or moment of hesitation 
in their own ‘politics as usual’ (cf. Ranciére 2010). This political moment 
neither produces a total replacement of one system with another – nor is 
it simply a ‘carnival of desire’ (see introduction to this volume) – but is a 
new form of politics-with-nature that breaks altogether with the progres-
sive ambition inherent in modern ideas of rupture.
In the following, I shall briefly provide a bit more background about 
the forest occupation before turning to two ethnographic scenes: a sneak-
ing workshop convened during a ‘skill-sharing camp’ held in the forest 
occupation to reach out to broader activist circles; and a conversation 
with two tree-sitting activists about how to do politics with trees. My aim 
in engaging with these two scenes is to consider the scale that we use to 
measure rupture and explore how the slowness involved in constructing 
new more-than-human political subjectivities in the forest occupation 
also awakens the brutal realization that something must change.
A forest occupation
Germany’s Ruhr district, with its enormous deposits of coal and lignite, 
became the powerhouse of early northern European industrialization. 
Located near the border with France, Belgium and the Netherlands, 
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this resource-rich area is a site of recurrent acts of conflict, but after the 
Second World War a shared concern with the smooth distribution of the 
area’s raw materials also came to play an important role in the establish-
ment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the precursor of the 
European Union. In the post-war period, urban areas in the Ruhr district 
underwent rapid economic development based on mining. Even today, 
the wider Metropol Rhine-Ruhr is home to some of Germany’s largest 
open-cast lignite mines, mainly owned and operated by the electric util-
ity company RWE.
In 2012, a group of radical environmental activists occupied the 
remainder of what was originally a 5,500-hectare old-growth forest 
adjacent to a large mine in the area, with the hope of slowing down or 
even stopping its continuous expansion. In 1978 RWE bought the for-
est, which had been managed as bürgerwald (a forest common) for the 
previous 500 years; after the change in ownership, clear-cutting of the 
land and forced relocation of several villages commenced. The expan-
sion of the mining operation is projected to continue until 2040, which, 
together with the company’s enormous carbon emissions, has created a 
strong sense of disillusionment among environmental groups and organ-
izations. The lack of political willingness to address the root causes of cli-
mate change, place a carbon tax on emissions and invest in green energy 
transition has contributed to the emergence of a strong German anti-coal 
movement since 2014. It was after one of the first annual summer camps 
of the movement that activists established a more permanent occupation 
and built a number of tree-sits in the forest’s slow-growing oak and beech 
trees to curb the advancing cutting line on what was left of the highly rich 
and biodiverse forest.
The forest occupation is made up of various tree-sits and a base 
camp, which is today located on a little piece of land at the edge of the 
woods lent to the activists by a local farmer, who is also a strong oppo-
nent of the mine as he is about to lose his land to the diggers. At the outset 
the main purpose of the camp was to support the tree-sitters by provid-
ing food and water supplies, to coordinate internal communication and 
security, serve as a space to store utensils, building and climbing equip-
ment, and coordinate and maintain relations with local villagers and the 
broader, by now international, anti-coal movement. Activists in the for-
est occupation have also participated in ongoing lawsuits concerning the 
future of the forest, political advocacy and information campaigns both 
in the Rheine-Ruhr region and internationally, and in the coordination of 
several large direct actions in the area under the slogan Ende Gelände.2 
These mass direct actions have drawn a large international attendance 
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of people willing to break the law by trespassing on private property in 
order to call attention to the demand for Germany to leave its fossil fuels 
in the ground, and particularly to the highly problematic effects of lig-
nite or brown coal mining.3 In the week prior to the COP23 (the name 
for the 23rd Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change) in Bonn in 2017, 4,000–5,000 activists 
refrained from protesting outside the climate summit venue in order to 
join a mass action on mining, which stopped all work at the Hambach 
mine for three days.
Activists living in the forest occupation share this commitment 
to take action on major carbon emitters, but over the years have come 
to do so through different means. Already in 2015, few activists in the 
forest occupation found it worth even considering joining the protests 
connected to the COP21 in Paris or argued actively against prioritizing 
these one-off spectacular protests. Instead, they passionately advocated 
the view that it is more important ‘to build alternatives’, for example 
by spending time building mud houses for people to keep warm in the 
base camp during the cold winter months. There, the ‘System Change, 
Not Climate Change’ slogan of the broader climate justice movement is 
increasingly enacted through the sharing of more mundane living skills 
that should enable and make feasible a life ‘in the wild’, and preparing for 
if or when dramatic climate change alters the fundamental conditions of 
life even in such places as Germany (Krøijer 2019).
Each year prior to the cutting season – which in Germany runs from 
1 October to 28 February and is the time when a landowner is allowed to 
clear the land – activists of the forest occupation organize a skill-sharing 
camp where visiting activists can share their skills and activist tactics by 
signing on to a daily schedule of workshops. Some of these activities are 
‘action skills’, such as tree climbing and climbing rescuing techniques, 
building of platforms in trees and tripods for blockading roads, as well 
as ‘sneaking’. Others are concerned with ‘living skills’ such as the col-
lection of mushrooms and wild herbs, scavenging and dumpster diving, 
house-building with clay, fire starting, and so on. The celebration of skill-
share gatherings is not limited to Germany, but can be found in most 
Earth First! circles and rendezvous, and among anarcho-primitivists in 
the USA (Austdal 2016). The aim of all this, I have been told, is to liberate 
human and non-human beings who have been ‘civilized’ and ‘domesti-
cated’ by agricultural progress and industrial capitalism. As I highlight 
further later, this process also includes the construction of a new and 
‘wilder’ political subjectivity. One way to accomplish human liberation of 
this kind is by burning identity papers, taking on aliases and cover names 
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from their life in the forest.4 Another parallel way to strive towards this 
goal, which is the subject of the present chapter, is to become enmeshed 
in nature by intensifying experiences of interconnected political being. In 
what follows, I expose two scenes from activist life in the forest to explore 
this point. 
The art of sneaking
Owen is leading the sneaking class on a late October evening. He is an 
experienced activist, who has been living in the forest on and off for four 
years, interrupted only by occasional jobs as a doorman at punk-rock 
venues in a large German city. Participants in the class are mainly new-
comers from Spain, Britain and Sweden, most of whom are planning to 
stay on in the camp for the winter and cutting season. They have been 
instructed to show up in either camouflage or black clothes, preferably 
also bringing a torch, which should not be used unless ‘something unex-
pected’ occurs. Owen is also taking a mobile phone, making it possible 
to connect with the camp group ‘in case for some reason we are not back 
before midnight’, he states. Owen tells the group that the sneaking skill-
share class will probably be completely uneventful, but that RWE’s secu-
rity personnel sometimes patrol the forest. ‘They will almost always beat 
you severely if they catch you’, a Spanish girl adds.
Owen tells the participants that the art of sneaking rests on the abil-
ity to move slowly sideways, rolling on one’s feet at every step in order 
to avoid the sound of snapping brushwood. To acquire night vision it is 
important to focus on the darkness and use one’s arms to slowly slide 
low-hanging branches to the side without making unnecessary noise. 
The destination of the sneaking expedition is an old road separating the 
activist-controlled part of the forest from the cutting area near the rim 
of the mine. First the group moves along a relatively illuminated path 
to train their skills, then they turn north through a darker section of the 
forest. After the first half hour of sneaking the group makes a stop. ‘Now 
we will move along a meadow’, Owen says. ‘We will squat down once in 
a while to listen for sounds and noises.’ Participants are also instructed 
to look out for flashing lights, the sign of approaching security guards. 
‘They usually wave their torches at chest height, which also means that 
you can avoid them by keeping an eye out for animal tracks’, Owen 
explains, pointing towards an almost invisible track below the ferns on 
the side of the footpath. ‘Get down on your knees and creep along. This 
forest is full of wild boars. If you are attacked you can hide below the 
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scrubs like a piglet and get up on the other side and just run off. The 
guards will not usually follow you because they are scared of being lured 
into an ambush’, he says.
After an hour and a half, the group reaches the side of the road. 
Some hundred metres away, mine security has a checkpoint from where 
they can overlook the road. ‘You need to get to the other side of this aban-
doned road if you want to reach the mine’, a young Swedish woman who 
calls herself Lynx explains to me. Many people in the camp take on an 
animal or plant name which, on an instrumental level, serves to conceal 
individual identity, but in which there also seems to be an effort to come 
closer to or become animal or plant-like. We are asked to squat down 
and wait behind the tree line. From the bushes ahead of us we hear some 
strange sounds and grunting noises. Lynx grabs my arm, ‘What is it?’ 
she asks. ‘What do we do if a wild boar charges out at us?’ Actual boar 
attacks on humans are rare, but they can occur during the rutting season 
and may result in multiple penetrating injuries to the lower part of the 
body. Lynx is ready to flee, but after a few moments Owen appears from 
the bushes, waving everybody forward. If it were not for the tension of 
the situation, the mistake would probably have produced laughter. The 
group makes a few crossings of the road, training to cross simultaneously 
and run in a straight line in order to appear as one, or at least make the 
exact number of activists indiscernible from the security check point. 
After the exercise at the roadside, the group makes a disorderly retreat, 
moving quickly along the forest trails towards the camp. Owen’s mobile 
phone rings and he flashes his torch. The forest turns pitch black and we 
continue blindly, while Lynx complains: ‘If he wants us to develop animal 
senses, why does he turn on the bloody torch? It will take us at least 45 
minutes to recover.’
Sneaking skills are useful if one wants to avoid arrest prior to an eco-
tage action or plans to build a new tree-sit near the cutting line. Sneaking 
is a tactic of avoidance, and when practised in a forest it gives a sense of 
both escaping and blending in with the surroundings. Scrubs, bushes, 
grasses and trees offer shelter, but if we are thinking like an impetuous 
wild boar, the vegetation can also be taken as the point of departure for 
a fast and relentless attack. Sneaking, in other words, opens up the ques-
tion whether it is possible to think of a slow or even sneaking rupture. 
Rupture and revolutions are moments usually associated with speed, with 
rapid, fundamental social and structural change as against slow reform 
processes (Dunkerley 2007, 23–6). The speed of revolutionary moments 
has been re-enacted numerous times through the protests of the radical 
left and the alter-globalization movement over the past century, but the 
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sneaking workshop exemplifies how a reinvention of forms of politics is 
under way in which slowness entails a rupture with radical left politics 
as usual, and with its tradition of vanguardism. The Occupy Movement 
already played on slowness – stressing encampment and permanence 
in public space rather than rapid and spectacular appearance – thereby 
turning existing forms of protest inside-out (Krøijer 2015, 215). In the 
forest occupation slowness is linked to nature, blending in with the forest 
and engaging in sympathetic magic (Taussig 1993) with wild boars and 
their piglets to draw from their power and bodily capabilities. Indeed, 
the most ‘untamable’ rupture of our time has to do with coming closer to 
nature and seems to involve more than human agency or human-animal 
assemblages. This changing temporality of rupture is tied to this ‘becom-
ing-animal’, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 242), and in the 
following scene I explore how activists develop a sense of interconnect-
edness with the trees through tree-sitting. Cultivation of nature sensibil-
ities and becoming-animal requires time, but also lead to a break with 
socio-centric ideas of radical change.
Adding arms to trees
After the skill-share camp in October, I do not return to the forest occu-
pation again until early January, at the height of the cutting season. Soon 
after my arrival I run into Lynx, who has stayed on in the forest occupa-
tion and proves to have had ample chance to train her sneaking skills. 
When we first met in October, she was eager to learn to climb and to 
experience ‘how little she could live on’, preferably in a tree-sit, but now 
she explains that the situation in the forest has developed into a rather 
‘brutal version of hide-and-seek’ between activists, police and the min-
ing company’s private security forces. The security personnel of the mine 
sometimes patrol the forest in groups, hunting people to and from the 
tree-sits, cutting down climbing ropes, or hanging ‘lynched’ dolls from 
branches, supposedly to generate fear and awe. More than once these 
encounters have led to physical confrontations, and recently an activ-
ist known as Fledermaus was badly hurt. ‘Things have escalated quite a 
bit since then’, Lynx explains: ‘we did not have a lot of discussion about 
it; it just seemed necessary’. As a result, some people have increasingly 
engaged in small sabotage actions, such as damaging the pumping sta-
tions that are used for lowering the groundwater level in the entire area, 
short-circuiting cables on the coal railway line transporting lignite from 
the mine to one of several power plants, and arson of mobile and radio 
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antennas in the area (Krøijer, in preparation). Lynx has spent most of her 
time occupying different tree-sits, which in her view is a political act in 
and of itself, but she has also occasionally ‘been out on nightly walks to 
avoid falling into winter torpor’, as she phrases it.
Lynx is sleeping in a tree in Beech Town, a group of 30 metre copper 
beeches some 15 minutes’ walk from the base camp. Her tree-sit is called 
Aquarium due to the many windows in the 6 square metre treehouse and 
the transparent plastic roof over the bed, which provides ample view of 
the sky through the naked top branches. The little treehouse, which is 
tied with ropes onto strong branches, is located some 25 metres above 
the forest floor. During the night, the distant noise from the mine gets 
mixed with the rustling sound of the branches and the wind, which 
today makes the entire tree sway lightly. Lynx enjoys being in the tree, 
she explains in the course of the evening, but, in contrast to some of the 
other tree-sitters, she finds it difficult to just be in the tree slumbering for 
several consecutive days.
During a long morning stretching into the early afternoon, we 
rest, talk and make coffee in the Aquarium, while observing the forest 
from above. ‘Can you see those little beeches and shoots down below?’ 
she asks me, and continues: ‘in a sense trees are like people, they help 
each other out, they create community.’ I ask her if she considers the 
trees to be living beings, which she confirms and then adds: ‘We talk 
about the trees as living beings when we are building the tree-sits: 
whether the tree looks healthy, if it is dead or has dead branches. What 
we see now is that big healthy trees fall over because their roots do not 
get sufficient water.’ The marvel of how the forest grows, and of the 
interdependence between trees, is in other words soon superseded by 
more sombre predictions: ‘The trees in this forest are in a sense already 
dead’, she exclaims, thereby repeating a phrase I have heard many times 
in the camp. ‘They are suffering from water shortage due to the low 
groundwater level around the mine. It is visible from their shorter leaf-
ing period’, she explains, admitting that, in this light, their attempt to 
save the forest does not make much sense, as the trees will die anyway. 
Nonetheless, she argues, by being in the tree-sits, occupying the trees, 
she and other activists are ‘adding arms to trees’, thereby ‘improving the 
part of their defence system that they have not naturally developed’. 
In making this argument she implicitly draws on recent popular and 
scientific studies of trees (see for example Simard et al. 1997, 2012; 
Wohlleben 2016), but also points to how a new political assemblage of 
people and trees might increase the chance of curbing the advancing 
logging machines.
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After some hours of doing nothing in particular, we visit another 
activist named Acorn, who lives in a large oak tree and who has been 
part of the forest occupation since its beginning in 2012. Acorn sticks her 
head out of a window far above ground as we approach and invites us up 
for a cup of tea, even though she warns us of the cold she has developed 
over the past few days. The treehouse, which she built with the help of 
a friend, is constructed on three platforms: a middle landing platform to 
unhook one’s climbing gear from the rope reaching the ground 25 metres 
below, a top platform with a roof constructed over a dome of hazelnut 
branches coated with old blankets, hay and a tarp, and a lower plat-
form with a 500 kg cement block with a lock-on inside to slow down the 
police’s attempt to arrest and remove her from the tree in case of eviction. 
She has been working on her nest over the autumn, to keep warm during 
winter and to have ‘a quiet place to withdraw to’, she explains.
Acorn shows us around and comments that a great titmouse jumps 
in from the little east-facing window almost every morning to look for 
breadcrumbs. ‘The Nest’ has a large mattress and a little kitchen corner 
with a gas cooker and a few utensils, but apart from this there is only a 
shelf with books and some papers. ‘It is so quiet in the forest’, she com-
ments. ‘Soon you can observe the leaves sprout, first hand, see the trees 
seed and later observe when their leaves turn purple. Being in the tree is 
just the most peaceful place to be’, a statement that at first surprises me 
due to the noise from the mine and the threat of eviction. She describes 
the tree as her ‘safe-space’, a term drawn from queer-feminist theory that 
defines such spaces as sites to avoid, rework or challenge mainstream ste-
reotypes (Roestone Collective 2014). I realize that the tree-home offers 
her the tangible safety that avoiding encounters with the private security 
forces entails, and peace from the sometimes heated debates and radical 
activities in the base camp, but that it also allows for an exploration of 
a different kind of ‘intersectional’ relation to trees.5 ‘It is very different 
from sleeping in the camp’, she says, and offers me this place to stay for a 
couple of days, to try it for myself, while she travels to visit her mother in 
a large German city.
Her comment points to a salient difference in the forest occupa-
tion between those activists that see the occupation of the trees as the 
most important form of action to stop the expansion of lignite mining, 
and activists in the camp who either favour direct actions or spend most 
of their time experimenting with alternative, sustainable livelihoods 
(Krøijer, in preparation). Acorn is in her late twenties, has long blond 
hair collected in plaits below a green hunter’s cap, and when she is on the 
ground she is black clad, wearing a harness or belt with climbing gear 
 SLOW RUPTURE :  THE ART OF SNEAKING IN AN OCCUPIEd FOREST 167
and a knife. She is also usually smiling, outgoing, and does most of the 
public relations work, but over the years she has grown increasingly con-
cerned with what she calls ‘sustainable activism’. This, she explains, does 
not primarily concern environmental sustainability, but how to endure 
in activism over time: ‘Many of the people that started the forest occu-
pation, back when Monkey Town existed, are gone now.6 They simply 
burned out, got too sad when the trees were felled, or the repression just 
got to them. I know my tree … not that I own it … but I intend to be 
here when Day X comes.’ Acorn explains that during the cutting season a 
number of interim tree-sits are put up, and will be shortly, but that they 
have agreed it can only be done if people are committed to occupying 
them until Day X; that is, when they are evicted by force. She tells the 
story of how two winters ago she occupied such an interim tree-sit that 
was constructed on an open iron fence, while writing a diary on a toilet 
roll, which she still saves. After two exhausting weeks she was arrested 
by climbing police.
The most important point Acorn wants to convey by introducing the 
issue of ‘sustainable activism’ is how the tree holds a promise of emo-
tional and physical renewal. This was not her motivation for occupying 
the old oak tree years back, but a feeling of responsibility and interde-
pendence that has emerged from years of co-living. The cultivation of 
these human–tree relations is so far only to a limited extent mediated 
by language: the hesitation I often experienced in conversations with 
activists included a careful avoidance of religious and spiritual vocabu-
lary to describe their experiences and political project as well as a delib-
erate attention on steering clear of the tree symbolism and romanticism 
of the Third Reich (cf. Crapanzano 2004, 234). Instead the alliance with 
trees is discreetly cast as a relation of solidarity between the dying and 
oppressed, joining together in the renewal of radical politics. Before 
heading down, Acorn points to the cement block below us and explains 
the ‘emergency procedures’ if the police arrive with their ‘cherry pickers’, 
lifts used to evict the tree-sits.
Scales of rupture
Over the years, fieldwork among anarchist groups and radical environ-
mentalists in Europe has led me to ponder about the scale on which 
rupture should be measured. In the literature on revolutionary change, 
adjectives such as ‘sudden’, ‘radical’, ‘complete’ and ‘fundamental’ are 
used to describe the nature of rupture and the transformation it entails 
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of society and its political institutions (Dunkerley 2007). Are tree-sitting, 
sneaking and building eco-friendly mud-houses in a forest occupation, 
instead of going to protest at the climate summit in Paris, radical prac-
tices that enable fundamental transformations, and if so in what way? 
Akin to the Danish jihadist described by Kublitz (this volume), the role 
of rupture in the renewal of political practice does not follow a linear 
perception of time. But to scrutinize the performance of slow rupture, it 
is first necessary to identify how the systemic structures of capitalism are 
envisioned among activists and activist writers.
As I have described in more detail elsewhere (Krøijer 2015), anar-
chist groups and radical environmental activists describe capitalism as 
having systemic qualities; it is a coherent, pervasive and dynamic sys-
tem, but unlike Marx’s prediction, it is not seen as likely that it is going to 
break owing to its own inherent contradictions (cf. Marx 1974). Several 
writers close to the movement have developed these thoughts most con-
sistently: in Empire (2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri describe 
the imperial and systemic qualities of capitalism, and how it comes to 
permeate all aspects of life; in The Shock Doctrine (2008) and No Is Not 
Enough (2017), Naomi Klein outlines how the capitalist system in fact 
grows stronger and even expands from its recurrent crises. In agreement 
with this, radical environmental activists see political processes, such as 
the UN climate talks for example, as machines for ‘greenwashing’ the sta-
tus quo. In the German anti-coal movement, activists describe the fossil 
fuel industry and the political elite, but also normal people’s passivity 
as coinciding in upholding a carbon-fuelled economy. As an example of 
this system-preserving alliance, the way in which RWE and other private 
energy companies in 2015 managed to reverse a government proposal 
aimed at placing a carbon tax on coal-fired power plants is frequently 
mentioned. Even so-called Green Capitalism, which still relies on a logic 
of growth and progress, is described as just another version of the same, 
almost all-encompassing system that essentially seems to exist at ‘the end 
of history’ (cf. Fukuyama 1992). Increasingly, the view of capitalism as 
historic endpoint has nonetheless over the last years come to rest uneas-
ily with more apocalyptic outlooks on the future, including the expecta-
tion of a total system collapse owing to capitalism’s own systemic death 
drive (Austdal 2016; Krøijer 2019).
In the light of this totalizing view of capitalism, any rupture has to 
be internal to the system. There is, in other words, no outside vantage 
point from where the system can be attacked in its totality (Krøijer 2015). 
The forest occupation in the heart of Germany’s industrial centre can, 
like many other anarchist and left radical projects and protest events, 
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be conceptualized as an attempt to establish an alternative space in the 
centre of capitalism. The anarchist writer Hakim Bey used the concept 
‘the temporary autonomous zone’ to characterize an already existing 
anarchist practice, namely the liberation of a place in space, time and 
imagination (Bey 1991, 99). These alternative spaces or occupied zones 
are interstitial, and are hence opened up ‘at an internal distance’ to the 
system they seek to transform (Krøijer 2015, 10; see also Critchley 2007; 
Gibson-Graham 2006). By being internal, the activist theory of change 
displays similarities to Edward N. Lorenz’s theory of the butterfly effect 
(1963, 1972; Prigogine 1997), which refers to the idea that a butter-
fly’s wings create tiny perpetuations that may ultimately create, alter or 
accelerate large-scale weather effects, such as a tornado, in another loca-
tion within a dynamic system. In Lynx’s account of a confrontation at a 
bridge described above, she talks of escalation in quantitative terms as 
the growth and escalation of conflict with mining security personnel, but 
these momentary escalations are also accompanied with doubt as to the 
effectiveness of confrontations. Apparently insignificant or mundane acts 
might potentially create large-scale or delayed systemic effects, but the 
lack of predictability produces not only hope among activists that their 
actions might matter, but also concerns about how to endure and sus-
tain activism over time, as illustrated by Acorn’s comments on the matter. 
This strategy of destabilization relies, as Greenhouse phrases it, on the 
‘heat of the moment’ (this volume), which unsettles time and social rela-
tions without a clear view of its consequences.
Independent of the processes that might be judged as escalating 
(capitalist collapse, climate change or just change), environmental activ-
ism seems to be slowing down without becoming less radical. Here I have 
focused on ‘the art of sneaking’ to illustrate this point. Compared with 
walking, sneaking involves a different temporal rhythm, and whereas 
walking and wandering is a particular form of onward movement 
described extensively by generations of phenomenologists and practice 
theorists (De Certeau 1984; Mauss 1992 [1934]; Pink 2008; Ingold and 
Vergunst 2016), sneaking is a tactic of avoidance, which on a very tangi-
ble level constantly establishes lines of flight. Crucially, sneaking does not 
rest on the expectation that something better lies ahead (cf. Tsing 2015, 
23–4); in the forest occupation it is a necessary skill for operating within 
enemy territory, and it implies a bodily defiance of the idea of progress.
The question then is if sneaking is less radical than ‘storming the 
Winter Palace’ in both practical political and analytical terms. Protest 
events of the radical left have historically been modelled on the revo-
lutionary moment of the armed assault during the October Revolution 
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in Russia in 1917, by orchestrating spectacular moments of bodily con-
frontations with the police in the streets of Europe. These moments were 
often saturated with aggressive macho aesthetics and display of mil-
itancy on both sides of the confrontation. On a different plane, this to 
a large extent also holds for anthropological ‘turns’, the celebration of 
paradigmatic ruptures and rowdy attitudes in theoretical debates.
In thinking differently about the pace of rupture, Isabelle Stengers’s 
call for the need for a slowing down of reasoning can be helpful, inso-
far as it advocates a form of analytical abstention and hesitation with 
political ramifications. Similarly, Marilyn Strathern has argued that the 
idea of incompleteness is one of the most important things to draw from 
feminist theory (Strathern, cited in Holbraad and Pedersen 2017, 143). 
The forms of activism described here involve an abandonment of both 
male and human vanguardism and a deliberate cultivation of slower, less 
complete and even sneaking radical transformations. Slowing down is 
accomplished by immersing oneself in the forest, and developing and 
assembling these more-than-human subjectivities that are following a 
different temporal rhythm. It is likely that some of Stengers’s thoughts are 
already entangled with activist practices, as she has been visiting anar-
chist projects in France in the company of an American neopagan and 
alter-globalization activist known as Starhawk.7 Cultivating incomplete-
ness, recognizing interdependence, and creating much-needed spaces 
of hesitation are necessary in both theory and practice to break with 
totalitarianism, ingrained ideas of progress predicated on exploitation 
of nature and non-human beings, but also with the kind of progressive-
ness that in spite of the supposed radicalism tends to reproduce existing 
power relations. In this light, I find that the challenge still remains to plu-
ralize and develop a more incomplete anthropological take on rupture 
that avoids taking the break inherent to violent overthrowing of power 
as its model.
This new hesitation in activist practice becomes further visible by 
considering how they are not only changing in pace, but also in their 
objective. If the ultimate rupture of past revolutionary movements con-
sisted in overthrowing governments, installing a different societal order 
and creating ‘a New Man’, then the fundamental object of rupture is 
still political subjectivity (Buck-Morss 2002; Fernandes 2010; Holbraad 
2014), but with the important addition that in projects such as the for-
est occupation this new political subject is more-than-human. Acquiring 
animal senses and learning to think like a wild boar, temporarily reas-
sembling human and tree forms of agency to procure new defence mech-
anisms, or mimicking rather naïve versions of indigenous people’s life 
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skills (see also Austdal 2016; Krøijer in preparation) to enable a life in 
the wild all suggest a break with anthropocentric, heroic tales of rup-
ture. Re-wilding as practised in the forest occupation is not only directed 
at the environment or nature, but at making more feral human beings 
and thereby remaking their relationship to other beings. It challenges the 
domestication of people – through citizenship, expensive lifestyles, and 
conventional thinking – but also the perception of nature as an object for 
exploitation.
As Cronon has suggested, wilderness is here seen as a refuge that 
should be recovered (Cronon 1995, 69), a space for other life-making 
projects, but also a space where humans are able to regain their physical 
and mental strength and become other. In the forest occupation the wild 
is not the last bastion of rugged (male) individualism, as in the classical 
American visions of the frontier (ibid., 75), but the land for forming new 
communities of humans and trees based on mutual help and inter-spe-
cies solidarity. In this logic, fundamental change is not only experienced 
to be in the hands of human beings, but emerges through human and 
non-human ways of being in the world that entails new assemblages of 
species and gendered beings. The attempts at ‘becoming-animal’ is full 
of hesitation and cautious rapprochement and failure; a new radical sub-
jectivity that relies on both self-imposed and unstable shape-shifting and 
attempts at redefinitions of the sensible world as instrument of struggle.
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Notes
1. Tree-sitting is a direct action tactic first developed by Earth First! in the USA. Activists live on 
platforms in tall trees to prevent them from being cut down by loggers (Hill 2000; Jordan 1998; 
Taylor 1995; Wall 1999).
2. The slogan Ende Gelände is an imperative that loosely translates ‘here and no further!’, playing 
on the double meaning of ‘an area coming to an end’ and a practice in an area that needs to end 
or be terminated.
3. Brown coal or lignite is a soft, low-grade coal with a wood-like texture. It has a lower carbon 
content and lower calorific value than conventional ‘black’ coal (Kopp 2016).
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4. In this chapter, I have used different aliases to secure the anonymity of people, but have tried 
to stay with the general ethos of the names already used in the forest occupation. I have also 
slightly altered some events and places to avoid the association of certain actions with individual 
persons.
5. Intersectionality is the concept used in feminist theory to describe the intersection of different 
forms of oppression (such as class, race, ethnicity and gender). Here I use the term slightly dif-
ferently, namely to highlight the intersection between humans and nature, and how this relation 
is experimented with to lessen human dominance.
6. Monkey Town is the name of the first forest occupation and base camp established in a forest 
meadow. The base camp and the first tree-sits were evicted and cleared in 2014, and the trees 
that had been occupied were felled.
7. Starhawk is mentioned in Stengers’s writings on cosmopolitics (2005), and has engaged in dis-
cussions with Stenger during her visits to anarchist collectives (Zad Collective 2017).
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The Rhythm of Rupture: Attunement 
among Danish Jihadists
Anja Kublitz
Introduction
We have spent the afternoon in the basement of a housing project in a 
Danish town watching YouTube videos of jihadi anasheed (militant Isla-
mist hymns), a sub-genre of Islamic a cappella songs accompanied by 
pictures that call upon Muslims to take up arms and defend their sisters 
and brothers. We started out in Palestine before jumping to Afghanistan, 
Chechnya and Syria. The videos – which were neither chronologically 
nor causally arranged – echoed each other with pictures upon pictures 
of Muslim suffering and revolt. After three intense hours, Khaled and I 
decided to take a break and stepped up into the courtyard.1 We are smok-
ing cigarettes while we watch the sun set behind the wide green lawn at 
the end of the grey blocks.
Then Khaled says, ‘You know, this is where we expect the buses to 
arrive.’
‘Which buses?’ I ask.
‘The buses that will take us to the borders when they deport us’, he 
responds.
‘Is this what happened in the Middle East?’ I ask, sidestepping what 
I know.
‘No’, Khaled explains. ‘This is what happened to the Jews in Europe. 
They were picked up in buses and taken to the concentration camps. In 
the Middle East you are shot next to your house.’ The sky has turned red 
and we are silent again.
Then I say, ‘You know, they are also waiting for the buses in 
Copenhagen.’
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‘Really?’ Khaled exclaims. ‘I thought it was just here.’
‘No’, I reply. ‘Behind most of the ghettos there are lawns just like this 
one, and that is where people expect the buses to arrive.’ Then I add, ‘You 
know, in Mjølnerparken, the buses actually did arrive.’
Khaled looks at me.
‘Yeah’, I continue, ‘one month after Omar.’ [‘Omar’ refers to a young 
Danish Palestinian from the housing project Mjølnerparken who, in 2015, 
shot two people in the centre of Copenhagen in what was deemed a ter-
rorist attack, before he himself was shot dead by the Danish police.] ‘One 
month after Omar, the anti-terror police turned up in large numbers with 
machine guns and face shields and several big buses. The police formed 
lines so nobody could escape and chased people out of their homes and 
into the buses. Then the police searched the apartments. Everybody 
thought that this was it, that they were being deported.’
‘But they weren’t?’ Khaled asks.
‘No’, I respond. ‘They were allowed back in their apartments, except 
for two who were arrested.’
We finish our cigarettes and return to the basement and the moving 
images of different formations of colonial powers – Israel, Russia, France, 
the United States – and the interwoven oppression of Muslims around 
the globe and across time. All accompanied by beautiful a cappella songs 
that cut through the existing political order and, in the words of God, call 
upon Muslims wherever they are to join the jihad and alter the course of 
the world.2
In this chapter I want to address the abundance of the past in the 
present that leaves my interlocutors gasping for air but also ripe for rad-
ical change. I will try to show the recursive ruptures, which are always 
new again, and the broken continuities that do not allow the past to 
remain past but instead make it reappear, reflecting and intensifying the 
present. Based on 13 years of on-and-off fieldwork among immigrant 
families in Danish housing projects and two years of fieldwork among 
Danish jihadists, I want to explore why Khaled and other Danish young-
sters have joined Islamic militant organizations in the Middle East.
The jihadi anasheed YouTube videos, I suggest, offer an emic scale 
of rupture that can be used to understand why young Danish Muslims 
feel called upon to radically change their lives and set off to war. The vid-
eos are characterized by the contrapuntal rhythms of a cramped colonial 
present (the images) and the voice of God (the soundtrack).3 The divine 
words (Hirschkind 2006, 39) emerge as if from nowhere. They are not 
related to the grim imagery of war and killings; instead the a cappella 
voices reveal a whole other dimension, where the world is not chaotic, 
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brutal and unjust but beautiful, coherent and self-evident. Unlike the 
images of violent colonial and post-colonial encounters situated in spe-
cific times and places,4 God is out of time and place and simultaneously 
omnipresent.5 The wider implication of this is that my interlocutors do 
not refer to the event of the Arab Spring as the Arab Spring but as a mir-
acle.6 For them, the event was defined neither as being Arab (indicating 
a place) nor spring (indicating a time) but as being godly. According to 
them, it was this miracle that made them wake up and radically change 
their lives. As such, the Arab Spring was able to cut through the exist-
ing spatio-temporal colonial order exactly because it was not delimited 
by space and time but offered a glimpse of a harmony that was there 
already, perfectly made, and which my interlocutors could choose to join.
Analytically, this chapter thus contributes to the body of literature 
that is concerned with ruptures as radical transformative events. Inspired 
by St Paul’s miraculous conversion to Christianity and especially the inter-
pretations of this event by the philosophers Alain Badiou (2003; 2007) 
and Giorgio Agamben (2005), anthropologists have studied Christian 
conversions as singular disruptive events that through the grace of God 
‘make the continuum of history explode’ (Robbins 2011, 185; see also, 
among others, Meyer 1998; Harding 2000; Robbins 2004, 2007, 2010; 
Engelke 2004, 2010; Marshall 2009, 2010; and Bialecki 2009, 2017). 
Within this literature – and most explicit in the work by Joel Robbins – 
rupture is opposed to and theorized against continuous, causal, linear 
time (Robbins 2007, 12). In this chapter I have taken the liberty of using 
this notion of rupture as but one – although widely adopted – example 
of how change might come about; namely, as the tipping point between 
continuity as linear and change as singular. Within my ethnography, I 
argue that rupture takes a different form; that of intersecting rhythms. 
The difference between Robbins’s and my own conceptualization do not, 
I believe, pertain to different religious cultural forms. Instead, I suggest 
they reflect our different ethnography, the different questions we pursue 
and that Robbins – and many of the anthropologists who study Christian 
conversions – has studied ruptures within singular lifespans, whereas I 
have studied them across generations (Kublitz 2011; 2016).7
That the young jihadists watch jihadi anasheed videos not only 
of the present uprising in Syria but also of past revolts in Palestine and 
Afghanistan reflects the fact that although they are born in Denmark, 
the majority of Danish jihadists are children of refugees and immigrants 
from the Middle East and North Africa, and have grown up in the shadow 
of the failed uprisings and revolutions of their parents’ generations. In 
other words, if we study my interlocutors’ families across generations or 
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my young interlocutors’ sampling of jihadi anasheed videos, it turns out 
that ruptures are not singular events but recurrent.
Contributing to the present discussion of rupture as an analyti-
cal prism through which to study radical transformations (Holbraad, 
Kapferer and Sauma, this volume), this chapter therefore introduces 
a different conception of change and continuity than that described in 
the literature on Christian religious ruptures (Robbins 2007; 2011). In 
the lives of my Danish jihadists and their families, continuity cannot be 
described as progressive and linear, nor can change be described as a sin-
gular disruptive event. Instead I argue – inspired by the jihadi anasheed 
videos and my long-term fieldwork – that rupture can be conceptual-
ized as the intersection between two contrapuntal rhythms. I have bor-
rowed the term ‘contrapuntal’ from the field of music, where it is used 
to describe music consisting of multiple, sometimes opposing, melodies 
that can interrupt each other. Edward Said used the term to describe 
hegemonic colonial culture in juxtaposition with its counter-hegemonic 
counterpart (Said 1993). Here I use it to describe how ruptures unfold 
in my interlocutors’ lives as the rhythm of a mundane colonial history 
on repeat that is interrupted by the rhythm of recurrent extraordinary 
counter-hegemonic events. The enduring colonial history (Stoler 2016) 
is experienced by my interlocutors as a repetition of the same (which is 
why they await the buses), whereas the repetitive ruptures across gener-
ations – such as revolutions and miracles – are experienced by the respec-
tive generations as introducing difference.8
I argue that the lives of my interlocutors and their families offer a 
different notion of change and continuity from the widely adopted dichot-
omist conceptualization. My ethnography attests that people’s everyday 
lives can be so marked by changes (in this case, forced migration and 
continuous violations) that any continuity understood as a chronological 
progressive sequence of past, present and future has collapsed, and that 
radical ruptures can come in series as a continuous repetition of extraor-
dinary transformative events (see also Kublitz 2013; 2016).
Ethnographically, this chapter explores how the Arab Spring and the 
ensuing uprisings in Syria paved the way for the becoming of European 
jihadists. The Danish jihadists are part of a larger population of European 
citizens who since 2011 have set off to the Middle East to take up arms, 
with the clear aim of overturning oppressive secular regimes and substi-
tuting them with righteous Islamic ones. Since 2012 approximately 150 
so-called foreign fighters have left Denmark (Center for Terroranalyse 
2018, 5) out of a total of approximately 4,000 foreign fighters from the 
European Union (van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016, 3). Despite the fact 
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that European jihadists are extremely exposed politically, almost no 
empirical studies have been conducted among them. Whereas a growing 
body of policy papers has been released (see among others Bakker and de 
Leede 2015; Hoyle et al. 2015), scholarly publications are primarily lim-
ited to political and historical studies (see for instance Kepel 2015; Roy 
2017) and analysis of jihadists’ cultural artefacts, such as their clothing, 
poetry, and YouTube videos (see among others Hegghammer 2017).9 
Taking as my point of departure the cases of two young Danish men who 
have fought in the Middle East, this chapter thus offers unique insight 
into the motivations and practices of European jihadists.
Denmark affords an especially fertile vantage point for such a study 
because, relative to the size of its population, it produces the second 
largest number of jihadists in Europe (Neumann 2015) and the high-
est percentage (approximately 50 per cent) of returned foreign fighters 
(van Ginkel and Entenmann 2016, 29). Furthermore, Denmark has only 
recently begun to prosecute jihadists, and it has therefore been possible 
to conduct fieldwork among those who have returned. I present here 
the cases of Khaled and Amr who, respectively, joined the Free Syrian 
Army (FSA) and Islamic State (IS). I have chosen these specific cases to 
highlight the similarities of ideas and practices across the spectrum of 
different political organizations. Although the ideologies of FSA and IS 
are very different and even antagonistic, my ethnography shows that 
the choice of which political and military groups my interlocutors joined 
was more dependent on chance and social network than ideology (see 
also Sageman 2004). In these specific cases Khaled, who joined FSA, an 
organization that from its outset was defined by its goal of bringing down 
the government of Bashar al-Assad, was more engaged in Islamic reli-
gious and political ideas than Amr, who joined IS.
Mimicking the composition of the jihadi anasheed videos, the rest of 
this chapter is structured as a cross-cutting between events that my inter-
locutors consider to be divine and an enduring colonial present (Stoler 
2016). In what follows I will therefore introduce the miracle of the Arab 
Spring that made my interlocutors radically change their lives before offer-
ing insight into my interlocutors’ everyday lives, in which there seems to 
be no change in sight. I will then return to the many changes that the mir-
acle introduced, before discussing how the recurring ruptures are always 
new again by comparing the current miracle with the revolutions of my 
interlocutors’ parents’ youth. I argue that the miracle of the Arab Spring 
introduced a change of change that not only paved the way for a different 
experience of time (cf. Robbins 2007; 2011) but also offered an attune-
ment to a divine present beyond the mundane progression of history.
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The miracle of the Arab Spring
The day after Hosni Mubarak was removed from power, Khaled decided 
to quit his criminal activities in Denmark and move to Egypt. Back then, 
in 2011, he declared himself a socialist. Since then, Khaled has not only 
stopped his criminal activities, changed his political convictions, lived in 
Egypt for half a year and been part of the revolution; he has also trav-
elled to Syria twice in order to fight against Bashar al-Assad and has, in 
his own words, become an Islamist. Like my other jihadist interlocutors, 
Khaled was neither politically active nor religiously observant before the 
Arab Spring. Rather he was an established criminal with a good head 
and a gift for numbers, who at an early age got a central position as an 
accountant for the local gang and the drug market in his city. Although 
Khaled was not politically active back in 2011, he became so when the 
Arab Spring took off. According to him, he simply stopped his criminal 
activities. ‘So you just stopped from one day to the next?’ I asked him. 
‘Yes’, Khaled responded, and continued:
I did. When I was a criminal, you had this idea that people in the 
Middle East are idiots, and that you have these corrupt regimes and 
nobody does anything about them. And you had no hope of return, 
because who had imagined that Mubarak would be overthrown 
in 14 days or that Gaddafi would be killed like that, and that the 
people would wake up? Nobody had expected that. Nobody had 
imagined that. It wasn’t realistic. I found out that you should not 
necessarily think about what is realistic. You should not be limited 
by what is realistic.
When I conducted this interview in 2015, I thought of the Arab Spring as a 
political event. Only later did I realize that my young interlocutors do not 
differentiate between worldly events and God. Two years later, therefore, 
I asked Khaled, ‘Do you remember that you said that the Arab Spring was 
beyond imagination?’ ‘Yes’, Khaled replied, ‘It was a miracle. A miracle.’
In a similar way, Amr explained why he decided to join IS in 2014. 
Like Khaled, Amr grew up in a housing project. According to him, he had 
been a troublemaker all his life and was engaged in a number of criminal 
activities before he decided to turn his life around in 2011. Like Khaled, 
he describes the fall of Mubarak as a miracle. When I ask him what he 
means by this, he responds, ‘A miracle is something that happens with-
out the human capacity to organize or plan it. It wasn’t us. It wasn’t the 
Muslims who planned the Arab Spring. The Egyptians only had to take 
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one step, then God opened the possibilities … It was obvious.’10 Amr 
started to visit the local mosque and explained, ‘As a Palestinian, when I 
started practising Islam, I also brought that, you know, hamas along – you 
know, enthusiasm, the idea that we want to make a difference. Not just 
talk, but do something.’ The continuous onslaught of violence against 
Syrian civilians by Assad made Amr decide to join IS.
What is striking in the narratives of Khaled and Amr, as well 
as those of my other interlocutors, is that setting off to Syria is not so 
much about heading for ‘an elsewhere’ as it is about reaching for ‘an 
otherwise’ (Povinelli 2011a; 2016).11 The rupture initiated by the Arab 
Spring is not considered or spoken of as a rupture of reverse migration 
or of going to war but rather as a rupture of religious awakening (see 
also Roy 2017, 30). Although all of my interlocutors have grown up in 
Muslim households and have some knowledge of and experience with 
Islamic traditions, they were not practising an Islamic way of life before 
2011. According to them, the miracle of the Arab Spring took them by 
surprise and made them ‘wake up’, a phrase that is not accidental, since 
Islamic revival is also referred to as Islamic awakening. In many ways 
my interlocutors’ narratives of the miracle as ‘beyond imagination’ are 
exemplary of how the event has been theorized – using St Paul’s conver-
sion as a model – as instigating an unexpected, fundamental break with 
what has come before and as paving the way for new modes of being and 
acting in the world (Badiou 2007; Robbins 2004; Bialecki 2009). Since 
God by definition is beyond mundane imagination, unexpectedness or 
shock is evidence in itself of a divine event (Bialecki 2009, 116, 121). As 
Bialecki writes: ‘God is about surprise’ (2017, 96; see also Jules-Rosette 
in Harding 2000, 38; Robbins 2010, 643).
Before I elaborate on how the Arab Spring and God introduced 
a new world order, I want to show why my interlocutors so happily 
embraced an event that was beyond imagination. The housing projects 
where my interlocutors grew up are not places for miracles; rather they 
are places where even modest changes seem out of reach. Before I return 
to God, I will therefore introduce the colonial history on repeat.
The block – camp – ghetto
A joint is being passed around. Adham turns to me with bloodshot eyes 
and says, ‘We are non-humans; we are hyenas.’ Mohammed continues, 
‘We always stand here. Every day. If you are first “under the block”, you 
do not get out of “the block”.’ ‘But you got out’, says Adham, lighting 
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up and looking at Khaled. ‘You got away.’ ‘Well … I’m still here’, Khaled 
replies, and looks down. ‘That’s true’, Adham says, ‘You are still here.’
‘The block’ to which the youngsters refer has a double meaning. It 
refers both to the housing project as such and the concrete balcony of 
staircase 145, which offers shelter from the rain and a place to hang out. 
‘The block’, somehow, also refers to the end of the world. It is not a place 
to start; rather it is where you end, where today resembles tomorrow, 
and where socio-economic mobility seems out of reach (Kublitz 2015). 
The block is also home, and that explains why Khaled has returned.
The majority of Danish jihadists’ parents arrived in Denmark in the 
wake of failed revolutions and uprisings. Khaled’s father was a prominent 
figure in the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria, which fought against Syrian 
president Bashar al-Assad’s father. Amr’s family has fled twice: first in 
1948 when they were expelled by the newly declared Jewish state, and 
then again in the 1980s after the Palestinian revolution in Lebanon.12 In 
Denmark the refugees were settled in housing projects where they still 
live today, 30 years on – sometimes together with their grown children 
who cannot afford their own apartments.
Among my interlocutors, there is a profound, shared experience 
of – despite their families escaping their homelands – never managing to 
escape the past. This is not only because the majority of their neighbours 
in the housing projects come from the Middle East and North Africa. 
More importantly, the relationship between the projects and the Danish 
state, to my interlocutors, echoes the past and present relations between 
Europe and the Middle East and Africa, and the past relation between 
Europe and its minorities. In her book Duress: Imperial Durabilities in 
Our Times (2016), Ann Stoler writes about the trouble with temporali-
ties. She argues that conventions of past, present and future occlude how 
imperial regimes endure and reappear in the present (Stoler 2016, 35). 
She encourages us to study the multiple temporalities in which people 
live (Stoler 2016, 25). In a similar vein, Rebecca Bryant describes how 
the present becomes uncanny, strangely familiar, when it relapses into 
the repetition of a traumatic past that does not allow for anticipation of 
the future (Bryant 2016, 21). The abundance of the past in the present 
is quite tactile for my interlocutors. Based on my ethnography, however, 
I have come to believe that the uncanniness of my interlocutors’ present 
reflects not only that the past keeps returning in the present but also that 
the future is anticipated in the present – just as more of the same. As 
the prelude to this chapter showed, my interlocutors expect the buses to 
arrive any day. To them, the past and the future are embedded in the 
blocks themselves and in their relation to the Danish state.
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The housing projects are not only referred to as blocks but also as 
refugee camps (in Arabic, mukhayyam) and ghettos. The many labels do 
not simply evoke past or distant sites of containment and confinement 
but are also ways of highlighting the multiple temporalities that are con-
tracted in the concrete blocks and green lawns. It is only because the ref-
ugee camps are present in the ghettoes that the Palestinians use the same 
terms for ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ as they did for the camps in Lebanon, and 
that ‘going outside’ does not mean leaving your apartment but venturing 
outside of the project. It is only because the Jewish ghettos are present in 
the blocks that the green lawns are not only sites for recreational activities 
but also pickup spots for extermination camps. The ghetto-cum-camp-
cum-block, of course, also points toward another present constellation, 
namely the empire-cum-colonial state-cum-welfare state. During a con-
versation when Amr expanded on the merits of IS, where the citizens 
pay taxes and the poor are taken care of, I couldn’t help commenting 
that it very much sounded like the welfare state. Amr simply replied, 
‘The problem is that when you say “democracy”, all I hear is imperialism, 
imperialism, imperialism.’ Amr, of course, refers to the United States’ and 
Europe’s – including Denmark’s – past and present ‘democratic interven-
tions’ in the Middle East, most recently in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria. But 
he also refers to the Danish state’s interventions in the housing projects, 
which are equally characterized by policies of abandonment (Povinelli 
2011b; Kublitz 2015), such as cuts in social benefits and welfare services, 
and increasing control and surveillance (Kublitz 2013), sometimes in the 
form of a kind of colonial care, as when immigrant children are removed 
from their parents (cf. the French empire’s children’s colonies in Stoler 
2016, 86).
The first time I visited Khaled in the housing project where he grew 
up, he singled out the ‘institution-children’. ‘There’, he pointed, ‘there’s 
another one.’ The ‘institution-children’ refers to the immigrant children 
who were forcibly removed from their families by the welfare state. 
Khaled explained, ‘You can recognize them because they are a head taller 
and broader than the rest of us. They grew up with three meals a day: 
oatmeal and potatoes. We often only got one meal a day.’ I asked, ‘Was 
it better to grow up in an institution?’ ‘No’, Khaled replied. ‘Those who 
were put in institutions never got out again. They grew up without their 
parents, among young criminals. My brother, for instance, he never got 
out; he is still in and out of prisons, even though my mother brought him 
Arabic food several times a week.’
Stoler suggests that we think of ‘the colony’ not as a specific geo-
graphical site but as a principle of managed mobilities (Stoler 2016, 117), 
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where being at risk and being a risk is a fuzzy political line (2016, 121). 
The block-cum-camp-cum-ghetto is exactly such a formation, where it is 
unclear and changeable who is the hunter and who is being hunted (ibid., 
121). Today in the housing projects, people who belong to rival gangs or 
refuse to cooperate are not only threatened or beaten but also kidnapped, 
systematically tortured and, increasingly, killed.13 The youngsters do 
not experience that they can get any help from the police, that is, the 
Danish state, who on the contrary label the youngsters as gang members. 
Therefore they find themselves caught between the gangs and the police, 
which my interlocutors also refer to as a gang, owing to their form of 
organization and violent practices. The youths’ practices of guarding the 
neighbourhood, their experiences with confinement and their parents’ 
experience of being unable to protect their children all echo and replicate 
the families’ previous experiences with wars (Kublitz 2013).
It is against this backdrop of a claustrophobic present – where pre-
vious and current constellations of force and fear have turned the present 
and the anticipated future into bare repetitions of the past (Bryant 2016; 
Deleuze 2009, 24) – that my young interlocutors received the uprisings 
in the Middle East as a miracle that radically changed the world and 
introduced new avenues for action.14
Striving in the way of Allah
According to my jihadist interlocutors, the fall of Mubarak and the sub-
sequent uprisings in the Middle East made them radically change their 
lives or, as some of them phrase it, made them ‘wake up’. Today they 
explain their previous criminal activities as the result of growing up in 
a capitalist society that primarily values the pursuit of money, a kind of 
false consciousness. My interlocutors, though, did not turn toward Marx 
but toward God (cf. Kublitz 2016). Whereas the European states tend to 
focus on the young people’s movement to the Middle East, the individ-
uals themselves consider their journey as just one way of striving in the 
way of Allah (jihad). The Arab Spring did not just set my interlocutors on 
the move to the Middle East but made them start praying, join humani-
tarian organizations and engage in community work. When they did join 
various political and militant organizations in the Middle East, their pri-
mary goal was not to take up arms but to alleviate the suffering of their 
Muslim brothers and sisters, and to join the struggle for a new Islamic 
order. And they were not disappointed. Khaled joined a faction under the 
Free Syrian Army and, although food was scarce, he was elevated by his 
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many conversations with brothers from all over the world. They spent 
most of their time smoking cigarettes and discussing how they would lib-
erate Muslims and create a future Islamic order. Amr, who joined IS, was 
impressed by how he and other foreign jihadists were welcomed by the 
local citizens, by how organized IS was, the low crime rate, and the firm 
but just law enforcement. Khaled returned to Denmark because he real-
ized that the revolution would take years and because he wanted to take 
a course in journalism that would equip him with qualifications that are 
in demand by the militant organization in Syria. Amr returned because 
he missed his fiancée.
Today Amr has given up his criminal activities. He is now married, 
attends a mosque, works for a cleaning company, and is striving daily to 
improve his iman (faith). As he explains, ‘You know, sometimes it goes 
up, sometimes it goes down, sometimes it is stronger, sometimes it is 
weaker. Right now it is OK, but it could be better. It has to go a little bit 
more up before it … you know.’ Khaled is back at the block, although not 
as a drug dealer. Instead, he runs free workshops on art and photography 
for other young people. Like Amr, he is striving to improve his faith and 
make up for his past misdeeds.
To my interlocutors, the Arab Spring introduced a rupture, a break 
in the current contraction of past, present and future that allowed for 
both personal redemption and a radically different experience of time 
(cf. Marshall 2009). As such, my interlocutors’ transformations resemble 
other conversion stories that highlight the intervention of God and the 
event, especially Joel Robbins’s description of Pentecostal conversions 
(Robbins 2011; 2010; 2007). Robbins, however, describes conversion 
among the Upramin as a rupture that renders the present disjointed from 
the past (Robbins 2010, 637). The miracle of the Arab Spring was that 
it rendered the future disjointed from the present. To my interlocutors, 
the events of the Arab Spring introduced a cut in the existing social rela-
tions that made my interlocutors see God’s actions and plans and allowed 
them to imagine a new political order. Not unlike the a cappella songs 
in the jihadi anasheed videos, the miracle of the Arab Spring created a 
caesura in the stalemate of the present and introduced a different future 
that did not replicate the past. As Khaled states, ‘I believe that the whole 
world is in the midst of a spiritual evolution. What happens in the Middle 
East is because of this. Yani [you know], I dare, I do not fear anymore, I 
can. I believe in justice. It’s an avalanche and it’s not gonna stop. Most 
Muslims are convinced that we will rule the new world order.’ Or in Amr’s 
words, ‘From an Islamic point of view, it is perfect that all the refugees 
arrive now. In 20 years from now, somebody else will rule Denmark … 
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Venligboerne [meaning ‘the friendly people’, a civil movement welcoming 
refugees in Denmark] are sweet, but what are they going to offer? Nude 
bathing? Soon the refugees will understand the system here and they 
will turn toward Islam.’
The miracle and the revolution
What surprised me the most when I started out my current fieldwork 
in 2015 was my interlocutors’ optimism. I had expected to meet disen-
chanted returned jihadists who, confronted with the brutality and oppor-
tunism of war, had decided to return home. But this is not what I found. 
And although time has left a ruined Syria, a severely diminished IS, and 
a Gaza that is deemed ‘unlivable’ by the UN, the spirit of my interlocutors 
has not declined. The reason for this, I believe, is the rupture that the 
miracle of the Arab Spring sparked. On an individual level, my interloc-
utors underwent a change when they stopped pursuing profit through 
selling drugs and other criminal activities and instead started pursu-
ing iman (faith) through helping their sisters and brothers, attending 
mosque, and building an Islamic state. Although both profit and faith can 
be quantified and are somewhat precarious in that you can gain or lose 
them (Mittermaier 2013), they nevertheless involve radically different 
practices and world views.
I do not believe, however, that this turn toward faith in itself 
explains why my interlocutors are happy with the current state of the 
world. Rather, I have come to believe that their optimistic stance reflects 
the miracle as a specific change of change in itself (Højer et al. 2018). 
Whereas the interlocutors and I can easily agree that the revolutions of 
their parents failed, they look totally baffled when I refer to the current 
developments as failures. If revolution is history’s locomotive – following 
Martin Malia (2006) and Reinhardt Kosseleck (2004) – the revolutions of 
their parents failed because history ended up repeating itself. In the spe-
cific cases of Khaled and Amr, the generation of Khaled’s parents did not 
succeed in overthrowing Syrian president Hafez al-Assad. On the con-
trary his son, Bashar al-Assad, has committed even worse crimes against 
the Syrian population than his father did during his lifetime. Similarly, 
the Palestinian revolution led by the generation of Amr’s parents did not 
succeed in challenging the occupation by Israel, whose stranglehold on 
the occupied Palestinian territories has only increased as the Palestinian 
political leadership has collapsed. If the uprisings and revolutions of my 
interlocutors’ parents were supposed to move history forward, the Arab 
186 RUPTURES
Spring, on the other hand, was received by my interlocutors as a mira-
cle, a messianic event, because it pulled the brake on the locomotive of 
history and made history on repeat explode – to paraphrase Robbins’s 
reading of Walter Benjamin (Robbins 2011, 185). To my interlocutors, 
the miracle of the Arab Spring was not that it moved history ahead but 
that it offered a glimpse of a divine world that was there already, per-
fectly made, and which my interlocutors could choose to join. Unlike the 
revolution, the miracle offered attunement to a divine present beyond 
the mundane progression of history. Having lost faith in the world, my 
interlocutors started believing in God.
Today my interlocutors’ practices are characterized by both an 
urgent need to act and a more laid-back attitude, reflecting temporal-
ities that we might call immediacy and telos. On the one hand, these 
youngsters are immediately affected by violent events, which they 
think of as urgent potentialities to restore justice and worship God. 
Simultaneously, many understand their current actions through the 
future Islamic governance that inevitably will come. These two perspec-
tives are not exclusive. When I asked Khaled why one should bother to 
fight in Syria, or do other good deeds, if an Islamic order was going to 
arrive anyway, he explained, ‘If you want to fly, you can stand like this 
[both legs solidly planted on the ground], but you can also lift one of 
your legs, like this. Then you are already halfway there.’15 Standing on 
one leg with his arms reaching for the skies, Khaled is ready for take 
off. The recent political developments, with Brexit and Trump, have 
convinced my interlocutors that the End of Time (Akhir al-zaman) is 
near (see Greenhouse, this volume). And who knows? Maybe this mira-
cle that comes as a whole new configuration of God and brutal practices 
of justice will topple the world and once and for all abolish the current 
political order. Or maybe Khaled has gone nowhere, but is just the son 
of an immigrant, trying to keep his balance in the basement of a ghetto 
while he repeats the tragedy of his parents. What I do know is that, to 
my interlocutors, the revolutions might have come to an end (Haugbølle 
and Bandak 2017), but the miracle has just begun.
The rhythm of rupture
In the basement of a Danish housing project, Khaled and I are watching 
another jihadi anasheed video, this time of a gloomy, endless desert with 
no trees or buildings in sight. In the midst of the sand dunes, a young man 
in his twenties is sitting dressed in a traditional white Afghan outfit of loose 
 THE RHyTHM OF RUPTURE :  ATTUNEMENT AMONG dANISH J IHAdISTS 187
linen trousers, a tunic and a folded turban, a Kalashnikov lying casually in 
his lap. The chorus fades out as the camera zooms in on the young man, 
who is quietly crying. In eloquent Arabic he bemoans that he had to leave 
his mother. Khaled turns towards me and says, ‘Most people cry when they 
watch this video. It is very hard to leave your mother.’
In an article on the genealogy of jihadi anasheed, Behnam Said 
traces the poetry of the contemporary militant hymns. According to him, 
the jihadist poetry brought forth in the Islamist hymns can be seen as an 
extension of a nineteenth-century anti-colonial poetry style. Furthermore, 
the many anasheed used today in videos by militant Islamic organizations 
can be traced back to the late 1970s and early 1980s, the decades that 
are known as the era of Islamic resurrection (Said 2012, 865; see also 
Hirschkind 2006). Mirroring Said’s historical analysis of jihadi anasheed, 
my ethnography on Danish jihadists questions whether one can under-
stand the latest rupture of the Arab Spring as a clear-cut break with the 
past (Robbins 2011; Engelke 2004; Meyer 1998).
Although my young interlocutors distance themselves from their 
parents and do their best to get rid of ‘the muck of the past’ (Shah 2014; 
see also Kublitz 2011) by refusing to recognize any resemblance what-
soever between their parents’ failed revolutions and the current mira-
cle, I do not believe that this should lead us to conceptualize this latest 
rupture as a singular event. The jihadi anasheed videos give them away. 
Not only does the composition of the videos that display the present 
uprisings and military battles in Syria mimic the composition of the 
many other jihadi anasheed videos from past battlefields in Palestine, 
Chechnya and Afghanistan (Said 2012), but my interlocutors also view 
them as one batch, in a non-chronological order, and do not distinguish 
them according to where or when they took place but according to the 
intensity of affect they cause, such as whether they make you cry (see 
also Hirschkind 2012). If we zoom out from the singular radical rupture 
within a specific life span and observe ruptures across generations – or 
through the practice of watching jihad anasheed videos – the multiple 
ruptures come across as a repetitive rhythm. My ethnography, therefore, 
questions not only the young interlocutors’ emic understanding that 
they are embarking on a fundamentally different journey from that of 
their parents, but also current theories that celebrate ruptures as sing-
ular moments of radical discontinuity (Badiou 2007; Robbins 2004). 
Although each rupture does introduce a radical change to the history on 
repeat, the ethnography indicates that they are also recurrent. The ques-
tion then becomes, how can each rupture be at once new, as my interloc-
utors insist, and recurrent?
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The answer, I believe, is that the singular ruptures are related 
exactly by way of the affect they cause – the difference they enforce in 
the world. In this way, my ethnography is more aligned with a Deleuzian 
reading of change than that of a Badiouan. Whereas Alain Badiou argues 
that change emerges through events that give birth to the new (Badiou 
2007), Gilles Deleuze argues that change comes about through repeti-
tions that introduce a difference in kind (Deleuze 2009). In the lives of my 
interlocutors the singular rupture is defined as such because it introduces 
a change that attempts to overthrow the history on repeat. Whereas this 
change has to be a change of change in order to come across as new in 
relation to previous ruptures – like the difference between a miracle and 
a revolution – the singular rupture is nevertheless related by exploding 
the history on repeat. Secondly, the multiple ruptures are related and 
recognizable by way of their form: through the events of violent upris-
ings. If one removed the soundtrack and texts from the jihadi anasheed 
videos, the pictures themselves would come across as interchangeable. 
The single rupture, in other words, does not only come as a surprise, in 
the sense that it is unexpected, but also has to be recognizable. When my 
interlocutors so radically and happily turned their lives upside down in 
the wake of the Arab Spring, it was not only because the miracle offered 
them a way out of their current predicament, but also because they rec-
ognized it as an event that could potentially change the world as they 
knew it – just as the jihadi anasheed songs are each distinct but neverthe-
less adhere to the same rhythm and pitch (Said 2012; Pieslak 2017), or 
as the rhythm of rupture is repeated with a difference across generations.
Inspired by the miraculous event of St Paul, Christian religious rup-
tures have been conceptualized as singular and in opposition to history 
as continuous and linear (Robbins 2007; 2011). My ethnography offers 
a quite different conceptualization of rupture. In the lives of my Danish 
jihadists’ families, continuity cannot be described as progressive and lin-
ear, nor can change be described as a singular disruptive event. Instead I 
suggest that rupture can be conceptualized as the recurring intersections 
between two contrapuntal rhythms: the rhythm of a colonial history on 
repeat and the rhythm of anti-colonial struggles. It is important for me to 
underline that the notion of history on repeat does not refer to an exotic 
mythical time (Lévi-Strauss 1966), but is the tragic outcome of the bro-
ken continuities of my interlocutors’ lives, where past, present and future 
violations echo each other (Bryant 2016). Likewise, the recurrent rup-
tures cannot be understood only as a repetitive joyous celebration of the 
new (see Holbraad, Kapferer and Sauma, this volume), but are first and 
foremost the dire consequence of the fact that although my interlocutors 
 THE RHyTHM OF RUPTURE :  ATTUNEMENT AMONG dANISH J IHAdISTS 189
and their parents did manage to introduce radical changes to the endur-
ing colonial history, they have not managed to circumvent it – yet.
By way of conclusion, I suggest that if we want to understand the 
current turn of the world with its populist and religious movements (see 
also Greenhouse and Pedersen, this volume), it might be helpful not to 
think of rupture as singular but rather as the outcome of contrapuntal 
rhythms. Not only because we might learn from the past, but first and 
foremost because it might help us to recognize what indeed is new.
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Notes
1. All names used in this article are aliases to secure the anonymity of the participants.
2. Jihad means ‘to struggle in the way of Allah’.
3. In this chapter I treat God as an object equivalent to other objects, such as the welfare state. I 
do so because it reflects how my interlocutors experience the world. As Jon Bialecki writes in 
relation to Christian charismatic evangelism, God is an object by way of how people refer to 
him and rely on him (2017, 77), and, I would add, by way of the effects and affects that my 
interlocutors believe he causes. See also Amira Mittermaier (2011, 28; 2012, 256) for a simi-
lar approach and Bialecki (2014) for a critique of ‘methodological atheism’. Furthermore, my 
interlocutors believe that the anasheed, like the Quran, reveal the word of God.
4. My interlocutors are very much in line with Stoler’s (2016) understanding of recurring colo-
nial durabilities. For instance, the Syrian secular regime’s dictatorship and suppression of its 
citizens and Islamist opposition has led my interlocutors to consider it on a par with previous 
secular colonial rule and aligned with contemporary imperialist regimes (see also Garten-
stein-Ross and Vassefi 2012, 835).
5. As creator, Allah necessarily stands outside creation. But Allah is also present in creation, act-
ing in it and directing it, as the Quran explains at length (personal communication with Pro-
fessor Mark Sedgwick and the interlocutor Khaled).
6. My interlocutors use the Danish term mirakel (miracle). However, if requested they would 
translate it into the Arabic muajiza.
7. When I have chosen this Christian-inspired theoretical framework anyway, it is first and fore-
most because the jihadist interlocutors to a certain extent conceive of the Arab Spring as a 
disruptive event along the lines of Badiou’s understanding; and because the ethnography in 
noticeable ways resonates with descriptions of Christian conversions (especially within Pen-
tecostalism), reflecting how my interlocutors are not only influenced by Islam but equally by 
Christianity and popular culture (cf. Larkin 2008). See also Saba Mahmood, who writes that 
despite the fact that the Islamic piety movement is antagonistic toward secularism, it presup-
poses many secular concepts and is far more hybrid than its participants will acknowledge 
(Mahmood 2012, xv).
8. In Difference and Repetition (2009) Gilles Deleuze distinguishes between two kinds of repe-
titions: repetitions of the same, which he refers to as ‘material repetitions’ (2009, 24), and 
repetitions that involve a difference and thereby pave way for the new.
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9. Several online studies have been carried out, though (see for instance Navest et al. 2016), as 
well as ethnographic studies among jihadist families (see for instance van San 2018).
10. Mittermaier describes how her Egyptian Sufi interlocutors believe that the uprising was driven 
by a divine force; that it was God who moved the people to dispose of Hosni Mubarak (2017; 
see also Gartenstein-Ross and Vassefi 2012, 835).
11. Elizabeth Povinelli’s work is dedicated to an anthropology of the otherwise, to describing ‘forms of 
life that are at odds with dominant, and dominating, modes of being’ (Povinelli 2011a, 1). Based 
on fieldwork among aboriginals in Australia, she analyses alternative potentialities of social ex-
istence to the current ‘settler late liberalism’ (Povinelli 2016, 18). In a similar way, the jihadist in-
terlocutors are experimenting with forms of life that are otherwise to (and transcend) what they 
perceive as the dominant imperialist and capitalist mode of governance.
12. The Palestinian revolution (al-thawra) lasted from 1969 to 1982. It consisted of a number of 
Palestinian popular uprisings that succeeded in liberating the refugee camps in Lebanon and 
paved the way for the Cairo Agreement, which handed over control of the camps from the 
Lebanese government to the Palestine Liberation Organization.
13. In 2016, ten people with gang connections were killed. In 2017, 25 people were wounded and 
three killed in the so-called gang war. In comparison, ten people with gang connections were 
killed between 2008 and 2013 (Lauritzen and Dreyer 2016).
14. Mahmood also partly describes the Islamic revival of the 1970s as a response to the failure of 
postcolonial Arab regimes (2012, xi). In a very different context, that of the Pentecostal move-
ment in Nigeria, Ruth Marshall describes the Pentecostal revival as a response to postcolonial 
radical insecurity and the related unreliability of human relations (2010, 216; 2009, 3).
15. Along similar lines, Marshall writes that Christian conversions are seen as a way of hastening 
the fulfilment of God’s plan (2009, 66).
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Earthquake Citizens: Disaster and 
Aftermath Politics in India and Nepal
Edward Simpson and Michele Serafini
While some earthquakes pass almost unnoticed, others become dramatic 
markers of history and time, signalling the rise or fall of civilizations. Part 
of this power lies in the violent ability of earthquakes to shake individual 
and collective certainties – and for someone or something to capitalize 
or prosper on that uncertainty. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 caused 
Voltaire, Rousseau and others to herald the death of God (Voltaire 1988, 
2005; Kendrick 1956). The same events directed Kant’s (1764) then revo-
lutionary thought on the nature of rationality and the sublime. Mill (1848) 
provocatively saw earthquakes as periods of ‘accelerated consumption’, a 
form of ‘quantitative easing’ – to use a contemporary term – given by nine-
teenth-century nature. Lenin (1970) saw parallels between the political 
potential of disaster and revolutionary crisis.
Recent literature turns back to the eventful nature of earthquakes 
(and disasters more generally). Naomi Klein (2007), for example, 
describes ‘the shock doctrine’ of opportunistic capital at work; Solnit 
(2010) sees the positive revolutionary potential of disasters as people are 
brought together in common humanity. In these formulations, the earth-
quake is always a moment of total rupture into which history and politics 
collapse as something new – good or bad – is produced in the aftermath.
In this chapter, we use contemporary earthquake ethnography and 
accounts of other disasters from the secondary literature to look at the 
kinds of actions that accompany earthquakes. In particular, we look at 
the changing relations between citizens and their states in the wake of 
tectonic shifts. One of these earthquakes took place in Gujarat, west-
ern India, in 2001; the other in Nepal in 2015. We look for patterns in 
action and commonality at macro-, intermediate and individual levels. 
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The material presented is based on ethnographic research conducted 
over a decade in Gujarat by Simpson and between 2015 and 2017 in 
Nepal by Serafini. We write in the first person when referring to research 
undertaken on specific earthquakes and together in the rest of the chap-
ter. Along the way, we pause to examine the rupturing of other cata-
strophic events such as the philosophical aftermath of the earthquake in 
Lisbon and falling bombs and rocks. In all cases, we describe how initial 
moments of cooperation gave way, in the longer term, to conflict, con-
tested identity politics and radical conservatism, and to a general sea 
change in the big politics of our regions. We do this with the aim of trac-
ing some of the mechanics of rupture in the wake of an earthquake to 
observe the intimate as well as the political bearings of the philosophers’ 
moral disquisitions. Rupture is here taken as a sudden and widespread 
crisis of judgement (Roitman 2013). Akin to the situation described by 
Greenhouse (this volume), we see how different scales of doubt and rel-
ativity are brought together in friction by the little events that permeate 
the lives of those who survive. If an earthquake becomes a moment of 
total change, that happens because the same words, funds and policies 
are given to the puzzled eyes of those who have just endured loss and 
suffering.
There is a large literature on disasters and survival that we will 
not pretend to review here.1 Two studies stand out to us from the rest as 
seminal and eloquent: Robert Jay Lifton’s (1967) account of surviving 
the Hiroshima bomb and Barbara Bode’s (1989) descriptions of living 
through an earthquake in Highland Peru in 1970. Both writers (psycholo-
gist and anthropologist respectively) attempted to place the intimate and 
personal aspects of survival within a broad landscape of policy and social 
change. They had a deep understanding of the worlds they were writ-
ing about and could consequently see the multiple connections between 
things and meaning that were confused by disaster. They describe situa-
tions where categories and boundaries are blurred, where rival ideas and 
persons interact and produce unintended outcomes. Themes common 
to survivor literature such as anger, rehabilitation policy, budgets and 
shame all live together, sometimes in the same breath.
Bode recounts changes in individual mentality and structure. 
The disaster occurred two years after a coup in which General Velasco 
Alvarado took over the revolutionary leadership of the country. His ‘Inca 
socialism’ or ‘Peruanismo’ strove for freedom from the shackles of America 
and the doctrines of socialism and capitalism. Alvarado saw it possible to 
make a new human morality, resurrecting the Indian past and elevating 
suitable national heroes. Part of his vision was to integrate the  marginal 
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sierra culture of Indian peasants (of which the earthquake- affected 
region was part) into the coast-dominated national sphere. Bode sug-
gests the General seized upon the disaster as a springboard to implement 
his imagined future. The Catholic Church too had expanded its presence 
in the valley in the years before the earthquake. Marxist inspired, the 
political hermeneutics of the gospel also came down squarely on improv-
ing the lot of the oppressed. Revolutionary and religious forces interpen-
etrated and stood united in an attempt to overturn the old hierarchical 
structures and to build a new egalitarian state.
Bode sees deliberate political will and the spread of neoliberal 
bureaucracy as keys to the transformation of the valley. The disaster 
became a providential mandate for redesigning all that had been. The 
state formed new branches to oversee reconstruction and the formation 
of a new social order. At the same time, changes were afoot at a more 
intimate level. The Catholic Church took ‘progress’ to mean that false and 
sinful religious practices, such as the worship of local deities, were to be 
extinguished. In response, the survivors repeatedly protested, fearing the 
foreign aesthetic and design being given to their town.
Lifton’s post-bomb psychology suggests that links between survi-
vors and those who spectate is not metaphorical; rather, we are linked by 
psychological components in which the growing spectacle of holocausts 
of the twentieth century has imposed on us all a series of immersions in 
death which mark our existence. Lifton’s ‘death imprint’ or ‘death spell’ 
relates to imagery and the conditions of death: the jarring awareness of 
the fact of death, in his case the grotesque and sudden burning and then 
slow disintegration of A-bomb bodies.
Similarly, the televised tsunami of 2004 encouraged us to imagine 
what it is to drown, with waves bubbling and chattering into concrete 
hotels, but then continuing to rise and swell and rise; laughter and 
surprised cries eventually cease, the brown wave swelling into Bandar 
Aceh carrying away the town. In our minds alone we could never quite 
reach the end of the fantasy. Unlike waves, the death imprint of those in 
earthquakes, as we shall see, is characterized by crushing, falling, the 
fear of falling again and the kind of gasping anxiety produced as certain-
ties move under our feet: madness, submission and images of collapsed 
things that should be standing (Simpson 2013).
Lifton describes the impossibility for the survivor of catastrophe to 
complete what Freud (1917) called the ‘work of mourning’ because there 
is no time to prepare for the theft of life. Survivors of Hiroshima mourn 
for their dead as well as the dead of others, objects and lost symbols, 
but also for beliefs that have been shattered, for a way of life that has 
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vanished. Yet they mourn in vain; the survivor mourns for his former self, 
for what he was before the intrusion of death and the emergence of a life 
impaired by mourning and the guilt of survival. The consequence of the 
survivor’s defence against death anxiety and the guilt of survival is the 
cessation of feeling. We may characterize this lack of feeling as an affec-
tive anaesthesia and as a key element in a broader disaster syndrome.2
Lifton describes the toxic combination of neediness and mistrust among 
bomb survivors: those surrounding them appear as disingenuous (what he 
calls ‘counterfeit nurturance’). In addition, they suffered ‘contagion anxiety’: 
if I come too close to you, I will experience your experience of annihilation 
and later your death, and I do not want that. I do not want to suffer more. 
We take from Lifton the idea that individual survival carries with it the struc-
tural conditions that lead to a more general social fragmentation.
If we marry the ideas of Bode and Lifton, we can see three distinct 
but related forms of post-disaster dynamic. There is opportunity in the 
rupture for the structural reform of countries and regions: the recon-
struction loan with certain conditions attached from an international 
bank, but also the expansion of state bureaucracy. On the same scale, 
there is chance for nation-building and large-scale ethnic politics, the 
march of the generals or the reform of the religious. Secondly, on the 
ground, there is the interface between local institutions, whether pub-
lic or private, and those affected by the disaster. Here, there might be 
a tug of ideas, a competition of rival agendas or an impulse to reform 
and development (however understood); or there might be resistance to 
change via the solace of identity politics, whether in the form of nostalgia 
for a golden age or in the invigoration of ethnic, religious or linguistic 
boundaries. The means and methods are manifold. Finally, there is the 
individual struggle for survival. Nuclear bombs might carry with them 
their own particular psychology; nevertheless, as we shall see, other dis-
astrous situations bring guilt and energy to those who survive. There are 
many other levels between the three, but in a broad sense they give some 
indication of the varying harmonies of violence that a disastrous moment 
of rupture can produce.
In our material, earthquakes emerge as peculiar moments in which 
these different levels come to reverberate, thus producing the possibility 
for change or for a renewed attention towards past things. The loose dis-
courses of power of the everyday come to have a tighter grip on the inti-
mate life of a survivor. Habitual behaviours may also be forgotten in the 
name of reconstruction. Latent conflicts may find the symbolic resources 
for building new and radicalized forms of ideology. Crisis, in the way 
Roitman (2013) has conceptualized it, may justify policies that would 
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not be allowed to fly in normal times. In this sense, the tectonic rupture of 
an earthquake leaves space for the production and reproduction of rup-
turing narratives of human manufacture.
Gujarat
The earthquake in Gujarat took place in January 2001, a time when many 
things in India were changing fast. I (Simpson) had conducted research 
in Gujarat before the disaster. Partially because of this, my attention 
was drawn to my friends who had survived. When I first visited after 
the earthquake in the second half of 2001, it was obvious that the over-
whelming concern of those I knew was the endemic sense of uncertainty 
about the future. They were also struggling to interact with the many 
who had come from elsewhere to use the moment of shock to profit and 
to change the order of things.
Looking back, many people I know well had their lives fundamen-
tally changed by the earthquake; or at least the earthquake now plays 
a prominent role in the way people make sense of their lives. Friends 
or family died, they consequently grieved and remembered. There are 
plentiful rags to riches stories and conspicuously fewer tales of those 
being deprived of their riches for lives of impoverishment. Over the 
years, the earthquake gradually became a marker of time: a point at 
which things changed direction, not radically and without reference 
to the past but rather as a form of filter through which some things 
did not pass while others grew in amplified form. The earthquake has 
become an origin myth, albeit told with knowledge of the previous 
state of things.
At a broad level, and deeply significantly, the earthquake in Gujarat 
brought a new chief minister to power. Narendra Modi, who is now the 
Prime Minister of India, was able to dislodge his predecessor in 2001 
in the name of the earthquake. Keshubhai Patel, Modi claimed, was 
unable to manage post-earthquake reconstruction in the region. Modi 
took charge of Gujarat – never having faced an election – on 7 October 
2001, some nine months after the disaster. As reconstruction got under 
way, he took a keen interest, visited many times, and gave some of his 
most well-known speeches at inauguration and anniversary ceremonies. 
Through reconstruction, his administration worked hard, as we will see, 
to build support for their Hindu nationalist project, developing particu-
lar partnerships, holding strategic renaming ceremonies, and promoting 
new heroes and history for the region.
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In the intervening 17 years, change has been profound. The differ-
ent scales and types of policies co-opted to restructure the region have 
allowed for the formation of new kinds of citizens and consumers as 
well as religious and cultural subjects. Post-earthquake reconstruction 
permitted the ideas and values of Hindu nationalism to be built prom-
inently into the landscape. Public–private partnerships were introduced 
for village reconstruction as a condition of loans from development 
banks. Hundreds of partnerships across the region provided opportu-
nity for cultural and religious organizations to build villages as they saw 
fit. New temples and forms of organized religion were thus presented to 
the villagers, often appearing to have state sanction because the respon-
sibility for clearing up after the calamity was generally regarded to be 
the responsibility of government. The combination of loss and trauma 
caused by the earthquake, the promise of wealth and abundance brought 
by the ‘sponsoring’ organization and the general uncertainties of the 
times meant that new ideas found a welcome home in some villages. 
Generally speaking, organizations with an elective affinity with the 
nationalist interests of the ruling government received contracts for the 
most prestigious and influential reconstruction projects. The earthquake 
thus became a mechanism for entrenching religious and political values 
into the fabric of provincial society through reconstruction.
Elsewhere, land and water were made readily available for the 
new industries that targeted the affected area to avail of tax concessions. 
Against this backdrop, the transformation of the once commonplace, the 
mundane and everyday, in the aftermath was, in many ways, as dramatic 
as the rapid loss of the conspicuous and noteworthy in the moment of ruin 
brought about by the earthquake. The shock of the disaster established 
the condition for the creation of new possibilities, namely an industrial 
society underpinned by the cultural politics of Hindu nationalism.
The longer I watched and listened, the more it was obvious that it 
was not the disaster itself but the doctrines of the interveners that were 
truly shocking: shock-doctrine-SHOCK. I say this because in urgent and 
confused circumstances, the gaze of those on the ground is distracted 
from normal things by spectacle. Rules may be suspended (caste, reli-
gious distinction), and new ones (building, planning and tax) introduced. 
In Gujarat, ‘aftermath time’ was marked most strongly by the struggle of 
the affected with those who intervened, the doctrine-SHOCK era. In this 
sense, aftermath time had both psychological and moral connotations, 
as new arrangements and ideas were battling to find a new peace with 
pre-existing ones. Those bewildered by the earthquake often called the 
aftermath ‘the second earthquake’, suggesting it too was terrible.3
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At the institutional level, as I have already mentioned, the con-
ditions placed on loans by the development banks (Asian and World) 
created the most generalized framework for reconstruction. These con-
ditions demanded the reorganization of local government and the privat-
ization or semi-privatization of many local services, including planning. 
Reconstruction also necessitated private insurance and bank accounts for 
the beneficiaries of housing assistance. At other times, such radical meas-
ures would have been debated and contested; however, in the heat and 
confusion of the moment these measures came into force almost unnoticed.
The industrialization of the region is the most visible consequence 
of the state’s home-grown reconstruction policies (tax breaks and permit-
ted land grabs). In the shadows of these interventions there were other 
technocratic, linguistic and bureaucratic aspects to the post-earthquake 
interventions. The awe of technology contributed to the pacification of 
the affected, as the new district hospital was mounted on springs. The 
swift instrument of town planning cut through old societies, encouraged 
people to learn how to read maps, and to adopt nationalist and suburban 
mentalities. Signs of reconstruction appeared in Hindi, the national but 
previously invisible language in the region. Others brought religious and 
cultural ideas in their relief trucks.
When viewed as a whole, there were a number of serious contradic-
tory pulls in the competing policy frameworks. For example, profession-
als in post-disaster reconstruction are often frustrated by the inability of 
their industry to learn from past calamities. As we will see in the Nepal 
material, such amnesia has been routinized by the ‘disaster paradigm’, or, 
the set of pre-existing knowledge and expectation that disasters engage. 
Emphasis is placed on the uniqueness of the circumstances of each dis-
aster. Concern lies with the cultural conditions of the affected region or, 
similarly, the specificity of patterns of risk or vulnerability. In essence, 
risk/vulnerability is ‘memory bumped forward’ (Jasanoff 2010) or ‘the 
taming of chance’ (Hacking 1990), which, given that local conditions 
are always unique, necessarily means each disaster must be different. 
Therefore, we might reason, all societies are affected by disaster, but this 
or that society has not been affected by this or that disaster before. The 
disaster industry thus operates under the tense conditions of its own mak-
ing: on one hand all disasters are unique, while on the other the standard 
codes and forms have been produced in an attempt to give those working 
in the industry a memory and a frame in which to work.
In short, the bewildered lived among varying superimposed 
spheres, as different ideological forms were traced one over the other. 
Some new formulations of meaning took root and displaced others; some 
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failed (but not many). And so, in the aftermath, those who intervened 
with new ideas and technologies created deep anxiety, or perhaps ambiv-
alence, among the local population over whether change and moderniza-
tion had been a cause of the disaster or were in fact predestined to be the 
primary consequences of reconstruction.
Until recently, the decayed frames of colonial famine and flood relief 
measures influenced contemporary post-disaster interventions in India.4 
Private trusts and charities had also developed parallel structures to chan-
nel compassion and cash to the affected. From a laissez-faire approach to 
disaster relief in the late nineteenth century, the twentieth century has seen 
the emergence of increasing state intervention and control in the aftermath 
of natural disaster.5 The earthquake in Gujarat was but one of the shocks 
that found the existing state of affairs wanting, and prompted the state to 
reform the old policies and design national codes for future bad happen-
ings.6 Consequently, doctrine came in many layers, from diverse sources 
and often with contradictory aims and tensions. Banks, national and state 
governments, local administrative units, private sector and humanitarian 
organizations all contributed their own favourite ingredients to the mix.
At the third or most intimate level there were other dynamics at play. 
For some, there was grief and mourning for people with names and per-
sonalities. For others, the moment of the earthquake left scars of incom-
prehension, which later became madness or recurrent foreboding. But the 
most general sense was that history had imploded into a rumbling moment 
and meaning had collapsed. At first, a sense of intensified community or 
humanity seemed to be blooming, as people helped and talked to those 
they usually ignored. This sensation was on the whole short-lived, and in 
the months and years to come other dynamics took hold. Following the 
aforementioned earthquake in Peru, the spirit of ‘brotherhood’ lasted two 
or three days.7 Similar reports were provided by those we met in Gujarat 
and Nepal. At first, people helped one another. After a few days, some 
said as many as 15, older patterns were restored. Secrecy ran through the 
town as compensation schemes and rumours of new property made people 
greedy and jealous. After a few years, a smug euphoria emerged as people 
were wealthy and had goods and cash aplenty. There was a short phase in 
which regional identity was promoted as a way to counter those who had 
come from the outside with foreign ideas. On the whole, however, survival 
tended to push people apart rather than bringing them together, a trend 
that was mirrored in the concrete plans to reduce the population density of 
the town through mass-suburbanization.
As months passed and new loyalties and configurations appeared, 
initial moments of cooperation gave way to other kinds of rupture 
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running through the aftermath. The population of Gujarat is far from 
homogeneous, and the different cultures of eastern and western parts of 
the state came firmly into contact through reconstruction. Most doctrine 
was brought from the east, where the big cities and centres of govern-
ment are to be found. The ‘truths’ and ‘realities’ with which doctrines 
and policies were supposed to engage were generally not the ‘truths’ or 
‘realities’ of local people themselves. At various times, the state and other 
doctrinaires began to see the people as ungrateful when they protested 
about what they were being offered. Often it was said that the people of 
Kutch in the west, where the earthquake had had most effect, did not have 
enough culture or education to see the benefits in the new reconstructed 
scheme of things. Those who came from the east to reconstruct the west 
brought with them the authority of state power and a greater sense of a 
‘Gujarati culture’. They also came with the knowledge that those in the 
west were victims, and this contributed to their sense of self-confidence.
Over those years of research, it was possible to see how those who 
intervened in the aftermath brought with them various understand-
ings of tragedy and right and wrong, in addition to some well-formed 
ideas (however misplaced) about the kind of people they had come to 
help. Conversely, those affected by the disaster struggled to differentiate 
between those who had come to intervene. Were all interventionists the 
same? Were there good and best organizations? It took a long time for 
the contours of that particular landscape to become visible.
In Gujarat, we see policy and organizations that understood the 
importance of rupture and unsettlement for making things anew. Many 
of the interventions saw the earthquake as an opportunity for putting 
forward new ideas and ways of doing things. Some of these interventions 
were calculated and experienced, perhaps based on a knowledge of pre-
vious disasters; other interventions were tentative and formed more by 
the conditions of the moment than by a long-term plan. The earthquake 
shook things up, rendered visible the commonplace of what had been 
there. In the confusion, fear and avarice on the ground combined with 
state uncertainty and ready-made plans of development banks to distil 
the values of political nationalism through reconstruction.
Nepal earthquake: the grammar of bureaucracy
Between April and May 2015, two devastating earthquakes struck Nepal, 
causing almost 9,000 deaths and leaving a path of destruction. What fol-
lowed was a period of significant change. For those who survived, there 
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was pain in mourning, anger for delays and inequalities, and hope for 
better times to come. With time, the sorrow for what had been lost turned 
into new forms of expectation. Indeed, similarly to what happened in 
Gujarat, the earthquake proved functional in problematizing relations 
between citizens and the state, already fractious in normal times. As I 
(Serafini) happened to be in the country shortly after the earthquake, I 
observed these events at first hand and in raw form. Cognizant of what 
had happened in Gujarat some years earlier, I could focus on the everyday 
ruptures of life to see if the same history was going to be made again. In 
this section, I will not speak with the certainty that comes when the dust 
is settled and new scaffoldings are unveiled. Rather, I will look ethno-
graphically at the points of juncture between the aforementioned scales 
of uncertainty and intervention to see how different ruptures were pro-
duced and tentatively bridged in the early aftermath of a tectonic shift.
As we have seen in the Gujarat case, an earthquake does not happen 
in a vacuum. Although devastation and death may suspend the normal 
rhythm of life, history does not collapse like a poorly built column in a 
low-rise housing block. Soon after the disaster, many villagers started 
reassembling things with the means they had at their disposal. There 
were those who rebuilt houses themselves and without fuss; those who 
found temporary refuge with relatives; and those who capitalized on pri-
vate connections to reboot life without waiting for the government to act. 
In the decade prior to the earthquake, a growing and largely unregulated 
remittance economy had allowed households throughout the country to 
accumulate relative wealth under the puzzled eyes of a powerless state. 
Where neither investment in land, urban houses and commodities nor 
the repayment of loans had sucked dry the migratory economy, people 
often did not wait for either state or private aid to start rebuilding things. 
Bricks and corrugated tin sheets, after all, could just be retrieved from 
rubble. Where not available, they could be purchased. A World Bank 
report (Ratha et al. 2016, 16–17) clearly showed how remittances (and 
only those sent through formal channels) surged 20.9 per cent to $6.6 
billion in 2015, and particularly so in the months following the earth-
quake in April – a steady growth from the 3.2 per cent rate of the previous 
year and way more than the $4 billion pledged by international donors 
for the reconstruction. For many of those who had relatives abroad at 
the time of tremors, remittances constituted a better short-term recovery 
scheme than any superimposed rehabilitation policy.
In the aftermath of the earthquake, the state entered into a crisis. 
It was not only that governmental buildings and the personnel of public 
offices had not been spared by tremors from ruination, but also that the 
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quake revealed the fragility of governance in the country. In the wake 
of the disaster, in fact, foreign governments, volunteers and non-govern-
mental organizations (NGOs) had sprung into action with an alacrity that 
could not be matched by the government. In less than two days, profes-
sional aid groups had come from everywhere, their uniforms and logos 
constituting a new landscape to be learned. Quickly and with minimal 
governmental intercession, emergency camps had been set up in play-
grounds and open fields. Two weeks after the first tremors, Nepal seemed 
like a land of conquest. Chinese flags could be seen waving amidst the 
rubble of famous heritage sites; foreign armies and international NGOs 
(INGOs) were distributing tents, blankets and food under the uncertain 
guidance of improvised translators; Japanese teams of engineers were 
giving instructions on how to assess damage; and helicopters painted 
with the colours of the Indian flag were delivering aid from the sky, pro-
ducing a mixture of awe and resentment amidst people on the ground.
Resentment took the form of what Bin Xu (2014), in relation to 
the Sichuan earthquake, has termed a ‘consensus crisis’. The earthquake 
acted as an event that erased and restarted long processes of negotia-
tion, interrupting silences and pushing people to speak out loudly about 
what had previously remained in the realm of unspoken dissatisfaction. 
Citizens everywhere could be heard asking ‘hāmro sarkār kahã chha?’ – 
‘where is our government?’ In fact, discontent towards the government 
was not particularly novel. Twenty years of political instability, ongoing 
constitutional uncertainty and civil war had already made people wary of 
the state and its representatives. In some locations, the complete absence 
of elected administrative bodies for over two decades had exacerbated a 
feeling of distance and reciprocal unreliability. The earthquake, with its 
attendant delays and malpractices, further contributed to a general sense 
of inefficiency, unveiling a naked king. As one seasoned commentator of 
Nepali politics put it bluntly, the government was ‘caught with its pants 
down’ (D. Thapa 2015).
The perception of loyalties being stressed and torn apart was further 
strengthened by the sudden rupture of traditional tools of governance. 
At the time of damage assessment, what could have been potentially 
precious information templates – from cadastral maps of properties and 
registered households to disaggregated data concerning land ownership 
(lalpurja) and population – were largely ignored in favour of newer, 
internationally defined formats. As Yogesh Raj and Bhaskar Gautam 
have rightly noticed: ‘just when ... state agencies needed to recover ... 
details and act swiftly to relieve people of their misery, they were struck 
by a severe bout of amnesia’ (2015, 27). Instead of giving continuity to 
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previous data, the machinery of assessment thus relied on standard for-
mats developed within common international frameworks for disaster 
management. Pre-compiled documents written in English were used to 
ascertain the identities of victims; ‘rapid visual assessment’ practices 
were established with no cognition of the extreme variety of architec-
tural styles and masonry in the country; clustering of life and people was 
done in a whimsical manner. What followed was confusion, drama and 
calculation; but also renewal in the form of an increasingly bureaucra-
tized everyday life.
The menace to sovereignty produced by an impressive post-earth-
quake mobilization of people, foreign institutions and private charities 
was not unnoticed by the state. With the aim to regain control of the 
situation, a number of actions were taken by the government. Already 
during the emergency phase, the government attempted to centralize 
relief through the creation of a Prime Minister Relief Fund (a tradition 
across South Asia), through which all donations were to be channelled. 
At the same time, special provisions were issued to limit earthquake-re-
lated interventions only to NGOs and INGOs that had been present in 
the country prior to the disaster. In some instances, the state’s suspicious 
attempts to control processes of aid distribution caused indignation and 
further troubles. A diplomatic crisis almost burst out upon accusations 
that the government was blocking vital supplies owing to peacetime cus-
toms rules. For some, the state’s reactions to a crisis of legitimacy had 
the contrary effect of intensifying discontent amongst citizens and media 
alike. In such a situation of emergency, many people complained, the 
brokerage of relief by the state was taken as a harmful caprice. As the 
editor-in-chief of a popular English-language daily put it in a challenging 
tone, ‘and now, eat nationalism!’
Yet, while an elite section of Kathmandu’s civil society and almost 
the whole of the international press endlessly reproduced standard nar-
ratives of government failing and corruption, affected people began turn-
ing to the state for long-term compensation, rehabilitation and succour. 
For most, complaining about the state was just part of the story, good for 
gossip with friends at a tea stall or for searching a common ground of 
understanding with hungry journalists, but not the central component of 
what was going on.
As weeks passed by, a vast array of policies was formulated with 
the aim of bridging ruptures that had turned political. In the process, 
new ideas and frameworks came to parse everyday life and mould novel 
citizens and political subjects. Through these frameworks, the state was 
given the chance to re-enter into people’s lives in a new attire and, for 
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many, in an unprecedented way. Citizens were steadily transformed into 
earthquake victims (bhukampa pidhit). A resurgent culture of expec-
tation was rearticulated in a new grammar, made of victims’ identity 
documents, compensation schemes and expanding bureaucracy. While 
public outbursts of anger towards the government kept spilling out of the 
well-remunerated pens of both national and international journalists, 
many people on the ground began learning the new dialect of post-disas-
ter recovery. A dialect, not a language, because it still seemed to draw on 
a well-rooted rhetoric of development (bikas) in the country:8 bhukampa 
pidhit became the new garib (poor), while new terms such as ‘resilience’, 
‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ made their way into the mouths of 
many.
Despite being applied to a completely different setting, the same 
vocabulary of vulnerability, risk reduction and resilience that we had 
heard in Gujarat came to parse and intersect the myriad ways in which 
people talked about the seismic event. The institutional setting within 
which this new language had been first created and from which it was 
now being shouted out, indeed, conferred to certain words the power to 
stand for the overarching discourse on the earthquake.
The management of rupture has a comparative history of its own. 
Discussions abounded on how things could be ‘built back better’ (echo-
ing the slogan first heard in the region after the 2004 tsunami). Specific 
issues that had been singled out as problems within a logic of vulner-
ability were given a general bearing, thus moving from being peculiar 
only to earthquake-affected regions to being applicable to the country as 
a whole. If recovery had to be followed by prosperity, and if short-cycled 
practices of resilience were to be strengthened by longer-term politics of 
security and risk reduction, new measures, plans and technologies had 
to be implemented nationwide. Envisioned changes had to encompass 
a multiplicity of scales, from more circumscribed fields such as those of 
house engineering or private banking to the broader ones of energy pro-
duction and infrastructural expansion.
‘Resilience’ became an essential concept in the language of the 
aftermath, one that well signalled the complex tension between the state 
and its citizens in the wake of the disaster. Soon after the earthquake, 
both national and international media praised Nepalis for their ‘resil-
ience’. Like many other technical terms, it mainly appeared in English-
language newspapers that winked to those who could use the word in 
their daily relations with donors and INGOs. Unsurprisingly, the term 
was also meant to praise those civil associations and common folk who 
had shown courage despite a weak and corrupt state.
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The word comes from Latin resilire, which means ‘to bounce back’, 
‘to return to an original shape after a trauma’. Although historically used 
to designate elastic materials, it has recently been applied to human 
beings, signifying their capacity to return after depression, physical and 
moral traumas. Without the innate resilience of its citizens, it was said, 
Nepal would have had a much worst aftermath. Nepalese were resilient 
because they knew how to handle difficulties at a time of crisis, they were 
elastic enough to endure often blurry processes of distribution, they were 
liveable enough to face depression and face an absent government. It 
comes as no surprise that resilience soon became the adjectival hub of a 
nationalistic pride, especially for those who understood the meaning of 
the English term.
Yet, in order to justify intervention, the resilience concept was 
slowly reformulated in a twist which is shared with other post-disas-
ter contexts (Benadusi 2013). Resilience became the conceptual aim 
of post-earthquake reconstruction, in line with an international rheto-
ric that had already been circulated for some years by institutions such 
as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States Agency for 
International Aid (USAID) and the UK Department for International 
Development. ‘Transparency’ and ‘accountability’ (pādarshitā and java-
phdehitā in Nepali-language newspapers) were included as essential 
tools for achieving the grand vision and pointed to what both the govern-
ment and citizens alike had to develop. In the translation, some mean-
ings were lost and others emerged. Javaphdehitā thus became the quality 
connoting the responsible person, in quite a practical sense of the one 
who responds to questions of any sort, or with a negative inflection of 
someone who has to take responsibility for a misdeed. In a context where 
the contact list on one’s mobile phone is revealing of a person’s social 
connectivity, javaphdehitā left the world of bureaucratic accountability 
and entered the pragmatic one of personal relations. Likewise, resilience 
became suraksha (security) as the ideal allowing the proliferation of dif-
ferent policies of control.
In order to have a strong and secure national recovery, the gov-
ernment attached side measures to rehabilitation policies. In the name 
of transparency and economic integration, remittances had to be con-
trolled and regulated. At the presentation of the budget for Fiscal Year 
2017/2018, Minister for Finance Krishna Bahadur Mahara clearly stated: 
‘Arrangements will be made toward making it mandatory for aspiring 
migrant workers to open a bank account before going for foreign employ-
ment’ (Ghimire 2017). Following the earthquake, the state sought to 
regain legitimacy by creating conditions for domestic employment and 
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by regulating that remittance economy whose informality had so suc-
cessfully helped people to thrive at a time of crisis.
Similarly, support for rebuilding houses was mainly given through 
the Rural Housing Reconstruction Project, jointly developed by the 
Government of Nepal and major donors (World Bank 2015). In order to 
be eligible beneficiaries of this programme, applicants were requested 
to sign a legally binding participation agreement with their respective 
village district committee or municipality. The participation agreement, 
as it was referred to in official documents, outlined ‘the entitlements and 
obligations of both parties regarding key details of the program such as 
payment, housing construction standards, and grievance redress mech-
anisms’ (World Bank 2015, 5). It was upon signing the agreement that 
people started receiving technical and social support to rebuild their 
houses, in line with a newly formed National Building Code that fostered 
resilient buildings. A subsidy of NPR 200,000 (later adjusted to NPR 
300,000 to cover inflation in building costs),9 disbursed in three tranches, 
was granted to those who could provide full documentation of ownership 
and citizenship. Money was to be transferred through formal banking. 
A special provision, moreover, was detailed for those who had started 
rebuilding things on their own. Again, subsidy was made dependent on 
compliance with standards of construction, on the provision of full doc-
umentation of ownership and of access to official channels of economic 
integration. The ideals of donors could thus be engraved in governmen-
tal compensation schemes from the outset.
Such an approach, which had been envisioned and justified in the 
terms of an accountable and transparent procedure to compensate ‘the 
right amount to the right people’, was not devoid of troubles and ine-
qualities. On the ground, earthquake victims who were living in remote 
rural areas had to travel long distances and spend thousands of rupees to 
reach bank branches usually situated in the regional headquarters; once 
there, long queues and delays in the transferring of money forced many 
to stay and wait in the headquarters for days, if not weeks. Moreover, an 
owner-driven reconstruction left out all renters and those incapable of 
providing satisfactory documents. It also opened up spaces of interfer-
ence for middle men and brokers of all sorts to step in: local cadres of 
political parties interested in intersecting funds or unblocking situations 
in exchange for future votes; professional writers and lekhapān (nota-
ries), mostly high-caste Bahun, acting as consultants and playing on their 
expertise of the law and on personal connections in bureaucratic offices; 
Catholic professionals sent to give consultancies in exchange for the rec-
ognition of theological efficiency.
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In the new setting, ruptures that had only been latent before the 
earthquake were now accelerated owing to the conditions created by the 
seismic event. Bureaucracy entered into people’s lives and intersected 
decisional processes imbued by doubt and uncertainty. As Haxby (2017) 
shows in his ethnography of households’ strategies of recovery, joint 
estates were legally separated between competing brothers; previous 
cycles of reproduction of amity and moral values amongst household-
ers were interrupted; and long-term, informal temporalities of affect 
were ruptured into a drier and better punctuated discourse on own-
ership, documentation and bureaucracy. With money pouring in for 
reconstruction – and often even for reconstructing what used to be of 
no concern whatsoever for the legal owner – fluid processes of occupa-
tion, informal renting, land usage and so forth were reduced and framed 
in the uncontradictory and exclusivist logics relating to ownership and 
documentation: this is mine, this is not. Infrastructural expansion, the 
decentralization of administrative structures and the fiscalization of the 
territory thus became ‘instrumental effects’ of a reconstruction project 
that never aimed only at rebuilding earthquake-affected areas – a hyper-
bolic process of bureaucratic intensification reminiscent of the expand-
ing states described by Ferguson (1990) and Scott (1998).
The earthquake also gave momentum to political processes that had 
been stalled for years. In less than five months after the first earthquake, 
then prime minister Sushil Koirala announced that an agreement had 
been reached amongst the four major parties for drafting a much-awaited 
new Constitution. With the so-called ‘emergency phase’ still ongoing, 
Nepal obtained what could not be obtained in the past decade. On 20 
September 2015, the Constitution was promulgated, after the deal had 
eluded citizens well after the failure of the first Constituent Assembly in 
2012. Seasoned commentators on Nepali politics began wondering why 
things had taken such a sudden turn. Some believed the government had 
found in constitution-drafting a desperate way for regaining state legiti-
macy in troublesome times; others glimpsed in it a practical response to 
the ever-increasing pressures of international donors and development 
banks, whose pleas for stability and for a structural readjustment of fiscal 
policies and administration could not be left unanswered; the most criti-
cal ones accused party leaders of chipping in on a popular piece of paper 
for drawing unwanted gazes away from all the troubles that had been 
festering in the rubble, while advancing personal agendas and exclusion-
ary politics that would be more difficult to handle in normal times (Jha 
2015; M. Thapa 2015). Whatever the reason may be, Nepal was given a 
new foundation when all others seemed to be failing.
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The foundation came in the shape of a federal state. For the first 
time in the history of the country, Nepal was officially declared a federal 
democratic republic. Its territory was to be divided into seven provinces, 
whose boundaries were ideally drawn on the basis of a mixture of iden-
tity and capability criteria. Geographical continuity, language, culture 
and ethnicity were to be considered alongside administrative governa-
bility, potential for infrastructure development, availability of natural 
resources and economic interrelationships in the making of new borders. 
Thus formed, provinces could work in a more autonomous manner, while 
provincial elections would decide the 165 members of Parliament. This 
exercise in collaging and decentralization had been at the basis of pre-
vious failures in drafting the Constitution. Now, the earthquake seemed 
to have provided the right condition for expediting the process without 
much second thought.
The new Constitution was saluted with joy and hope by a substan-
tial chunk of the population. Candlelit ceremonies were held in many 
seriously affected districts, soon becoming signals of an upcoming period 
of renovation; welcoming banners for a new Nepal were hung at the 
entrance gate of villages and neighbourhoods; and a touching ceremony 
was organized at Kasthamandap, one of the historic hubs of Kathmandu, 
with leaf plates burning around the image of a bygone Dharahara tower: 
this was circulated on all media. A sudden gust of national belonging 
rushed through the rubble, with top-tier politicians blowing in the wind 
their speeches of unity and renovation.
Yet, while pleasing donors and everyone who hoped for a refreshing 
wave of stability, critical stances towards such a ‘fast-tracked’ document 
were not absent. In fact, the Constitution was promulgated in a climate 
of resurgent ethnic politics. For weeks prior to the official announce-
ment, people in the Southern plains of Nepal (Tarai) had been protesting 
against a state that, they felt, was profiting from a situation of emergency 
to erase years of struggle for recognition. Since Nepal had emerged as a 
unified nation at the end of the eighteenth century, the political econ-
omy of the country had been flourishing around a fundamental postu-
late: people from the hills are different from the people of the plains 
(Madeshi). For most of the past two centuries, the Gangetic soils of the 
Tarai had been more the agricultural goldmine for a hillcentric politics of 
extraction than an integrated part of Nepal’s self-crafted national iden-
tity. The new Constitution was now further strengthening a hillcentric 
state ideology. Seen from the perspective of Madeshi leaders and critical 
analysts (Lal 2016), the introduction of unfavourable rules of citizenship, 
the demarcation of federal state borders so as to reinforce old patterns of 
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dominance and the dissolution of equitable provisions contained in the 
former Interim Constitution of Nepal were all clear instances of the dura-
bility of exclusionary politics. The post-earthquake wind of unity thus 
turned incendiary.
As protests took place and people kept dying – more than 60 casual-
ties would be counted at the end of the conflict – a blockade of the Nepal–
India border (nākābandi) was enforced. In a characteristic convergence 
of institutional and street stereotyping in the country, Madeshi’s quests 
for recognition were turned into a matter of international geopolitics. 
People started blaming Madeshi and Indian leaders indiscriminately, 
their responsibility for stalling essential goods in a post-earthquake 
emergency phase taken as a particularly serious issue.
With petrol and gas blocked at the Indian border, life in earth-
quake-hit areas became tangibly more difficult – if that was possible. In 
Kathmandu, one had to spend hours lining up in queues just to obtain a 
few gallons of petrol; kitchen stoves ran low on gas, and many restaurants 
had to shut down or adopt ‘Modi-fied’ menus (a play on words inspired by 
a widespread feeling of resentment towards the Indian prime minister); 
and hospitals and pharmacies ran short of medicine, as the blockade was 
now affecting the delivery of all kinds of goods. The nākābandi was also 
extensively used to explain why some things were stopping and why oth-
ers had not started yet. Both the government and I/NGOs started com-
plaining about the shortage of petrol and gas for justifying their inability 
to carry on with the recovery. Street beggars and unemployed youths 
soon took the chance to earn some money by queuing on demand. In 
the countryside and up the mountains, the situation was either slightly 
better or terribly worse. Old practices were recovered at the time of need. 
Homemade chulos – wood-burning stoves – reappeared in their dozens, 
at least where people could retrieve the precious red earth (rāto māto) of 
which they are made. Trees were cut and the price of wood went through 
a period of hyperbolic inflation. Some villagers profited from the situa-
tion to pump up their incomes.
At the same time, while temporary shelters had yet to be delivered 
and the reconstruction proper was still at a vestigial stage, fantasized 
images of future developments started appearing in the press. Pictures of 
engineeringly sound buildings, often legitimated with the stamp of the 
Nepal Engineering Association, were widely circulated on newspapers 
and social media; working plans of railways, highways and smart cities 
caught the imagination of many; projects for the reconstruction of ‘model’ 
villages mushroomed. Even the project of making Nepal a self-sufficient 
hydro-nation gained momentum along the lines of a post-earthquake 
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ideology of risk reduction, economic growth and security – one that was 
backed up by the interests of development banks and donors (Lord 2016). 
If such images, inflected in the popular, future-looking grammar of bikas 
(development), had been part of life before the earthquake as well, now 
they were reformulated in the catchy terms of an ameliorative project of 
recovery and security. In the process, what had been daily practices of sur-
vival at the time of the crisis, especially in the countryside, were reartic-
ulated in the grammar of commendable and yet short-term instances of 
resilience, to be enhanced and made more effective within a modernist 
logic of risk reduction suitable to the needs of a growing urban nation.
Conclusion
Aftermath refers to the second growth or crop in the same season, the new 
flush of grass after mowing, which is often quite different in its qualities to 
the first crop; but it is still grass. The second crop may grow unevenly as 
it races for the light. It may pale before establishing itself. Aftermath is a 
measure of a quality of time and growth. It is also popular to think about 
disasters leading to a tabula rasa, or blank slate. The term refers to society 
akin to the unformed and featureless mind found in the philosophy of John 
Locke.10 Destruction wipes things clean so that they can be remade anew. 
Naomi Klein in her appropriately titled Shock Doctrine finds obvious fault 
with this idea, adopting a metaphor of her own. She describes the exper-
iments of psychologists who thought that if the personality of a patient 
could be erased, then it could be built back again without fault or disor-
der.11 To this end, patients were deprived of all routine and structure, and 
were subjected to irregular and disorienting sensory stimulation. Despite 
initial successes, the psychologists were often frustrated by the return of 
elements of the patient’s original personality. So too, in Gujarat and Nepal, 
those who came to intervene did not find the featureless mind they might 
have hoped for. However, in both locations we can see nation-building, 
expanding states and intimate transformations that can be empirically tied 
to the earthquake. Remarkably, we can also see regime change in Gujarat 
and radical constitutional reform in Nepal, both of which have strong and 
clearly identifiable origins in the moment of the earthquake.
Aftermaths often appear to have similar structures characterized by 
the interaction of shock and stun with new intentions and plans. They 
cannot, however, be seen as a generic sociological condition, for the 
shocks and doctrines vary. An aftermath is a product of the longer history 
of the locality. The world does not implode into the moment of disaster 
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to emerge afresh or ready to be remade in any old way. Older ideas will 
not disappear: old Bhuj was thrown into disarray by the earthquake, yet 
the national flag was still raised to mark Republic Day before the dust 
had settled. Likewise, post-earthquake grievances of blame and poverty 
in Nepal drew on well-established grammars of complaint and hierarchy 
in the country. In both moments, people found their way home despite 
the absence of streets and buildings; networks of amity and economic 
support did not vanish in the rubble; Bhuj was reconstructed from archi-
val sources and the Madeshi were kept at the usual distance in the new 
federal setting. In sum, there was no clean slate in rupture.
Yet the sudden suspension of certainty that comes with an earth-
quake makes people dubious about the proper course of action. How to 
tame the sense of things being torn apart? In history, the sublime reach 
of catastrophe has led to speculation on the possible purpose of mass 
death and destruction in the grander scheme of things. In particular, 
the catastrophe of an earthquake has provided opportunity to recon-
sider how men should properly relate to their gods, and has prompted 
additional speculation on God’s supposed intentions. We have described 
the promotion of neo-liberal Hindu nationalism in Gujarat and the 
formation of bureaucratic subjects in Nepal. In both locations, codes, 
regulations and new ways of ordering chaos and thought became the 
order of the day. The momentum to reform and restructure the state and 
relations between people and the state was central to disaster politics 
in Gujarat and Nepal. In Gujarat, the east moved on the west; in Nepal, 
highland moved on lowland, as spatial and identity politics entered the 
debate about rights and privileges of development. In both locations too 
we saw regime change and an intensification and occasional renewal of 
pre-disaster politics. These events were accompanied by the personal 
stories of grief, guilt and gain, and the difficulties of surviving. If one 
looks deep enough, there is a possibility for comparison in aftermaths.
The 1755 Lisbon earthquake is much written about by those seek-
ing to understand the debate enlivened by the disaster about whether 
optimism or pessimism was the underlying philosophical condition of 
eighteenth-century Europe. Looking at the earthquake with hindsight, 
historians have wondered whether the shock of the disaster pushed 
the Enlightenment in certain godless directions. Some say it did; oth-
ers believe the paradigm shift from God to rational science was already 
under way.12 But what of the moral and philosophical content of the 
debates provoked by the earthquake? Do these have relevance for think-
ing about the earthquakes we have discussed? Can we think compara-
tively about the thoughts people have in the aftermath of a disaster? Or 
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do the thoughts earthquakes provoke only belong to a particular place 
and time, in this case Lisbon and Europe of the mid-eighteenth century?
At the time of the tremors, Lisbon was a prosperous mercantile cen-
tre. The destruction of its inhabitants and wealth by an earthquake and 
the ensuing floods and fires reverberated across Europe. Lisbon was also 
known for its inquisitors and idolatry, which added a sharp edge to events 
in the aftermath. The Protestant clergy in northern Europe asserted that 
the earthquake happened because the people of Lisbon were Roman 
Catholics. The clergy of Lisbon, on the other hand, felt that the shock 
was the result of divine anger at the presence of certain Protestants in the 
town. The heretics were forcibly baptized and a splendid auto-da-fé was 
held, with a view to preventing further disaster.
Lisbon, too, like Gujarat and Nepal, boomed after the math of its 
destruction, and the new glory sat uneasily with the images of loss, 
wrath and human sacrifice that accompanied the initial news of the 
earthquake. The tugs and contradictions of the destruction and the pros-
perous aftermath detained some of the foremost thinkers of the age: 
Rousseau, Voltaire and Kant. They discussed the death of God, whether 
God’s design for the world was the best of all possible designs and, if so, 
what place there was for the terror and destruction of an earthquake. Is 
chance or fate the general principle of universal operation? Is death a 
greater evil when it strikes at many people simultaneously, rather than 
removing them at intervals?
Their thought shows that earthquakes shake certainties as well as 
foundations, and, therefore, they necessarily became part of the discus-
sions of theologians and philosophers. For the Christian theologians, 
earthquakes were instruments of fear, operating either as a routine and 
indiscriminate part of the divine order of things, or as divine instru-
ments of punishment, which could be distributed when appropriate. 
Consequently, not only in Europe, but in India and Nepal, aftermaths 
have often spawned the rise of new religious forms, as the beleaguered 
have become zealots, transforming their fear, guilt, trauma, ecstasy or 
rapture into improved forms of devotion or into ritualized apologies for 
their wrongdoings. In Bode’s Peru of the 1970s, the religious resurgence 
took the form of a battle between different currents of Christianity. The 
discussions that followed the Lisbon earthquake, although not restricted 
to that disaster by any means, marked another kind of critical shift and 
added momentum to thinking in the Enlightenment mode.
The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 broke Voltaire’s faith in the doctrine 
of ‘whatever is, is right’. In his first poem on the earthquake, he (1756) 
attacked the optimism represented by characters such as Pope: ‘come, 
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ye philosophers, who cry, “All’s well”, And contemplate this ruin of a 
world’.13 Voltaire mocked: whatever happened must have happened for 
the best of all possible reasons! In Lisbon, the heirs of the dead will ben-
efit financially; the building trade will enjoy a boom; animals will grow 
fat on meals provided by corpses trapped in the debris; an earthquake 
is a necessary effect of a necessary cause; private misfortune must not 
be overrated; an individual who is unlucky is contributing to the gen-
eral good. Is this the best of all possible worlds? Is there not as much evil 
in these sentiments – Voltaire asked – as in the earthquake itself? For 
Voltaire, man could not hope for a safe life with benevolent protection of 
Providence rewarding virtuous behaviour. The saddening truth is that we 
know nothing of our origin, purpose or destiny. Nature has no message 
for us. God does not speak. The bodies of men are made for decay and 
our minds for grief.
Rousseau was unhappy with Voltaire’s views on our fate. He said 
that at a personal level the optimism Voltaire attacked had helped him to 
endure the very things supposed to be unendurable. For Rousseau, man 
must recognize evil as the consequence of his own nature as well as that 
of the universe. A benevolent God desired to preserve man from evil, and 
of all the possible systems whereby God’s creation might be ordered, God 
had chosen the one that contained the least evil and the most good. Put 
bluntly, said Rousseau, the reason why God had not done better for man-
kind was that God could not do better. Rousseau maintained that moral 
evil originated in man himself, not God, and that, even though physical 
evil is a necessary part of the creation, the majority of physical evils are 
man’s own fault. According to him, it was not nature or God that had 
congregated 20,000 houses of six or seven storeys in Lisbon. If the inhab-
itants of the city had not lived in crowded and dangerous buildings, the 
damage would have been less. Had they left the city after the first shock, 
then they could have been saved. Instead, they stayed obstinately on the 
spot, worrying about their money and their possessions. For Rousseau, 
there was sociology in the disaster as well as theology and philosophy.
These lyrical discussions serve to show how earthquakes impose 
on the imagination in practical, sociological and philosophical registers. 
The philosopher sublimates the variegated doubts that an earthquake 
produces into a moment of epistemological, even theological, rupture. 
Is God dead, or is He simply incapable of catering for His worshippers? 
Is Evil a part of God or the unwanted offspring of humanity? In the same 
vein, we like to think, as the planner or the political leader embroiders 
narratives of blame and rehabilitation, and reassures the citizens who 
have been left to wonder about their future amidst rubble. In this sense, 
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the doubt and hope of the Enlightenment philosophers no longer seem 
so profound. Their thoughts are the stuff of teashop chat on the streets of 
South Asia. The earthquake, wherever it takes place, is an opportunity to 
take ownership of the story and to turn abstract thoughts into concrete 
realities. These doubts and hopes are those that allow for the implemen-
tation of new building codes, bureaucratic citizenship and the renaming 
of prominent public spaces after once-obscure figures in nationalist his-
tory. The oscillation between life and death also allows the governments 
of India and China to develop their influence within Nepal through the 
creation of infrastructure and supply chains.
Our discussions of events in South Asia have also shown how earth-
quakes break, disorient and bereave. They have also allowed for the 
formation of new policy landscapes, new forms of citizens and govern-
ments. Earthquakes are opportunities for those with the composure and 
gall to see them as such. The long drag and conclusion of processes in 
Gujarat contrasts with the contingency and immediacy that still animates 
Nepal. In Nepal, we have seen the opportunism of fleet-footed interna-
tional organizations seeking to make the world new.
Regime change and constitutional reform are not perhaps linked to 
earthquakes with any organic or scientific certainty. However, the fail-
ure of God, buildings and society to protect leads to the distinct sense 
of betrayal that comes with inevitable delays to post-earthquake recon-
struction. In both Nepal and Gujarat, dramatic changes to government 
occurred at about the same time as people had come to terms with what 
had happened to them and were beginning to understand what needed 
to be done in order to make things better. The urge to rebuild individual 
lives and houses thus clashed with the ideas and plans of those who could 
ease recovery. Out of the crisis of judgement, new forms of narrative fol-
lowed. Earthquakes allow for storytelling, and effective storytellers may 
find particularly receptive audiences given the conditions of particular 
uncertainty that earthquakes bring with them.
Notes
1. The edited works of Anthony Oliver-Smith and Susanna Hoffman (1999) and in reverse name 
order (2002) have been influential.
2. On syndromes and New Orleans see Adams et al. (2009).
3. This ascription of disaster-like qualities to the aftermath is commonly reported. The wave of 
aid in Sri Lanka was called the ‘second tsunami’, for example.
4. See, for example, Klein (1984) on famine relief and D’Souza (2006) on flood control in India.
5. Tirthankar Roy (2008) suggests that patterns of response during the period see the destruc-
tion of state capacity, which activates anarchic unregulated markets and private institutions, 
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until the state bounces back to take control. We see some resemblance of this pattern in Guja-
rat, with the additional influence of the international community and the partnership of state 
and private interests in reconstruction.
6. The Gujarat State Disaster Management Bill was passed as Act 20 of 2003. A national disaster 
management bill was passed in 2005.
7. Anthony Oliver-Smith (1986, 76) writing about the Peruvian earthquake and landslide of 
1970. Rebecca Solnit (2010) sees the moment of post-disaster disorientation as a possible 
source of new politics. While sympathetic with the sentiment, the nationalist and cultural 
chauvinism evident in Gujarat were probably not the forms of utopia Solnit had in mind.
8. For critical approaches to the ideology of bikas in Nepal, see Pigg (1992, 1996); Fujikura 
(2013); Heaton-Shrestha (2004).
9. World Bank (2018).
10. John Locke (1632–1704), the Scottish Enlightenment philosopher, thought humans were 
born without innate ideas, and that knowledge is instead determined only by experiences 
derived from sensual perception (see Baird and Kaufmann 2008).
11. Naomi Klein (2007, 25–48) outlines this theory in a chapter provocatively entitled ‘The Tor-
ture Lab: Ewen Cameron, the CIA and the Maniacal Quest to Erase and Remake the Human 
Mind’.
12. Recent historians such as Goldberg (1989), Larsen (2006), Paice (2008), Shrady (2008) and 
Wootton (2000) contribute to placing the earthquake and its debates in proper context. Ken-
drick (1955) remains the classic account of the English sources.
13. From Voltaire’s poem on the Lisbon disaster; or an examination of the axiom ‘All is well’ (see 
1988).
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Afterword: Some Reflections 
on Rupture
Joel Robbins
In keeping with the commitment to ethnographic complication rather 
than grand theorizing that marks the approach of this collection, I 
write this final reflection not to provide an overall synthetic reading 
of all the previous chapters, but rather to offer a few rather scattered 
thoughts on the notion of rupture. I come to this task as someone who 
has on the one hand been working at this topic for a long time (at least 
since an article published in 2003), but who on the other came to it 
not by the road marked ‘revolution’, but rather by the one named ‘con-
version’. At an abstract level, conversion is like revolution in that both 
are, at least in their fullest forms, processes of change undertaken in 
light of a story about how such change can work. That is to say, both 
are kinds of transformations rooted in cultural models of cultural rup-
ture – in models, to borrow terms from Caroline Humphrey’s chapter 
in this volume, that specify things to ‘break from’ as well as things to 
‘break toward’. Based in part on this similarity between revolution and 
conversion, there has been in the recent past, albeit fading a bit now, 
some movement toward erasing the distinction between these two 
paths to rupture, particularly on the part of continental thinkers such 
as Žižek (2003), Badiou (2003) and Agamben (2005). These figures, 
generally considered closer to political philosophy than to theology 
or other forms of religious thought, have taken St Paul’s sudden and 
thorough conversion as a possible model for revolutionary process (see 
also Robbins 2010; Robbins and Engelke 2010). I hope that the similar-
ities between revolution and conversion, along with this recent move 
toward holding these two types of change together, might mean that my 
reflections in what follows will be relevant to those interested in both 
kinds of rupture. Yet it will remain the case that even as I start with a 
brief discussion of one important work on revolution, I will focus my 
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remarks mostly on some new developments in thinking about Christian 
conversion as a process of rupture.
My primary interest is in rupture considered as cultural process – 
that is to say, I am inclined to ask how ruptures in social life can arise 
out of conceptual resources shared by the people who experience or 
create them. It is this concern that motivates the observation I made in 
my opening remark that both conversion and revolution are changes 
undertaken in the light of stories about or models of change. One can, 
of course, imagine kinds of rupture that affect cultural and social life but 
do not arise from within it, situations of change in which people are sim-
ply overtaken by events or phenomena they neither find they can readily 
understand nor attempt to direct. But I want to set those kinds of rup-
tures aside to consider instead radical breaks that people bring about at 
least in part by deploying culturally meaningful tools.
An argument for rupture as culturally driven cultural change is eas-
ier to assert than it is to really work through, for in theoretical terms it 
is not as simple as one might imagine to construe rupture as a cultural 
process. This is so because culture is generally taken almost by defini-
tion to be, and in fact often is, a force for its own reproduction (Robbins 
2007). Defined as structure or tradition, culture is all about steering social 
action along well-worn grooves, and this means rupture ought not to be 
part of its modus operandi. This is one of several reasons many contem-
porary anthropologists do not want to have anything to do with culture, 
being more interested in what the editors, in their introduction, describe 
as vitalist or life-affirming conceptualizations of human being that find 
notions of well-worn grooves, social forms or structures of any kind to be 
misguided at best and pernicious at worst. From this point of view, as the 
pioneering electronic composer Edgard Varèse put it, ‘tradition is simply 
a bad habit’ (cited in Stubbs 2018, 64). But I would argue that if we do 
not posit culture or some other force that pushes for reproduction, rup-
ture itself becomes uninteresting – just the norm, or at most little more 
than a fancy name for an increase in the scale of processes of change that 
are always under way. To put this another way, vitalist or immanentist 
anthropologies, with their strong commitment to nominalist views of the 
world, render the question of rupture or change generally moot, since 
nothing ever stays the same in any case. To keep rupture firmly in focus, 
then, I propose to hang on to some conception of culture – a conception 
that sees it as a mechanism mostly of order and reproduction – and then 
try to account for how culture so conceived can sometimes foster radical 
change by means of processes that are not outside or in excess of culture, 
but are rather themselves cultural.
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One hypothesis I want to explore is that if any given case of rupture 
is to be seen as a result of cultural processes, then it will need to involve at 
least in part shared conceptualizations of rupture itself. On this account, 
only cultures of rupture, or cultures that at least conceive of the possi-
bility of rupture, produce ruptures that are culturally meaningful and of 
real interest to the people involved in them. This is a strong assertion, 
and I am more than willing to be wrong about it. But I want to float it here 
and see how far it might be able to take us.
The thought of a number of scholars has inspired this claim, most 
importantly Marshall Sahlins, whose work I have discussed in related 
terms elsewhere (Robbins 2016). But to launch my argument here, I 
turn first to another scholar strongly influenced by Sahlins, the histo-
rian William Sewell (1996). Writing of ‘events’ rather than the narrower 
notion of rupture (narrower not in terms of its purported effects, but 
only in the sense that revolutions might be seen as a subcategory of the 
broader category of event), Sewell insists in terms very close to my own 
‘that social relations are profoundly governed by underlying social and 
cultural structures and that a proper understanding of the role of events 
in history must be founded on a concept of structure’ (1996, 842). In the 
superb 1996 article from which this quotation is taken, ‘Historical Events 
as Transformations of Structures: Inventing Revolution at the Bastille’, 
Sewell exemplifies his approach by considering a key event of the French 
Revolution. The taking of the Bastille on 11 July 1789, Sewell argues, was 
in the conception of the actors who undertook it no more than an effort to 
secure gunpowder stored in the former fortress so that they could better 
resist Louis XVI’s attempt to retake Paris by military force. In its initial 
performance, it was not an event in the strong, socially transformative 
sense Sewell reserves for this term, but rather a familiar form of pop-
ular contention. It was only in the days that followed that the General 
Assembly transformed the taking of the Bastille into an event, a feat they 
accomplished by working out a cultural model of revolution as ‘a rising 
of the sovereign people whose justified violence imposed a new political 
system on the nation’ and then applying it to what had transpired (1996, 
859). Initially applied retrospectively, this new notion of revolution 
immediately began to do prospective work by encouraging further radi-
cal transformation of French social life, and in time of course it became a 
shared cultural model for similar practices of cultural rupture the world 
over; or, as Reinhart Koselleck (2004, 50) puts it in an analysis that cov-
ers ground similar to that covered by Sewell, it ‘became a metahistorical 
concept … charged with ordering historically recurrent convulsive expe-
riences’ (emphasis in original). Inasmuch as it was the development and 
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rapid cultural diffusion of the very notion of ‘revolution’ itself during the 
heat of the events of mid-July 1989 that pushed forward the rupture that 
became known as the French Revolution, one must accept that it was pre-
cisely the development and diffusion of a new cultural model of change 
that allowed for the production of a major rupture in French culture and 
social life, not some acultural force.
I find Sewell’s article enormously helpful in thinking about rupture 
as a cultural process, but as I have already noted I came to an interest 
in rupture and discontinuity not through the study of revolutions, but 
rather by way of an interest in Christian conversion. It is to this topic 
I now want to return in an effort to explore some aspects of Christian 
notions of rupture that I think anthropologists (myself included) have 
neglected in the past. I hope that in doing so I might raise some more gen-
eral questions about a few of the less remarked upon aspects of rupture 
as a cultural process.
Before launching into a broad argument about the nature of Christian 
notions of rupture, it might be useful very briefly to summarize the ethno-
graphic experience that brought me to this topic in the first place. In the 
early 1990s, I carried out fieldwork among the Urapmin of Papua New 
Guinea. Only a little over a decade before I arrived in Urapmin, all of the 
adult members of the community had converted to a charismatic, spir-
it-filled form of Christianity in the midst of a revival movement that was 
then moving through their country. People in Urapmin consistently and 
frequently insist that their conversion changed their lives dramatically. 
As they often say when discussing aspects of their lives that were impor-
tant before revival but are not any more, ‘that was before, this is now’. 
And the list of things that were important to them before their conversion 
but not after it is long, attesting to the extent to which the revival did in 
fact count as a major rupture in their lives. Thus, for example, Urapmin 
no longer think their ancestors created the human world in which they 
dwell, and they no longer practise any of the many rituals directed at 
these ancestors. The cult houses in which Urapmin men used to prac-
tise such rituals have been torn down, and the paraphernalia involved in 
these rites, including the bones of the ancestors themselves, have been, 
as people put it, ‘thrown out’. More than this, the complex system of 
taboos that used to govern who could eat what and that strictly regulated 
contact between the sexes is gone. Now, the Urapmin say, using a phrase 
borrowed from English, is ‘free time’: because God made everything and 
gave it to his children, people can eat whatever they want. And women 
and men no longer sleep in separate houses or walk on different paths 
through the community – they can be together all the time now if they 
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want to be. All of this has changed, Urapmin say, because to follow any 
of the ancestral rules or customs is to live in a way that God does not 
approve – it is to sin. For a group of people strongly focused on follow-
ing God’s ‘law’ in order to reach heaven, it has been morally necessary 
to bring about these major ruptures in their social life in order to come 
into compliance with His commands, and the Urapmin are glad they have 
done so.
So far, so much rupture as straightforward radical discontinuity 
with the past. This is indeed how Urapmin talk about their conversion, 
and as I tried to suggest above, they are able to marshal plenty of evi-
dence for a reading of their past framed in these wholly transformative 
terms. If you push the Urapmin to name anything traditional that might 
still matter to them and count as good, they will sometimes say that they 
still build houses mostly as they did before, and that these houses are 
good; and they will add that so are their gardens, which, though now 
watched over by God and not the ancestors, also look pretty much the 
same. But they are not inclined to expand the list of enduring and good 
traditional things much beyond these few items. On the surface, their 
model of rupture is one that holds out complete abandonment of tra-
ditional culture as the ideal; to quote Kirk Dombrowski (2001) writing 
about Native American charismatics in Alaska – Urapmin Christianity ini-
tially appears quite thoroughly to be a culture ‘against culture’.
In a complicated way I will come back to later, I think the Urapmin 
are right in the way they understand the model of rupture at the heart 
of their Christianity as a matter of radically changing everything. But to 
understand the complication involved, it is best to start with some ways 
in which one might imagine that on the face of things Urapmin asser-
tions are wrong about the kind of change Urapmin converts have actually 
accomplished. There are at least two major elements of Urapmin life in 
the early 1990s that might lead us to this conclusion. I have written about 
both in great detail elsewhere, so I will just mention them here. The first 
is that the morality that guides most of Urapmin social interaction is still 
much as it was before, despite the fact that this morality conflicts with 
the Christian moral understandings that are central to Urapmin religious 
thinking and that people regularly proclaim should govern everything 
that they do. In my book Becoming Sinners I argue that it is this conflict 
between their traditional and their Christian moral systems that accounts 
for people’s deeply felt conviction that they are sinful (Robbins 2004). 
The second piece of evidence that not all vestiges of the past except 
houses and gardens are gone is that the Urapmin still believe all illnesses 
are caused by nature spirits, and they sometimes still practise modified 
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forms of traditional sacrifice to these spirits in order to heal the afflicted. 
Urapmin are reluctant to practise these sacrifices, but nonetheless they 
do occasionally resort to them. I have in other places analysed these 
sacrifices and the controversy among the Urapmin that surrounds their 
practice in relation to the first point I made about lingering aspects of 
traditional Urapmin culture, for it is possible to see the sacrifices as exem-
plifications of the tenets of traditional Urapmin morality (Robbins 2009). 
But I do not need to rehearse that argument here. For present purposes, 
I merely want to note the continued existence of these two important 
elements of traditional Urapmin culture in the Urapmin Christian era in 
order to pose the questions of what their presence means for our under-
standing of the Christian model of rupture the Urapmin promulgate and 
for our judgement of their own success in living in the light of that model.
To answer these questions, I want to step back from the Urapmin 
for now and consider some recent work on Christian models of rupture 
more generally that reveal it to be more subtle than our first interpreta-
tion of the Urapmin version would lead us to believe. French historian 
Rémi Brague (2002, 54) notes that Christianity is at its core a religion 
of ‘secondarity’ – one that understands itself as appearing in the wake 
of a prior religion with which it has a complex relationship that is not 
in any simple terms one only of rejection. Christianity, after all, never 
wholly rejected the Jewish Tenakh, instead incorporating a version of 
it as its own ‘Old Testament’ and therefore requiring that its followers 
always have some or other understanding of Christianity’s relationship 
with the religion that preceded it. In situations in which converts have 
had little contact with Christianity before, it is evident that part of what 
makes Christianity attractive to them is the way its self-conscious sec-
ondarity leads it to acknowledge that converts start from somewhere else 
and must forever negotiate a relationship with that origin. The demand 
that Christianity as a religion of secondarity sets up for such negotiation 
is a key feature of Christian models of rupture.
Along with Brague’s model of Christian secondarity, there is also 
another, closely related, aspect of Christianity that drives forward pro-
cesses of cultural rupture and gives them a distinctive Christian shape. 
The work of the theologian Katherine Tanner (1997, 97) is useful in 
laying this out. She argues that Christianity rarely attempts to construct 
an entire culture or create a whole society in its own terms. Instead, she 
notes, ‘The majority view in Christianity for most of its history never 
favored efforts to make Christian social practices into the sort of group 
that modern anthropologists would think of as possessing its own way 
of life.’ For this reason, she goes on to assert, Christians have often 
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participated in the ‘educational, economic, familial … [and] political’ 
institutions of the wider societies of which they have been a part (see also 
Brague 2002, 160–5). This point is helpful, for as with Brague, Tanner 
helps us to see why the existence of ‘pre-Christian’ or not wholly Christian 
aspects of a culture may not stand as evidence of the incomplete applica-
tion of the cultural model of rupture that Christianity installs, but instead 
as fulfilments of it.
But Tanner does not end her argument on the point that Christian 
ruptures tend to leave some aspects of social life as they are. After making 
this claim, she develops the argument that Christians do not generally 
relate to these prior or non-Christian institutions in a manner of straight-
forward acceptance. Rather, in the spirit of Brague’s continual negotia-
tions between forms of Christianity and the older cultures they do not 
wholly discard, Tanner (1997, 116) suggests that Christians ‘trope’ on the 
prior social forms that endure in their lives, giving them new Christian 
meanings or otherwise bringing them in line with Christian concerns 
(1997, 116). This point brings her work into line with some of the best 
recent anthropological work on Christian rupture.
Consider, in this regard, Simon Coleman’s (2006, 3) argument 
that at least some forms of Christianity, and Pentecostal and charis-
matic Christianity in particular, take the form of ‘part cultures’ that are 
designed so as to be able to relate to other cultures with which they come 
into contact not by endeavouring to replace them wholesale, but by com-
ing into ‘tension’ with their values. Making a related point, Courtney 
Handman (2015) has argued that Christianity is a religion that tends to 
promote criticism of past and current social and religious practice to a 
central place in the lives of its adherents. This fact is responsible for the 
tendency of some of Christianity’s forms to over and over again produce 
the ruptures we call schisms, even as in less dramatic cases this sacralized 
critical impulse keeps up the kinds of tensions between Christianity and 
aspects of the world it is breaking from that suggest that no rupture ever 
quite completes its work of making that world wholly anew.
Drawing on the work of Handman, Coleman, Tanner and Brague, 
we might say that Christianity is a religion that is inclined to create what 
we might usefully call duplex cultural formations. These are formations 
in which converts do not in fact completely discard their traditional cul-
tures, or even transform all of their parts in ways that lead them to be 
unrecognizable in relation to their previous forms, but are rather ones 
in which Christians are enjoined constantly to take an evaluative posi-
tion with regard to their previous traditions. In a recent book on Navajo 
Pentecostalism entitled Upward, Not Sunwise that stands as the most 
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sophisticated recent anthropological interrogation of Christian notions 
of rupture that I have read, Kimberly Marshall (2016) adds a final, impor-
tant, moving part to the Christian model of rupture as I have been laying 
it out here. An ethnomusicologist as well as an anthropologist, Marshall 
does this by arguing in detail that Christianity works by means of estab-
lishing what she calls ‘resonant ruptures’. These are cultural formations 
in which, as in musical resonance, some vibrations amplify others with-
out becoming identical to them (2016, 15). In cases of Christian rupture, 
this means that Christian forms resonate with older ones in ways that 
do not erase them, even as they assert dominance over them. This hap-
pens, for example, in the cases of both Urapmin traditional morality and 
sacrifice to the nature spirits – forms that are sometimes highlighted in 
Urapmin consciousness because of their entanglement with Christian 
concerns, but that are never able to reassert the taken-for-granted status 
they once had. The point that Marshall (2016, 8) makes, and that I am 
keen to borrow here, is that this kind of ‘complicated nexus of continuity 
and rupture’ does not mark cases in which Christian notions of rupture 
have failed to fully realize themselves. They are, rather, precisely the kind 
of enduringly dynamic kinds of ruptures Christianity aims to produce. It 
is because the Urapmin are fully caught up in just this kind of dynamism, 
a kind of dynamism that is captured in similar ways in all of the models 
of Christian rupture I have been discussing, that they are right to say that 
their conversion has changed everything about the way they live; noth-
ing is left as it was, at the very least the ways Urapmin evaluate all aspects 
of their lives has changed; but this does not mean that no elements of 
their tradition are in any respect present in their lives. Tobia Farnetti, 
in his chapter on the lives of Japanese Catholics in this volume, offers a 
portrait of different version of these same kinds of dynamics, one that at 
once indicates how diverse they can be in practice and how recognizable 
they remain as species of a broader genus of Christian rupture.
What I have aimed to lay out here is a model of Christian rupture 
that on the one hand expects it to set up duplex cultural formations 
in which parts of the cultures from which people break remain in play 
even whilst they also remain in tension with the converts’ new Christian 
understandings, and that on the other hand thrives on the energy these 
tensions produce, making of rupture a continuing ideal rather than a 
settled accomplishment. It is this kind of enduring impetus to continu-
ally work toward rupture that some Christians capture in such slogans as 
‘reformed and always reforming’ or ‘God has no Grandchildren’ (i.e. each 
person and each generation has to experience the Christian rupture for 
themselves – it is an experience that cannot be inherited). My suggestion 
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is that these kinds of dynamics are also in play in many changes guided by 
cultural models of revolution, beset as they are by the temptation to put 
new purifying measures in play in the wake of their initial success. But 
others will be more competent than I am to cash this point out empirically.
Among the many reasons that scholars are not always quick to 
group Christian conversion and revolution together as kinds of rupture, 
and this even in the wake of the recently flagging vogue for doing so in 
some corners of continental thought, is that in many times and places, 
and often as a matter of theological principle, Christian ruptures are 
seen by converts as involving individuals in the first and ultimately most 
important instance, while most scholars assume that revolutions are by 
nature collective (at least if they are those that succeed in driving radical 
change). Indeed, it is a bit of a critical cliché amongst politically minded 
secular thinkers that Christian conversion is ultimately quietest because 
it focuses only on individual change, and when Christians respond to this 
charge by asserting that making changes within individuals is the only 
way to change society more broadly, these same thinkers are inclined to 
feel that they are misguided. The Urapmin case I discussed above, which 
features a group of socially related people all undergoing individual con-
versions within a short span of time, and which also features the adop-
tion of a version of Christianity that itself possesses a strong model of 
cultural change, somewhat sidesteps this issue in a way not all cases of 
conversion do. Situations such as that of the Danish Lutheran movement 
discussed by Morten Pedersen in his chapter in this volume fit the stere-
otype more closely and are perhaps more common. In this case the indi-
vidual, personal and subjective nature of conversion and of ongoing faith 
is self-consciously crucial for participants’ understandings of both their 
religious and their political lives in ways that point in a direction other 
than that of work toward radical social or cultural transformation (see 
also Bialecki 2009).
The recognition of tensions between conflicting evaluations of per-
sonal and cultural ruptures in some kinds of Christianity sets up a host 
of new questions for research in the study of change. Nicholas Lackenby 
(n.d.), who has worked with strongly committed and engaged Orthodox 
Christians in Serbia, has explored some of these questions in seeking to 
give strong personal senses of rupture their due in a situation in which 
people understand themselves to be transforming their lives by returning 
to an ancestral religion marked by a strong commitment to continuity. 
The study of the revival of Orthodox Christianity in post-socialist times 
more generally raises issues of the concatenation of rupture and conti-
nuity across the personal–social boundary with great clarity because, 
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at least within the anthropology of Christianity, the Orthodox tradi-
tion, along with Catholicism, has often been held up as exemplary of 
forms of Christianity that do not value rupture (Hann and Goltz 2010, 
see Freeman 2017 for a review). Yet as Timothy Carroll (2017) nicely 
argues, there are serious limitations to the image of Orthodoxy as mono-
lithically committed to continuity. This makes this tradition an excellent 
place to explore how personally experienced ruptures, whether as part of 
a ‘return’ to a religion that one never really practised before, as Lackenby 
explores, or by taking part in the disruptive presencing of the transcend-
ent in Orthodox liturgy, as Carroll documents, intersect with a simultane-
ous investment in the continuity of what Lackenby calls the ‘overarching 
historico-religious tradition’.
The question of how subjective experiences of rupture relate to 
broader movements either of rupture or continuity also raises a press-
ing problem for any theory of radical cultural change: how do personal 
desires for or commitments to change ever become effective cultural 
projects? This question besets discussions of revolution as much or more 
than it does those of conversion. In an important recent discussion of 
rupture in the anthropological literature on Christianity, Dena Freeman 
(2017) has begun to explore one potential answer to this question that 
is rooted in the relationship between the impetus provided by religious 
models of change and the practical openings to transformation afforded 
by people’s political and economic situations. My goal here is not to eval-
uate her argument, but just to note that, along with work like Lackenby’s, 
it indicates the extent to which a more nuanced understanding of the 
personal side of rupture could help us develop better answers than we 
have been able to offer in the past to the question of how personal and 
broader social and cultural ruptures relate to one another.
The matter of rupture as profoundly felt personal experience – of the 
undoubted presence of Pauline moments of intense personal  disruption 
in some person’s encounters with Christian or revolutionary models of 
change – suggests a perhaps unexpected connection between the study of 
rupture and another topic of broad contemporary concern within anthro-
pology and the human sciences more generally. I have in mind here the 
study of trauma as the negative experience of the disruption of one’s life 
and thought by the appearance within them of unassimilable phenomena 
that are often but perhaps not always violently imposed (Das 2007 is an 
already classic discussion; see Robbins 2013 for a brief review of some 
other important contributions to the literature on this topic). Revolution 
and conversion have in common with trauma the quality of constituting 
a life-altering force, and in neither are experiences of violence always 
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absent as the old life is made to give way in the face of the new. The pres-
ence of these similarities leads us to the question of how it is possible to 
understand these two phenomena of rupture as different from trauma. 
This is a question that requires an answer if the study of conversion and 
revolution is not to become simply a subset of a broader investigation in 
which trauma is taken to be the kernel of all disruptive experience.
My own sense of this issue, and the brief sketch of an approach to 
it I will offer here, comes out of some recent reading in theology. The 
prominent German Lutheran theologian Eberhard Jüngel, who grew 
up in what became East Germany and taught there before moving to 
Switzerland and then, after German reunification, to West Germany, has 
lived through more than his share of radical changes. Perhaps drawing 
on his own background, and certainly drawing on the Lutheran tradition, 
he reckons Christianity as a religion based upon experiences of what he 
calls ‘interruption’, a phenomenon that fosters an ‘experience with expe-
rience’ that leads those who undergo it to re-evaluate all of the under-
standings that have previously constituted their lives. He is not alone 
in linking Christianity and religious experience more generally to inter-
ruption – indeed another prominent German theologian, in this case a 
Catholic, once offered ‘interruption’ as ‘the shortest definition of religion’ 
(Metz 2007, 158; see also Boeve 2007; Hart 2001). But Jüngel stands 
out for our purposes for having asked a necessary follow-up question to 
such a definition of interruption: what is it that distinguishes Christian 
interruptions from other kinds?
Jüngel answers that question by asserting that the Christian inter-
ruption is unique because it ‘has the peculiarity of interrupting human 
experience unequivocally to its benefit’ (Jüngel 2014, 209; original 
emphasis). For Jüngel, the Christian interruption is peculiar in this way 
because it is caused by the Christian God. In the terms in which he offers 
this explanation, it is unlikely to satisfy the demands of the kind of sec-
ular social scientific and humanistic thought that has shaped this collec-
tion (and that has shaped my own reflections here as well). But he may 
nonetheless point us in a fruitful direction that can also be explored in 
those terms. A younger theologian from the United States, Kevin Hector 
(2015), gets us closer to these terms when he argues that modern the-
ology (a lineage that for him runs from Kant through Schleiermacher 
and Hegel to more recent figures such as Tillich) has been preoccupied 
with answering the question of what he calls ‘mineness’: this is the 
question of how it is that individual human beings – beings that are 
not themselves the most potent force in the universe or even in their 
own lives – can claim as their own and integrate into their senses of 
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themselves  experiences that profoundly interrupt them (he does not 
use Jüngel’s term or cite him, but something like interruption is a fair 
gloss on the kinds of experiences he has in mind). On Hector’s account, 
the philosophers and theologians he treats offer different answers to 
this question, all of which turn on some notion of ‘faith’ as a trust in 
the beneficial potential of disruptions that one experiences. This need 
not be faith in God per se, but only in the ability of radical disruption to 
improve one’s life in its wake.
I think there is a lesson in Jüngel’s and Hector’s writings about how 
the possession of the kind of self-conscious models of change I have been 
discussing – models such as those of conversion and revolution – allow 
people to trust in the benign potential of changes they participate in 
bringing about but do not alone fully control. Put otherwise, having such 
models at hand allows people to have experiences of radical rupture that 
do not traumatize them. Such experiences do not confront people, as 
Jüngel (2014, 207) puts it, with the threat of the ‘non-being’ of the older 
self that is being transformed, but instead solicit their active engagement 
in change and by doing so become parts of that self’s own life-projects. 
This quality of mineness that is critical to conversion and revolution as 
forms of practice is thus at least one key feature that sets them apart from 
many other types of change that people experience, including those that 
are traumatic in the currently accepted sense.
I have come to the end of my remarks. I know that I rest my argu-
ment here leaving many questions unanswered. Some of these may be 
theoretically consequential. For example, it is fair to ask where new cul-
tural models of rupture come from, and if they themselves might have 
acultural causes (arising, for example, out of genuinely unprecedented 
experiences). There are some hints about this as regards the notion of 
revolution in Sewell’s (1996) work and in Larry Hurtado’s (1998) study 
of Christian origins, where he offers a theory of the advent of Christianity 
as a new religion that also looks to acultural causes to explain the rise of 
new Christian models of change. It is at least arguable that even models 
of rupture that have their own origins outside culture only become effec-
tive forces for change when they themselves achieve cultural status, and 
this would preserve the value of some of the arguments I have made here. 
But it is clear that these issues need further investigation.
A second important question I regrettably have to tackle in the same 
absurdly limited way is that of whether a culture of rupture – that is to 
say a culture that gives one or more models of rupture a central place in 
its conceptions of social life – is only working out its own reproduction 
when it generates ruptures that follow the lines its own models set out. 
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When cultures that are heirs to cultural models of revolution undergo 
revolutionary transformation, should this count as a rupture or is it just 
more of the same? If we answer that it is a rupture, then we might have 
to say that cultural processes of rupture by their very nature count sim-
ply as performative contradictions – claims to foster something new that 
are themselves nothing more than routine. I do not think this argument 
should rest here, but I will leave figuring out how to get beyond this posi-
tion for another time.
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